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Abstract
This thesis is a technical inquiry into remedies for high inflation. In its center there
is the usual tradeoff between inflation aversion on the one hand and some benefit
from inflation via Phillips curve effects on the other hand. Most remarkable and
pioneering work for us is the famous Barro-Gordon model - see (Barro & Gordon
1983a) respectively (Barro & Gordon 1983b). Parts of this model form the basis of
our work here. Though being well known the discretionary equilibrium is suboptimal
the question arises how to overcome this. We will introduce four different models,
each of them giving a different perspective and way of thinking. Each model shows
a (sometimes slightly) different way a central banker might deliver lower inflation
than the one shot Barro-Gordon game at a first glance would suggest. To cut a long
story short we provide a number of reasons for believing that the purely discretionary
equilibrium may be rarely observed in real life.
Further the thesis provides new insights for derivative pricing theories. In partic-
ular, the potential role of financial markets and instruments will be a major focus.
We investigate how such instruments can be used for monetary policy. On the con-
trary these financial securities have strong influence on the behavior of the central
bank. Taking this into account in chapters 3 and 4 we come up with a new method of
pricing inflation linked derivatives. The latter to the best of our knowledge has never
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been done before - (Persson, Persson & Svenson 2006), as one of very view economic
works taking into account financial markets, is purely focused on the social planer’s
problem.
A purely game theoretic approach is done in chapter 2 to change the original
Barro-Gordon. Here we deviate from a purely rational and purely one period wise
thinking. Finally in chapter 5 we model an asymmetric information situation where
the central banker faces a trade off between his current objective on the one hand
and benefit arising from not perfectly informed agents on the other hand. In that
sense the central bank is also concerned about its reputation.
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Introduction
In most of the existing economic literature monetary policy is considered as a pow-
erful tool by which a government or central bank may influence the economy of a
country. In a lot of countries (e.g. the USA or the UK) extensive use arguably is
made of monetary policy to stabilize the economy. Nevertheless, this can also cause
problems and suboptimal equilibria making other countries fairly restrictive in its
use - most remarkable the Euro-Zone countries or Switzerland. Monetary policy has
been discussed in many macroeconomic investigations by use of various techniques,
models and assumptions. Basically there are three major questions:
• Should monetary policy be used as a tool at all?
• What is a good monetary policy?
• How can actual monetary policy be explained?
How one answers these questions depends on the economic school to which one
belongs. For instance according to monetarists in the long run there is no welfare
coming from monetary expansions due to their believe in the neutrality of money - see
e.g. (Maier 1978) or (Bennett 2005). Further Real Business Cycle theory denies any
effect even in the short run due to its deep trust in real effects. Traditional Keynesian
1
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theory on the other hand tends to believe in some welfare due to a monetary expansion
- even in the long run - see e.g. (Samuelson & Solow 1960). Before going more into
detail, even with more schools of economists we should first say what we mean by
monetary policy.
I.1 What is Monetary Policy? What is Inflation?
The term monetary policy is strongly connected with terms like money supply or
inflation. Typically central banks have the power over the money circulating in an
economy. Since going off gold standard in most economies the central bank has direct
control over the money supply (i.e. the actual amount of paper money and book
money). Along with the money circulating there are goods which can be purchased
with money. Obviously the ratio of goods and money has a direct consequence on
the price of a particular piece of good. Intuitively an increase in the money supply
without a corresponding increase in the amount of goods will cause an increase in
prices of goods. Inflation then is a sustained rise in the general or average level
of prices. Since the central bank has the power over the money supply it has also
control over inflation via the mechanism just described. Another factor is so called
velocity. That is the speed by which the money circulates. The higher the velocity
the more often a particular good (e.g. a used car) can be purchased by the same
bank notes - of course this is only true in some statistical average sense. However
this increases the virtual amount of money in relation to a certain number of goods.
Therefore a sustained increase in velocity may also lead to inflation - here we should
refer to the quantitative theory of money. A central bank might be able to see such
(e.g. exogenously caused) changes in velocity and act accordingly. In that sense by
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monetary policy we should mean the way a central bank controls the money supply.
In a wider sense we also mean the way the central bank controls the actual inflation
rate.
For the remainder of the thesis we should agree on the term inflation. When
reading newspapers or watching TV we usually see some percentage numbers like:
Last years inflation was 5%. What does 5% mean? The most intuitive interpretation
is that of a percentage change over the period:
pi :=
PT − P0
P0
,
where Pt denotes some aggregate price level at time t and pi is our notation for
inflation. However this definition lacks some desired properties. For instance by this
definition inflation is bounded from below by −1 - at least if we do not want to
consider a possible negative price level! Hence for the rest of the thesis we want to
agree on a definition of inflation as a rate:
Definition I.1.1 For some finite time interval [S, T ] the accumulated inflation (rate)
is a number pi[S,T ] such that
PT = PSe
pi[S,T ] ,
where PT and PS denote the price level at time T and S respectively. Obviously one
has pi[t,t] = 0. Furthermore by the actual inflation (rate) at time t we mean
pit :=
1
Pt
∂Pt
∂t
= lim
s→0
1
Pt
Pt+s − Pt
s
= lim
s→0
epi[t,t+s] − epi[t,t]
s
=
∂epi[t,t+s]
∂s
|s=0.
=
∂pi[t,t+s]
∂s
|s=0epi[t,t] = ∂pi[t,t+s]
∂s
|s=0.
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In that sense accumulated inflation is the time integral over actual inflation:
pi[S,T ] =
∫ T
S
pitdt.
Last but not least we should also define the average inflation
p˜i[S,T ] :=
1
[T − S]pi[S,T ] =
1
T − S
∫ T
S
pitdt.
Remark I.1.2 (Deflation and Disinflation) Note, in principle any kind of the
above defined inflation (rates) can be negative. In that case the term deflation is used.
However this is very rarely observed in practice and not important for the remainder
of the thesis. In contrast to that the term disinflation describes a shrinking, but (in
general) still positive (actual) inflation rate.
Most important for our purposes will be the actual inflation rate such as the accumu-
lated inflation rate. The latter obviously is the natural choice whenever we deal with
discrete time models like in Chapter 2 and 4. For notational simplicity then we will
also write pit for pi[t,t+∆t]! Here ∆t denotes the discrete time step in the underlying
model - i.e. the period length - e.g. one year or one business cycle. Alternatively one
can think of pit respectively pi as the average inflation rate for some time interval. In
that case pi∆t equals the accumulated inflation rate for a period of length ∆t. The
latter is what we particularly use for chapter 4.
I.2 The Phillips Curve
So far we have assumed that the central bank can somehow control the inflation
rate. To answer each of the questions from the beginning first we should ask what is
the welfare following from inflation. A priori there seems to be disutility caused by
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inflation - e.g. the money households save is diminishing in value (in terms of goods).
Hence it seems to be optimal to have a negative inflation. On the other hand inflation
provides welfare to those holding mortgages etc. Further it should be a policymakers
premise to weight out such contradicting interests and to provide a stable regime.
Hence a stable inflation rate (most often authors claim zero inflation) should be
the goal. Further welfare coming from inflation was first discovered by the New
Zealand born economist Alban William Phillips. In his famous paper (Phillips 1958)
he found the so called Phillips curve. This article was just an empirical work finding a
relationship between inflation on the one hand and unemployment on the other hand.
In particular he found that from 1861-1957 (in Great Britain) inflation was negatively
correlated with unemployment. He himself did not intend to develop any economic
theory based on his observations. This for the first time was done in (Samuelson &
Solow 1960) putting an explicit link: When inflation was high, unemployment was
low and vice-versa.
Meanwhile due to further research and observations a number of versions of the
Phillips curve have emerged in various strands of the literature.
I.2.1 The Monetaristi Phillips Curve
Monetaristi theory today is most associated with Nobel prize winner Milton Fried-
man and Anna Schwartz in English speaking countries and Karl Brunner in German
speaking countries. Modern Monetarism has its roots in the quantity theory of money
with its simple but fundamental equation
MV = PY.
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Here M denotes the money supply as controlled by the central bank, V is the velocity,
P is the price level and Y is aggregate output of the economy. It is characteristic for
monetarists to believe in the primary importance of the money supply in determining
nominal income - money matters. This is often coupled with a minor role for velocity,
which typically is assumed as almost constant - see e.g. (Friedman & Schwartz 1963).
Another key implication of monetarism is the so called neutrality of money. There-
fore Friedman, Brunner and the others criticize the Keynesian idea of the Philips
curve. They argue monetary and fiscal policy (in the long run) are able to influ-
ence inflation (a nominal variable) but not output or the rate of unemployment (real
variables). This leads to one of the most simple forms of the Phillips curve. For
the long run Friedman and the others deny any relationship between inflation and
unemployment, as Phillip’s empirical work suggests. In particular monetarists claim
a vertical line in a diagram where unemployment is on the x-axis and inflation is on
the y-axis. This (according to monetarism - in contrast to real business cycle theory)
is only true for the long run - see (Bennett 2005).
This is in contrast to Keynesian theory (see Figure I.1) which provides an expla-
nation and justification for a non vertical line. However monetarists here criticize
that the (initial) Keynesian long run Phillips curve (as given in e.g. (Samuelson &
Solow 1960)) does not take peoples’ expectations of inflation into account. According
to (Friedman 1968) or (Phelps 1968) individuals will start anticipating the inflation
rate more or less correctly due to an adaptive learning strategy. In the long run
this will negate the effects on output and unemployment of money growth traditional
Keynesian theory predicts. In the next subsection we will see how the traditional
Keynesian Phillips curve argument works.
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I.2.2 The Traditional Keynesian Phillips Curve and its Mod-
ifications
Following Phillips’ paper in 1958 it was commonly believed there is a permanently
stable inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation. Hence unemploy-
ment could be controlled by the government respectively by the central bank via
setting an appropriate inflation rate. In particular monetary policy then was consid-
ered as choosing some trade-off between reasonably high inflation on the one hand
and reasonably low unemployment on the other hand. Most famous here is a state-
ment by the former German Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt: Lieber 5% Inflation als
5% Arbeitslosigkeit! - Better to have 5% inflation instead of 5% unemployment!.
The Keynesian (also referred to as the traditional) Phillips curve has two main
underlying stories, the wage-setting story and the pricing story. Over the years
there have occurred several changes and modifications to the curve. The following
is mainly taken from (Blanchard 2008): Let Wt denote nominal wages at time t and
wt := log(Wt). As pit according to Definition I.1.1 is a measure for the growth of the
price level Pt so is wt a measure of growth for nominal wages Wt. The basic model
tells us:
wt = w
∗
t − f(Ut), (I.1)
where w∗t denotes some initially given trend rate of nominal wage growth and Ut
denotes the unemployment rate. Furthermore f is a monotonically increasing function
in U with f(0) = 0 - a typical example would be f(Ut) = αUt. In particular we
can see that an increase in wages is negatively correlated with the actual rate of
unemployment.
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When Phillips first formulated his work in (Phillips 1958) the Phillips curve had a
strong empirical character lacking any explanations. It was a bit later that Keynesian
economists like Samuelson and Solow implemented the story of decreasing real labor
costs for firms as real wages decrease. This lead to the traditional Keynesian Phillips
curve as given by (I.6). In the beginning (the 1960’s and early 1970’s) such models
fitted reasonably well the data and Governments all over the world were tempted to
deliver high inflation to push unemployment down. However these models started
to fail in the first half of the 1970’s. From the wage setting perspective according
to monetarism it is clear why: Wage setters (one can think of unions and employers
bargaining) started to take a positive average inflation rate into account. For instance
workers wanted to be compensated for their loss of real wages and hence wages started
to rise more or less in the same way as the price level. Till the early 1960’s inflation
came along quite randomly with a mean close to zero. Sometimes this mean is referred
to as the so called core inflation rate or natural inflation rate. The term core inflation
has first been introduced by Robert J. Gordon in (Gordon 1975). According to his
definition it means an inflation which excludes certain high volatile items as food or
energy. However, when we talk about core inflation in the following we think of a
(natural and) constant inflation rate which would be seen eliminating any kind of
shocks.
However due to the above described temptations governments faced this has
changed significantly and private agents started to anticipate future inflation ac-
cordingly. As stated before Monetarists started implementing papers using some
kind of adaptive learning approaches. This implies agents form their expectation of
future inflation by using historic data. Then they choose the wage rate wt equal to
the expected inflation rate piet . Hence equation I.1 had to be extended taking into
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account peoples’ inflationary expectations:
wt = w
∗
t − f(Ut) + λpiet .
Here the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree to which employees can gain nominal
wage increases to keep up with expected inflation in order to prevent a decrease in
real wages. Obviously in the long run the only possible value for λ is 1, as λ < 1 would
mean that real wages converge to zero. This then is consistent with the Monetaristi
Phillips curve as a vertical line - see section I.2.1 and Figure I.1. However some
people argue that employees have less bargaining power when the unemployment
rate is high. This might justify a lambda value less than 1.
Additionally one realized that it seems impossible to push unemployment to zero.
This led to the concept of the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemploy-
ment), some natural rate of unemployment U∗t , which always exists and is attained
given no shocks and no effort from a monetary or fiscal policy side. For a deeper
insight to the concept of the NAIRU we refer to section I.2.4. This further modified
the model:
wt = w
∗
t − f(Ut − U∗t ) + λpiet . (I.2)
So far the wage curve. Another thing are prices. Since imperfectly competitive
markets are assumed one assumes price to be set like
P =ULC + UMC
=
average nominal wage
average labor productivity
+ UMC, (I.3)
where ULC and UMC denote unit labor cost and unit materials cost respectively.
In the following we should denote labor productivity with L. Though it is not true
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in the following it is convenient to assume that material costs remain constant whilst
nominal wages (as seen above) and productivity increase a reasonable equation for
inflation pit := logPt is given by
pit = wt − lt. (I.4)
Again lt denotes the logarithm of Lt.
Next it is assumed that Lt also follows some trend rate l
∗
t . Furthermore for
simplicity one can assume lt = l
∗
t - there is no deviation from that trend rate. As
labor productivity of an individual worker rises it is natural thinking the real wage of
that individual rises by the same amount. Aggregating this over the whole economy
and assuming an unchanged amount of unemployed, respectively employed people
one would expect real wages to grow with Lt. In particular wt − piet = lt and hence
w∗t = wt − piet = lt = l∗t .
This justifies the assumption that the trend rate for labor productivity is equal to
the one for wages. Using this and substituting I.2 into I.4 one gets
pit = λpi
e
t − f(Ut − U∗t ). (I.5)
For the special case λ = 1;U∗ = 0 and taking into account some core inflation
pict ≥ 0 one gets
pit = pi
c
t − f(Ut). (I.6)
Equations like (I.6) are usually referred to as the traditional Keynesian Phillips curve.
It is represented by the blue line in Figure I.1 for the special case of pict = 0.
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Some economists like Robert J.Gordon in (Gordon 1982) take equation (I.5) and
add the term umc, representing the log value of UMC:
pit = λpi
e
t + umc− f(Ut − U∗t ).
Starting with equation (I.3) mathematically it is not correct to do so. Nevertheless
intuitively this is a nice extension to the model as the new term then copes with
supply shocks in the goods market - e.g. the oil price shock in the early 1970’s. This
then is also referred to as Gordon’s triangle model since it points out three different
sources for inflation:
• Demand inflation - e.g. due to a low unemployment rate.
• Supply-shock inflation - e.g. due to shocks on the goods market.
• Inflationary expectation inflation - also called inertia inflation - see e.g. (Romer
2006).
In the long run it is assumed that pit = pi
e
t . This assumption seems quite plausible
since it is quite natural to believe that the private sector will learn from historic
inflationary experiences. This leads us to so called adaptive expectation, a general
economic theory. This one is in contrast to so called rational expectation, a more
recent approach to modeling expectations formation. In section 1.4 we will have a
discussion of the pros an cons of both of these theories. However this is not our
concern here since both concepts can explain the assumption taken. So in the long
run the Phillips curve suggests:
pit =
1
1− λ (umct − f(Ut − U
∗
t )) .
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Figure I.1: The blue line λ = 0 refers to the original or short run Phillips curve, where
no inflationary expectation is taken into account. Taking inflationary expectations
into account with a high factor (λ = 0.9) makes the curve much steeper.
One immediately sees that the greater is λ ∈ (0, 1) the steeper is the curve in
Figure I.1. Note in the short run piet = 0, which is equivalent to λ = 0. In particular
we see in general the short run effect is much stronger than the long run effect.
Furthermore according to the above story one could argue the long run effect only
exists due to the imperfect bargaining power of employees represented by some λ < 1.
I.2.3 A New Keynesian Phillips Curve
So called New Keynesian Phillips curves are characterized by the assumption that
actual inflation depends on actual output and expected output and expected inflation
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for the next period. Therefore a typical model as given in (Romer 2006) looks like
pit = Etpit+1 + 2φ(yt − y∗), (I.7)
where yt is output in log-terms for period t and φ denotes some parameter involving
the elasticity on labor supply of a representative individual. Further y∗ denotes
the natural rate of output, a concept similar to the concept of the NAIRU - see
I.2.4. Sometimes the term yt − y∗ is referred to as the output gap as it characterizes
the deviation of actual output yt from its natural level y
∗. The above relation is
based on the assumption of sticky prices and derived from a simple two period price
setting model (see (Romer 2006) for more details). More generally in New Keynesian
theory it is assumed that an individual firm cannot adjust prices in every period.
In fact when resetting its price the firm must take into account that it has to stick
to that price for a certain number of future periods while the general price level
changes. The menu cost argument may justify this assumption. Two main models
for this costly price adjustment can be found in (Rotemberg 1982) or in (Sheshinski
& Weiss 1983). However one needs to model some timing when an individual firm
adjusts (or can adjust) it’s price. Phelps and Taylor have an endogenous way of doing
so (see (Phelps 1978), (Phelps 1979), (Taylor 1979) and (Taylor 1980)). In contrast to
that in (Calvo 1983) the timing is modeled as an exogenously given Poisson process.
In the following we present a discrete time version of Calvo’s price setting model
and from this then we conclude a Phillips curve equation similar to (I.7). Similar
derivations can be found in (Roberts 1995) or (Woodford 2003).
Though things in (Calvo 1983) are done in continuous time for simplicity here
we choose a discrete time framework. However one can say for every period t for
every firm Calvo assumes an exogenously given signal to adjust its price or not. The
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number of firms to change their price is the same every period but it is completely
random which firms do change. So let θ ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of firms not
adjusting their price at time t. Then an individual firm’s probability of retaining
with its current individual price P it for the next k periods is given by θ
k.
As the firm has set an individual price level P it that may deviate from the current
frictionless optimal price level P ∗t it is natural to model the firm’s cost due to deviating
by (P it − P ∗t )2. For future periods where the P it does not change the firm needs to
form its expectation of future losses via Et
(
P it − P ∗t+k
)2
. This expression has to be
weighted by some discount factor βk (β ∈ (0, 1)). Note the probability that P it+k = P it
is given by θk. Building an aggregate sum of this over future periods leads to
U(P it ) :=
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt
(
P it − P ∗t+k
)2
.
Simple first order conditions lead to the firm’s optimal individual price level P it :
0 = U ′(P it ) =2
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
P it − EtP ∗t+k
)
⇔
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEtP
∗
t+k =P
i
t
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k.
Since β, θ ∈ (0, 1) we can apply the geometric row theorem to the sum on the right
hand side and therefore we get
P it = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEtP
∗
t+k.
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We can rewrite this in the following way:
P it =(1− βθ)P ∗t + (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=1
(βθ)kEtP
∗
t+k
=(1− βθ)P ∗t + (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k+1EtP
∗
t+1+k
=(1− βθ)P ∗t + (1− βθ)βθEt
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt+1P
∗
t+1+k
=(1− βθ)P ∗t + βθEtP it+1.
On the other hand the actual aggregate price level is given by
Pt =θPt−1 + (1− θ)P it
⇔ P it =
Pt − θPt−1
1− θ ,
and hence we get
Pt − θPt−1
1− θ =(1− βθ)P
∗
t + βθEtP
i
t+1
=(1− βθ)P ∗t + βθEt
(
Pt+1 − θPt
1− θ
)
⇔ Pt − Pt−1 =βEt (Pt+1 − Pt) + (1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
(P ∗t − Pt).
Hence with pit := Pt − Pt−1 this is equivalent to
pit =βEtpit+1 +
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
(P ∗t − Pt).
As Calvo assumes P ∗t to be equal to marginal cost plus some fixed markup this model
implies that as real marginal cost (mct−Pt) rises this causes an increase in inflation.
That is because having received the signal to adjust prices each firm will do so taking
into account higher real marginal cost.
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Models like above are often referred to as so called staggered contract or price
models - see e.g. (Fischer 1977) and (Kiley 1997). More generally there are models of
nominal (or real) rigidities (see e.g. (Ball & Romer 1990)), where menu cost models
(see e.g. (Mankiw 1985)) are another special example. Some further work on such
New Keynesian models can be found in (Burmeister & Wall 1982) and (Watson 1989).
These articles are about to mention the expectation building process via a Kalman
filtering approach, also taking into account some rational behavior. The latter is
coming from a similar idea as what we do in chapter 5. See also section 1.5 and 1.4.
I.2.4 The Stagflation Problem
Previously quite often we have mentioned the terms short run and long run Phillips
curve. However in the beginning and according to traditional Keynesian theory there
was no such distinction. This came up later with more and more Monetaristi, re-
spectively New Classical, influence and a new phenomenon later called Stagflation.
Stagflation mainly describes the situation of the early 1970’s as already mentioned in
section I.2.2. The predictions of the traditional Phillips curve did not work anymore.
Suddenly there was both, high inflation rates and a high rate of unemployment.
Monetarists around Friedman argued this was due to changed expectations of private
agents who had learned from the past that inflation had started to be systematically
high. Another explanation came from the New Classical side, basically arguing that
agents know about the central bank’s incentives and based on that agents form their
expectation. As we have seen before both theories can explain why the Phillips curve
was not working any more.
To cope with this Edmund Phelps in (Phelps 1968) developed a model where he
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Figure I.2: To keep the unemployment rate below the NAIRU (Non Accelerating
Inflation Rate of Unemployment) the central bank would have to raise the inflation
rate more and more - i.e. an acceleration of pit would be necessary. That’s where the
NAIRU has its name from.
first explicitly distinguished between short run and long run Phillips curves. In the
long run there is no systematic effect on unemployment due to a correctly anticipated
inflation rate - this is the case at least up to some random shocks. In the short
run however the Phillips curve looks like the traditional Phillips curve, where high
inflation has the desired effect to pull unemployment down - i.e. below the NAIRU.
On the other hand the opposite is true if the central bank delivers an unexpected
low inflation. Nevertheless the unemployment rate (once agents started to expect
high inflation) will go back to its natural level the NAIRU while inflation remains at
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a high level. For the central bank to gain from another short-run effect now it has
to deliver a even higher surprise inflation. In that sense one can say the short run
Phillips curve has shifted upwards whilst the long run curve still remains a vertical
line like in the Monetaristi view - see Figure I.2:
Starting at A in period t the central bank may decide to deliver a higher inflation
in order to push down the unemployment rate. According to the Phillips curve
prediction in the short run the economy then is at point B. Then as time goes by
agents learn about the high inflation and the unemployment rate adjusts to its initial
natural level (the NAIRU), whilst the inflation rate is still high - that is point C.
Further to have the same effect on unemployment as before the central bank has to
deliver an even higher inflation rate - the short run Phillips curve has shifted upwards.
A crucial point here is the time agents need to adjust their expectations. In other
words: how long is it until the long run Phillips curve is attained? This crucially
depends on the expectation model ones believes in. A more detailed discussion of
this will follow in section 1.4.
So today the original Phillips curve seems fairly outdated and is just rarely in
use. Most modern theories are based on a distinction between the short run and the
long run curve, taking inflationary expectations into account. According to Phelps’
model the long run curve is also referred to as the natural rate or NAIRU since the
vertical line intersects the unemployment axis exactly at the level of the NAIRU-value.
The short run Phillips curve on the other hand is often also called the expectation
augmented Phillips curve as it shifts up if inflationary expectations rise. For more
details here we should refer to textbooks like (Blanchard 2008).
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I.2.5 The New Classical Phillips Curve and the Basic Barro
Gordon Game
Most important for this thesis is the New Classical approach, as all our results and
contributions are based on a specific New Classical model - i.e. the Barro-Gorden
model from (Barro & Gordon 1983a) respectively (Barro & Gordon 1983b)! A lot of
extensions can be found in the literature, most famous Rogoff’s conservative central
banker (see (Rogoff 1985)) and Walsh’s linear contracts (see (Walsh 1995)).
New Classical theory, Similar to Monetarists suggests stimulating effects for the
economy (respectively for unemployment) only in the short run and only due to
a surprising effect of a high and unexpected inflation. Characteristic of the New
Classical paradigm is a believe in rationally acting individuals - in particular agents
are believed to form rational, or model-consistent, expectations. We will further
discuss this in section 1.4. New Classical modeling basically starts with a Lucas type
aggregate supply function of the form
yt = y
∗
t + a(pit − piet ),
where yt denotes log-value of output at time t and y
∗
t is the so called natural rate of
output. Further a is some positive constant measuring the effect surprisingly high
inflation has on output - one can think of a as the slope of the Phillips curve. Typically
one adds an economic shock term to the model which reflects some unforeseeable
events:
yt = y
∗
t + a(pit − piet ) + ε˜,
where ε typically is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean - i.e. ε˜ ∼
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N (0, σ2). Equivalently one gets
pit = pi
e
t +
yt − y∗t
a
+ ε,
where ε = − ε˜
a
. This model first has been introduced by economist Robert Lucas in
(Lucas 1973). To see the link to unemployment we need to employ Okun’s law. This is
an empirical observation which suggests some negative correlation of unemployment
and output - for a more detailed discussion we refer to the original paper (Okun 1962)
or some standard textbooks like (Romer 2006), (Walsh 2003), (Mankiw 2000), (Hall
& Taylor 1997) and (Blanchard 2008). Furthermore on a log-scale this relation is
almost linear and hence
yt − y∗t
a
= −b(Ut − U∗t ).
This gives us
pit = pi
e
t − b(Ut − U∗t ) + ε.
The stochastic shock term ε in this model is completely exogenous and henceforth
irrelevant. In particular if one assumes pit = pi
e
t +ε there is no persistent effect coming
from ε. Again latter equation can be motivated by a rational expectations argument,
such as an adaptive expectation argument only for the long run. The latter is true
as under adaptive learning the agents’ expectations will also move towards the true
pit - at least if the other model parameters do not change over time. However then it
is obvious that
0 =− b(Ut − U∗t ) + ε
⇔ Ut =U∗t +
ε
b
,
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suggesting unlike in the Keynesian Phillips curve there is no effect on unemployment
coming from inflation in the long run. Furthermore we have seen the unemployment
rate here is something like a random walk with the NAIRU U∗t as its mean. However
in the short run the central bank may surprise the public sector with high inflation
such that pit − piet = µ + ε for some positive µ. In this case µ can be seen as a non
random effect inflation has on the unemployment rate Ut.
So far we have said that the rational expectations approach would suggest some
correctly anticipated pit, just different from the real one due to some stochastic shock
term. The question that arises here is how can agents anticipate the inflation rate so
accurately?
The answer lies in the agents knowledge of the central bank’s incentive. This time
inconsistency problem first has been analyzed by Kydland and Prescott in (Kydland
& Prescott 1977) and Calvo in (Calvo 1978). Based on that Barro and Gordon later
developed their famous Barro-Gordon game suggesting a suboptimal outcome due
to the inflation bias, the wrong incentive the central bank faces. Today there are
different versions of this game used in the economic literature. The main difference
most often lies in the utility function. In (Barro & Gordon 1983b) the game starts
with a central bank facing the following period cost function:
zt =
λ
2
pi2t − bt(pit − piet ). (I.8)
The second term is clear from above as according to the Phillips curve there would
be some economic welfare due to surprisingly high inflation - i.e. there is a negative
cost. The first term measures the cost coming from inflation itself according to the
central bank’s preference parameter λ. Another cost function is applied in (Barro &
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Gordon 1983a), but also see e.g. (Walsh 2003), whose notation we follow:
V =
1
2
λ (a(pit − piet ) + ε− k)2 +
1
2
pi2t . (I.9)
The parameter k here determines some target value for output (or unemployment
rate) the central bank has - deviating from k is costly and can be controlled via the
term a(pit−piet ) due to the above Phillips curve argument. Note the opposite meaning
of λ for cost function (I.8) (λ is the weight set on inflation aversion) and (I.9) (λ is the
weight set on output targeting)! However in either case according to the parameters
λ and a respectively bt the central bank has to find the best trade off between cost
and benefit. In the following we will do the derivation just for (I.8). However the
story we are telling also holds in the case of (I.9) - a proper derivation for this case
can also be found in section 4.1.
As agents know the central bank’s cost function they do what the central bank
would do to optimize equation (I.8). The first order conditions (regardless of the
particular value of piet ) imply:
pit =
bt
λ
.
Hence the central bank would optimally choose pit like this and therefore agents
knowing that would also choose piet = pi
∗
t =
bt
λ
!
I.3 Outline of the Thesis
In (Barro & Gordon 1983a) equation (I.9) is employed to construct a simple one shot
game. Later using equation (I.8) Barro and Gordon constructed their reputation
model - see (Barro & Gordon 1983b). For the entire thesis either model (I.9) or (I.8)
will be the basis of our analysis and research.
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Before implementing our first model in chapter 1 we will introduce common tech-
niques and concepts as they are usually used to address such questions. The most
common technique in econometrics is time series analysis, while the concept of ratio-
nal expectation has established as a benchmark technique in many macro papers. Be-
side here we will also give brief and intuitive introductions to basic probability theory
and continuous time dynamic programming (in particular Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman
approach) as these are basic tools for chapter 3. Further we will say something about
the classical adaptive learning approach filtering methods and basic game theory.
So we should be well prepared to set up our models. In chapter 2 we do a purely
game theoretic approach. We take the one shot game approach as given by equation
(I.8) and change the underlying permissable strategies of the players. We will use
Hofbauer’s (see (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998)) so called stochastic reaction strategies
to make it an infinitely repeated game. Under suitable assumptions then we see
there will be not just one suboptimal equilibrium. There is a whole range of not
strict Nash equilibria. These are not as bad as the prisoner’s dilemma equilibrium
from the original game.
In chapter 3 we will consider a continuous time framework, where again equation
(I.8) is the basis of the model. The central bank is optimizing the present value of
its utility using a standard dynamic programming approach - i.e. Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman. To this end in that model we assume private agents to have an adaptive
learning approach (like in (Phelps 1967) or (Cohen-Cole & Cosmaciuc 1999)) when
anticipating the inflation rate pit. This results in some expected and actual average
inflation rate. To increase the central bank’s incentive to be more moderate we
introduce the opportunity to issue inflation linked bonds on the financial market.
This results in an additional aversion to inflation as it means an additional negative
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payoff increasing in the average inflation rate for the central bank.
We tell a similar story in chapter 4. However the setup is quite different to
chapter 3. In contrast to that we take equation (I.9) as our basis. Furthermore
we go back to the roots and consider a discrete time framework of just one period.
The most fundamental difference however is that agents now are assumed to form
their expectation rationally. So before the original game starts the central bank can
think of placing inflation linked calls on the financial market. As this is directly seen
and taken into account by private agents pie decreases. On the other hand due to an
asymmetric pricing the central bank expects a financial loss due to this. In that sense
we can say the bank buys credibility as a conservative central bank when issuing such
calls.
Finally in chapter 5 we consider a filtering approach. The inflation rate is delivered
continuously over time according to some preference the central banker has. This
preference may change following a Poisson jump process - think of a new central
banker or a central banker learning something new.... As it is not credible to announce
being a very conservative central banker private agents will have to learn via a filtering
approach about the type of the banker. The underlying model is a so called Markov
chain model and the filtering technique is the Wonham filter we will introduce then
in the chapter.
To the best of our knowledge chapter 3 and 4 is the first quantitative work men-
tioning the impact financial markets have on monetary policy. However the idea of
buying credibility is not new. Typical models here deal with governments to influence
the central bank. For instance a government buys credibility (on the cost of sudden
economic welfare) by announcing a conservative central banker. This one needs to be
even more conservative than expected - see (Rogoff 1985) for more detail. Another
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model are Walsh’s linear contracts - see (Walsh 1995). Here the central banker is
paid a linear transfer payment by the government to make him behave. Nonetheless
these works lack the independence of central banks from their governments.
Chapter 1
Techniques and Concepts
As mentioned before the traditional Keynesian Phillips curve does not take into
account a change in private agents’ expectation building process. Particularly it does
not consider employees who want to be compensated for their loss of real wages.
Further it also does not take into account that business people realize the higher
price they can get on the market is purely nominal increase. As we have seen this
kind of curve might still be plausible in the short run as bargaining for new wages or
adjusting prices (e.g. menu costs - New Keynesian perspective for instance) cannot
be done instantaneously. However for the long run the critique from Monetarists or
New Classical economists seems legitimate and in any case is widely accepted. As
agents adjust wages and prices according to their expectations the question now is
how these expectations are formed.
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1.1 Discrete and Continuous Time Processes
Most variables in the world and especially economic variables do not remain constant
over time. Though most economic schools claim there should be an equilibrium - e.g.
supply and demand - this does not mean everything is stable. Empirically one usually
observes changing values of a specific variable over time - things are in progress. This
behavior usually is called a process.
Definition 1.1.1 (Process) Let X be a set of variables describing something - e.g.
X can be a single number or some finite vector. Further let Xt denote the value of
X at time time t. Then by a process we mean the set of all Xt for t ∈ T . T can
be any subset of the real numbers. If T is discrete we should call (Xt)t∈T a discrete
process otherwise (then typically T is some interval) we will say (Xt)t∈T is a (time)
continuous process. Typical discrete sets are sets of equidistant points in time.
Traditionally models in the economic literature have dealt with discrete processes.
They form the basis of a lot of econometric models. Particularly the extensive lit-
erature on time series analysis with its autoregressive AR-models, respectively the
multidimensional vector versions the so called VARs. In principle these models can
be seen as the solution of some given difference equation.
With New Classical theory some continuous time models have evolved. In contin-
uous time equivalently one deals with differential equations. Often such difference or
differential equations are not solvable analytically. Then one uses numerical meth-
ods to generate some sample paths. For differential equations such methods always
include some discretization, in fact converting differential equations into difference
equations. However some differential equations are still not understood numerically
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and therefore have no stable solution. For further details on that we should refer to
the standard literature as it is not so much our concern within this thesis.
1.2 Random Variables and Stochastic Processes
So far we have seen what is meant by a process. What we did not consider until now
is uncertainty - this leads us to stochastic or random processes which are in contrast
to deterministic processes. To distinguish between those two the famous Russian
mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov once gave a very simple but also convincing def-
inition:
Definition 1.2.1 (Kolmogorov) A (finite) sequence of numbers is random (or stochas-
tic) if and only if the shortest way to write it down is to write down the whole sequence.
- see (Kolmogorov 1933) or (Kolmogorov 1956).
This simple definition is based on the idea, that everything that is not stochastic
or random is deterministically predictable. In particular for a deterministic sequence
one can find some rule that perfectly predicts the remaining numbers of the sequence
for a known subsequence. For infinite or even non discrete deterministic processes
this rule then is given by the previously described difference or differential equations.
For completeness one usually has to add some starting point for the process.
In discrete time it is quite simple to attach randomness to the model. Usually
this is done by adding a random variable to the difference equation model. Since
one has to do so for every period of time, usually the model is set up in a way that
iid (independent identically distributed) random variables can be used. Any kind
of drift in the whole model is modeled as a deterministic drift term. Most often
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normally distributed random variables are used. Uncertainty in general is caused by
many small overlapping random events that would be quite intractable to write down
explicitly. However the central limit theorem tells us that such overlapping events
will sum up to something normally distributed as long as they are independent and
some other conditions are fulfilled - see e.g. (Jacod & Protter 1999), (Hald 1998)
or (Fischer n.d.). This justifies the widely used assumption of normal distributed
random variables.
As the classical central limit theorem holds true for random variables (i.e. single
numbers or vectors without variation in time) for continuous time stochastic processes
most often Donsker’s invariance principle (often also referred to as the functional
central limit theorem) is considered as the natural analogue.1 This basically tells us
that many different overlapping stochastic processes (given some conditions) in the
limit add up to some other Gaussian process - see (Donsker 1952) or some text books
like (Dudley 1999) or (Bauer 2001) for more detail. This justifies the use of Brownian
Motion or Wiener process, as is widely done in probability theory or Itoˆ calculus. We
denote these either by Bt or Wt. There are different ways to characterize standard
Brownian Motion (see e.g. (Protter 2005), (Karatzas & Shreve 1998) or (Kuo 2006)),
however most common are definitions like the the following one:
• W0 = 0
• Wt is almost surely continuous - i.e. to find a jump in any path is of probability
zero. In a strict mathematical sense this does not mean every possible path is
continuous, it just means the set of non continuous possible paths is a P-null
1A stochastic process can also be seen as a random variable with values in some vector space -
the set of functions respectively deterministic processes
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set.
• Wt is a Leˆvy process - it has stationary independent increments - i.e. the
random variables Wt −Ws and Wt∗ −Ws∗ are independent whenever (s, t) and
(s∗, t∗) are disjoint and for t− s = t∗ − s∗ one has Wt −Ws ∼ Wt∗ −Ws∗ .
• The increments are normally distributed - in particular Wt−Ws = N (0, t− s).
Brownian Motion is used as the prototype of a continuous time stochastic process. In
Itoˆ calculus other continuous time processes are derived from that one via stochas-
tic differential equations, SDEs - kind of an analogue to deterministic differential
equations as we previously mentioned them. Some standard SDEs can be solved
analytically but most of these cannot. Again there is a large amount of literature
on that such as (von Weizsa¨cker & Winkler 1990) or (Øksendal 1998). However it
is clear that any solution (no matter if it can be found or not) then has continuous
paths almost surely.
Often, as in the real world jumps are observed - e.g. in mathematical finance
- it is not satisfactory to be restricted to continuous path models. Though time
is continuous there may be a discrete number of jumps in the state space of the
process. Most of the literature on jump processes such as (Øksendal & Sulem 2005)
or (Klebaner 2005) deals with the Poisson jump process as a prototype process. For
our purposes it is most convenient to follow the lines of (Jonek 2008): By a Poisson
process, denoted by qt we should mean a process with the following properties:
• q0 = 0 almost surely.
• Almost all paths are isotonic increasing and right continuous.
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• q has independent increments - it it not necessarily a Leˆvy process - increments
do not have to be stationary.
• The waiting time for the next jump is exponentially distributed and independent
of the jump size, which may also be random.
General (continuous time) jump diffusion processes Xt are processes that can be
written as
Xt =Xa +
∫ t
a
µ(s,Xs, νs)ds+
∫ t
a
σ(s,Xs, νs)dWs +
∫ t
a+
ζ(s,Xs− , νs−)dqs,
or in differential form
dXt =µ(t,Xt, νt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, νt)dWt + ζ(t,Xt− , νt−)dqt,
where νt is some cadlag F -adapted process. It might be considered as a control.
The numerical solution of such SDEs as of those of the discrete stochastic processes
usually involve some Monte Carlo methods as one normally is just interested in the
mean of such processes - as things are random one cannot predict anything.
1.3 Stochastic Expectation
In statistics, probability theory (stochastics) or particularly in time series analysis
this mean - also called (stochastic) expectation - plays an important role. It is the
basis of many econometric models like ARMA or ARIMA processes. In stochastic
theories the expectation of a random variable most often is defined as the average
value the random variable takes - that is the mean. If possible one approximates the
expectation of a random variable by its arithmetic average. Most famous here is a six
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sided fair dice with mean 3.5 = 1
6
∑6
i=1 i. If the distribution of the random variable
is not known statisticians do the same. They throw the dice several times and use
the arithmetic average of their observation as an estimate for the expectation.
The expectation of the outcome of a random variable changes if one has some
additional knowledge. For instance suppose the dice has been already thrown, but
we cannot see it yet. Further suppose somebody tells us the outcome is greater than
or equal to 4. Still assuming a fair dice and taking into account this information the
stochastic expectation would be given by 5 = 1
3
∑6
i=4 i. The reason for that is that
due to the additional information the random variable X has been transformed into
another random variable Z := X|given X ≥ 4 by cutting off 1, 2 and 3 as a possible
outcome. Another possibly new information might have been the outcome of X is less
than 4 - i.e. we get some random variable Zˆ := X|givenX ≤ 3 with EZˆ = 1
3
∑3
i=1 i =
2. As this information whether X is greater or less than 4 is random in the first place
a new random variable Y := E(X|information X ≥ 4?) can be constructed. This
random variable is called conditional expectation as it is derived from X conditioned
on some additional information which is still random. As the randomness of Y comes
along via the information one can show that EX = EY = E(E(X|information)).
This is also referred to as the tower property. Conditional expectation plays a major
role in classical probability theory, particularly in Itoˆ calculus where continuous time
Levy processes are subject to research.
In the context of expectations the last two properties of Brownian Motion are
most evident. In fact it means that the unconditional expectation EWt is zero for all
t since Wt = Wt − 0 = Wt −W0 ∼ N (0, t). In particular Wt is a mean zero random
variable. Furthermore having knowledge about W up to time s < t (in particular the
value of the process at time s is known) then conditioned on that information the
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expected value of W at time t is no longer zero. Instead one has
E(Wt|Fs) = Ws. (1.1)
If the value of Ws is not known yet from this we see the conditional expectation (on
the left hand side) is also random as the underlying information is not known yet. The
left hand side is the common notation for conditional Expectation where (Fs)s∈[0,∞)
denotes the so called natural filtration of the process Wt. For each s Fs symbolizes
the aggregate knowledge about W that comes along when observing the process up
to time s. Equation (1.1) is the so called martingale property of the process Wt.
One can prove a stochastic process is a martingale if and only if the unconditional
expectation is the same for all t - see (Hackenbroch & Thalmaier 1994). For a deeper
insight to all that mathematical background we should refer to standard text books
like (von Weizsa¨cker & Winkler 1990) and (Jacod & Protter 1999)... For our purposes
the exact meaning of filtrations and so on is not important and hence we also denote
conditional expectation in the above described sense just by EsWt.
1.4 Rational vs Adaptive Expectation and the Lu-
cas Critique
In the very early literature people used very simple static expectations and processes
were modeled most often in a pure deterministic way. This often was realistic as the
economic variables did not change much. For instance as mentioned in section I.2.4
till the early 1960’s inflation came along randomly with some core inflation pict . Static
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expectation in its cleanest sense here would say
piet = pit−1.
As pit = pi
c
t +εt was random due to some shock but with constant mean agents formed
their expectation according to piet = pi
c
t . Substituting such expectations into supply
and demand models like the Cobweb model (see e.g. (Evans & Honkapohja 2001))
one ends up with an AR process, respectively with an ARMA process if shocks are
involved.
In the 1950’s economists like Cagan (see (Cagan & M. 1956)), Friedman (see
(Friedman 1957)) and Nerlove (see (Nerlove 1956)) started to establish so called
adaptive learning. The basic idea is quite simple. Instead of just believing that
what agents recently observed determining completely the expectations, agents are
assumed to be sticky with their expectations. The old expectation of some economic
variable is taken and modified (adapted) by some term linear in the error agents
made in the last period. So in discrete time the model reads
piet = pi
e
t−1 + γ
(
pit−1 − piet−1
)
,
where γ is some parameter measuring how strongly past errors influence current
expectations. Another thing is the size of the error made that determines the rate
of adjustment. There is an explicit solution available for such adaptive learning
strategies. In fact it is not hard to show that the above equation holds true for
piet = γ
∞∑
i=1
(1− γ)i−1pit−i.
This shows the expected value of pit depends more on the recently observed values
for pi. In fact the weights are exponentially decreasing in time. In a continuous
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time framework the above difference equation needs to be replaced by a differential
equation:
dpiet = γ (pit − piet ) dt.
This model first has been applied to monetary policy in (Phelps 1967) and later in
(Cohen-Cole & Cosmaciuc 1999). In chapter 3 we will also use this as the basic
learning rule of private agents on the inflation rate.
In the 1970’s people started to consider adaptive learning as less appropriate
in the context of many economic questions. Most remarkable here was Lucas with
(Lucas 1976) formulating his famous critique. Basically he criticized the use of the
common statical methods, such as e.g. the adaptive learning approach and the time
series analysis to predict peoples behavior. Such methods rely on past data and hence
they are obsolete at the moment when policy makers start utilizing them. As this
would go along with a change in the policy people would realize this. This then
would also cause a change in their behavior accordingly. To this end he criticized
econometric models for assuming several parameters (e.g. agents behavior) as exoge-
nous while in fact they were (at least according to him) endogenous. For instance
today most economists believe this was very much the case with the Phillips curve.
The traditional Keynesian model worked fine in the beginning (1950’s and 1960’s)
and governments all over the world could decrease unemployment at the cost of some
higher inflation. However as we have seen before the model started to fail in the
1970’s where the stagflation phenomenon became relevant due to agents now expect-
ing higher inflation. To overcome this problem Lucas suggested the use of rational
expectation.
The main difference of rational expectation (in a very strict sense) compared
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to adaptive learning is that the one forming the expectation is not about to make
any systematic mistakes. In the context of inflation for instance this would mean the
expected inflation rate piet is equal to the actual inflation rate pit up to some stochastic
noise εt. The latter in (stochastic) expectation being zero. However as we have seen
in section I.2.5 this implies agents need to know all the central bank’s model and
preference parameters etc.
The latter on the other hand is the most evident in criticizing the rational ex-
pectation model: How would agents know about the bank’s preferences? If they
want to know there would typically be some cost to get such information. Evans and
Honkapohja (see (Evans & Honkapohja 2001)) argue that there is almost no empirical
evidence for this. Typically people setting up such models using rational expectation
do not know the parameter values themselves. Hence for empirical work these have
to be estimated, again by some econometric techniques. That is why they suggest
agents themselves act as statisticians or econometricians. This would lead to another
concept of rationality often referred to as bounded rationality as it is discussed in
(Sargent 1993).
1.5 Time Series Analysis and Stochastic Filtering
Most often in Economics one observes (past) data of an economic variable having
evolved over time. As the number of past observation never can be infinite it is
most likely to consider the whole data set of a discrete process in time according
to definition 1.1.1. Taking these data as given the task is to develop reasonable
simple models capable of forecasting, interpreting and testing hypotheses. The typical
approach in econometrics is that of time series analysis. One sets up a model having
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an autoregressive component (i.e. Xt is a function of past data Xt−1, . . . , Xt−n) and a
moving average component. The latter usually is described by some random variable.
In its most simple form such an ARMA model is given by
Xt = αXt−1 + βεt. (1.2)
However much more complicated models with several different shocks and functions
depending on much more past data are conceivable. As one usually assumes to know
the distribution of the shock ε such a model predicts some average (stochastically
expected) curve for Xt over time. This one of course depends on the model parameters
one chooses. In the above model the parameters are α and β. Having set up the model
in the above way then one tries to choose these parameter such as to get the best fit
to historic data. This process is called the calibration of the model. Most common
here is to use ordinary (OLS - see e.g. (Enders 2004)) or weighted least squares
as a measure of distance which is to minimize. However a lot of others involving
maximum likelihood or Kalman filtering techniques are available - see e.g. (James &
Webber 2000).
Clearly every new observation changes the parameter estimate described above
when this one is also taken into account. On the other hand as n (the number
of observations) increases any mathematical optimization approach (e.g. OLS) gets
quite fuzzy. Therefore common filtering approaches (most famous the Kalman filter
- see (Kalman 1960), (Grewal & A.P. 1993) or (Simon 2006)) are based on the idea
of updating the estimated variable (or parameter) when new information (i.e. a
further observation comes in) is obtained. This is similar to the adaptive learning
approach, where instead the time series approach is to do the data fitting routine
again and again. Though there are quite general filters available in the literature
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most commonly used is the discrete Kalman filter. This one is restricted to linear
models with a normal distributed disturbance. The idea is to explicitly distinguish
between some process Xt and its observation Yt. The process Xt is assumed to be
determined by the following stochastic differential equation:
Xt = Ft−1Xt−1 +Bt−1ut−1 + σt−1Nt−1,
where ut determines the deterministic part of the disturbance. Further Nt is a se-
quence of iid standard normally distributed random variables responsible for any
stochastic disturbances. Further the model assumes
Yt = HtXt + σ˜tN˜t,
where N˜t is another sequence of normally distributed random variables independent
from Nt.
Remark 1.5.1 When looking at this, at a first glance the above structure with some
true process Xt and some observed process Yt might look not to be in line with the AR
or ARMA structure from before. However for Ht = 1 and σ˜t = 0 for all t the filter
also works and we are in a position as for time series models.
Obviously for each t according to the above assumption Xt is a normally distributed
random variable with some mean xt and some variance σt. Therefore the whole
filtering problem reduces to estimate xt and σt. As already mentioned this can be
done in an recursive way using the estimates xˆt−1 and σˆt−1. This all ends up in solving
some difference equations and stuff - standard literature can be found in (Grewal &
A.P. 1993) or (Simon 2006). For particular case that one knows xt and σt (and hence
Xt itself) is the same for all t this implies that Xˆt
t→∞−→ Xt when Xˆt denotes the
estimate of X after t observations.
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For time continuous problems Kalman together with Bucy (see (Kalman & Bucy
1961)) developed another version - so called Kalman Bucy filtering. This one is best
described in (Øksendal 1998).
1.6 Stochastic Optimal Control
Optimal control theory is a widely used standard technique with many applications
in economics, physics, mathematical finance etc. In its most basic form it reduces to
the standard Lagrange multiplier technique as it is well introduced in (Forster 1984)
or (Fliessbach 2009). However this is a one for all times method and things are
getting more complicated if one has to take future periods into account. In discrete
time this leads to so called dynamic programming methods as they can be found in
(Cornuejols & Tu¨tu¨ncu¨ 2007). Closely related to that is the so called Kuhn-Tucker
approach, see e.g. (Bo¨hm 2007) or (Chiang 1984). For either of them also stochastic
versions are available.
We will more concentrate on the continuous time equivalence as it is relevant for
chapter 3 and 5. Most often in economics the so called Pontryagin maximum principle
is applied. However the standard technique does not cope for any stochastic models,
though meanwhile an extension for uncertainty models is available. More common in
physics as in mathematical finance therefore is the so called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) approach. As we will see later in this section the HJB-approach ends up with
some partial (sometimes ordinary) differential equation. As mentioned in section 1.2
these are not always solvable. Sometimes, given some special circumstances this can
be overcome by the so called martingale method - see e.g. (Korn & Korn 2001). One
last approach we want to mention here is done by Chow in his book (Chow 1997)
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basically claiming the HJB-approach is redundant. Everything can be done using
some extended Lagrange multiplier technique. This method is also closely related to
the martingale method by Korn.
In the following we will describe the HJB-approach. As our main reference we will
use (Korn & Korn 2001) and (Ewald 2007). So consider the following cost functional
J(t, x, u) =Et,x
(∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)U(s,Xs, us)ds+ ψ(τ,Xτ )
)
,
where ut is the so called control and
dXt =µ(t,Xt, ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt, ut)dWt,
with Wt a standard Brownian Motion, r some discount rate, U some instantaneous
cost (or utility) function and τ some finite or infinite number greater t. Et,x denotes
the expectation at time t given Xt is staring in x. Obviously if τ is infinite the ψ-term
will drop out. The process ut can be controlled by the optimizer - in our case the
central bank, see chapter 3 and 5. The goal is to optimize (i.e. minimize or maximize)
J(t, x, u). So let V (t, x) := infu J(t, x, u) denote the so called value function (here
we choose to minimize a cost rather than to maximize a utility). Hence the question
arises what is the optimal choice of ut for every instance of time?
The key is the so called Bellman-principle. It is analogous to the one used in
discrete time dynamic programming. The idea is to split the time interval [t, τ ]
into many small subintervals and then work backwards. Taking into account Xτ−∆t
behave (i.e. choose uτ−∆t) optimally on the interval (τ −∆t, τ). Then, knowing the
optimal uτ−∆t do the same for the interval (τ−2∆t, τ−∆t) and so on till the initial t
is reached. As ∆t approaches zero one can show the optimal ut process is determined
by a deterministic differential equation. In particular one gets:
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rV (t, x)− Vt(t, x) = inf
u
(
U(t, x, u) + Vx(t, x)µ(t, x, u) +
1
2
Vxxσ(t, x)
2
)
, (1.3)
where Vt and Vx denote the derivative of V with respect to t and x respectively. To
find the optimal u the right hand side needs optimized for u. This yields an expression
for u in terms of U, µ, σ, Vx and Vxx. Substituting this back into (1.3) results in a
(partial) differential equation for V . If this can be solved then one can easily solve
for ut by substituting Vx and Vxx into the previously found equation for u. Again for
more detail we refer to (Korn & Korn 2001) or (Ewald 2007).
In (Jonek 2008), (Øksendal & Sulem 2005) and (Klebaner 2005) for instance one
can also find extended versions for jump diffusion processes - i.e. Xt follows
dXt =µ(t,Xt, ut)dt+ σ(t,Xt, ut)dWt + u˜(t,Xt− , ut−)dNt,
with Nt a Poisson process of size one, as introduced in section 1.2. In that case
equation (1.3) is extended to
rV (t, x)− Vt(t, x) = inf
u
(
U(t, x, u) + Vx(x, u)µ(t, x, u) +
1
2
Vxxσ(t, x, u)
2
+ γ(V (t, x+ u˜(t, x, u))− V (t, x))
)
.
This jump diffusion case will be most relevant for chapter 5.
1.7 Game Theory - Nash Equilibrium
Finally we close this chapter considering game theory as it is the basic underlying
approach for the next chapter. Like all the previous sections here we want to keep a
fairly brief and introductive character. Our main reference therefore will be (Schlee
2004).
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Game theory has been established as a powerful tool to investigate agents’ be-
havior in different economic situations. Best known in this context is the pioneering
work of John Forbes Nash and Reinhard Selten - see (Nash 1950), (Nash 1951),
(Selten 1965) and (Selten 1967). In contrast to most of the pure differential (respec-
tively difference) equation and, or stochastic approaches it gives us the opportunity
to model things endogenously as it is relevant for many economic applications. Im-
plicitly through all over the previous chapter we have made extensively use of game
theory. In particular we have seen many authors argued that as more and more in-
formation was brought to private agents this changed their behavior. This further
led to formally known results now being obsolete and the model had to be extended.
At the end of section I.2.5 we saw an explicit example of what is commonly known
as a one shot game, the most simple type of game that is known. Further we saw the
two players were trapped in an suboptimal equilibrium. In the game from section
I.2.5 as possible strategies one might consider zero inflation (strategy one) and pi = bt
λ
(discretion - strategy two) for both, private agents and the central bank. Often in
such situations it is convenient to write down so called payoff matrices, one for each
player:
A =
 0 b2tλ
− b2t
2λ
b2t
2λ
 and B =
 0 1
1 0
 .
Further the set of (pure) strategies for player one (central bank) and two (Phillips
curve) can be represented by e1 :=
 1
0
 (playing zero inflation) and e2 :=
 0
1

(playing discretion). Then the payoff for the bank is given by etiAej = Aij if the bank
playes ei and private agents play ej. Accordingly private agents receive e
t
iBej = Bij).
To get B we have chosen 1 as a cost for private agents if the anticipated inflation
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level was incorrect and 0 otherwise. Further the costs for the bank in the matrix can
be obtained by equation (I.8). If both players choose zero inflation we see the cost
(for both of them) is zero. From matrix A we also see no matter what private agents
choose the central bank is always better off choosing discretion pi = bt
λ
. However if
agents choose discretion the corresponding cost for the central bank then is
b2t
2λ
what
is greater than zero (the cost for the bank if both players had played zero inflation).
Remark 1.7.1 Note here the above term payoff matrix is misleading as we have
constructed cost-matrices rather than payoff matrices. However this is just up to a
sign and we will keep using payoff matrix as it is standard in the literature.
For the special case B = At one refers to the situation as a symmetric game.
Otherwise (as in our problem above) the game is called asymmetric.
We have seen that for private agents it is not credible to believe in zero inflation
and hence a suboptimal equilibrium is attained. To go on we should formalize the
underlying concepts:
Definition 1.7.2 (Nash equilibrium) In a game played amongst n players each
player i has a set of possible strategies Si. Then a set of strategies (s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n) with
s∗i ∈ Si∀i is called a Nash equilibrium if each player cannot improve his/her payoff by
choosing another strategy given all other players stick to their strategy s∗i . Further we
call a Nash equilibrium strict if each player can only get a worse payoff by choosing
anything else than s∗i given all other players stick to their strategies.
In a symmetric two player situation with payoff matrix
 2 3
0 1
 we see the
following: If both players play e1 then the payoff for each player is 2. However
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playing e1 is not a Nash equilibrium as for each player it is better to play e2 given
the other player plays e1 - the individual payoff then is 3 what is greater than 2. The
other player then receives 0 which is less than 1, the payoff each player gets when
both players choose e2. However playing e2 (for both players) is a Nash equilibrium
as each player would loose when deviating from e2 without the other player deviating
from e2. On the other hand each player’s payoff would be improved if both player
play e1, which is not a Nash equilibrium. Situations like this are usually referred to
a prisoner’s dilemma .
In our game we do not have a real prisoner’s dilemma situation as private agents
are indifferent between both players playing e1 and both playing e2. However we have
a situation kind of similar to the prisoners dilemma as it is not credible for private
agents to believe in zero inflation. To overcome this problem one might think of
the bank convincing private agents to choose zero inflation. This might happen e.g.
by sharing the better payoff (or the lower cost) as it arises aggregate over the two
players. This leads to so called cooperatively played games.
Many situations of interest are not subject to a one time period framework. Play-
ers play the same game many (maybe infinitely many) times over and over again.
Furthermore often the information available to each of the players is of interest. The
latter is not so important to us as we do not consider real information asymmetry
in chapter 2. However often there is uncertainty, modeled by an exogenously given
stochastic shock. Another thing are so called mixed strategies. Here one allows each
player to have some probability to choose each of the strategy. Then according to
that probability distribution the outcome of his/her action is exogenously given. In
that sense this probability distribution itself can be considered as a strategy. Kind of
a special case of this are stochastic reaction strategies as they are relevant for chapter
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2. These are best introduced in (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998) and are closely related
to evolutionary game theory. In evolutionary games most often a symmetric game
situation is considered. For its most simple form consider a (large) population, with
individuals having either strategy one or strategy two. Every period randomly many
pairs of two individuals are merged playing a certain game using their strategies.
Three different pairs are possible: both players play strategy one, both players play
strategy two and both players have different strategies. According to the distribution
over the whole population each flavour of pairs has a certain statistical probability. A
strategy is about to increase inside a population as it is more successful (in average)
pushing out individuals having the wrong strategy. As the distribution of (mixed)
strategies therefore changes formally dominant strategy may become less successful
because it is more likely that a single individual of that population faces another
individual having the same (formally dominant) strategy. However most often again
here one can hope for a Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 2
Stochastic Reaction Strategies,
Barro-Gordon and a Null-Inflation
Equilibrium
In this chapter building on the simple static Barro and Gordon (see (Barro & Gordon
1983b)) model (I.8) we assume that rather than playing a one shot game the mone-
tary authority and private sector react to each other repeatedly for an infinite number
of times. Both, the monetary authority’s and the private sector’s reactions are as-
sumed to be stochastic in the form of fixed behavioral transition probabilities. These
probabilities are interpreted as strategies in a new game. We study the set of Nash-
equilibria of this new game and how these correspond to the classical discretionary
Nash-equilibrium identified by Barro and Gordon as well as the non-Nash low infla-
tionary state. In contrast to Barro and Gordon we show that the low-inflationary
state can be realized as a Nash-equilibrium in our model.
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2.1 Stochastic Reactive Strategies: Classical Setup
Stochastic reactive strategies have been introduced by Hofbauer in (Hofbauer &
Sigmund 1998) to explain a certain degree of cooperation within the prisoners dilemma
game. The general idea is that, while the original game is repeated infinitely many
times, players act according to fixed behavioral strategies which are represented by
certain transition probabilities. If the original game has two pure strategies for each
player these transition probabilities are given by the conditional probabilities of play-
ing pure strategy 1 after the opponent played his pure strategy 1 in the previous
round and playing pure strategy 1 after the opponent played his pure strategy 2 in
the previous round. The unconditional probabilities can be computed using Bayes’
theorem and it can be shown that these unconditional probabilities converge and
can in fact be interpreted as mixed strategies in the original game, leading to a well
defined payoff. It has to be said clearly however that the strategies in the new game
are the stochastic reaction strategies, consisting of a pair of conditional probabilities
(p, q)> and that the space of pure strategies in the new game is therefore given by
[0, 1]× [0, 1]. We do not consider mixed strategies, which would be probability distri-
butions on [0, 1]× [0, 1] in what follows, but focus on pure Nash-equilibria of the new
game. The setup has originally been used for symmetric games, but it is not hard
to adapt it to asymmetric games. To see this assume that the payoffs for player one
and two are given respectively by the two matrices
A =
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 , B =
 b11 b12
b21 b22

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Pure strategies can be represented by e1 =
 1
0
 and e2 =
 0
1
. A stochastic
reaction multi strategy then consists of a pair (v, v′) ∈ ([0, 1]× [0, 1])2 where
v =
 p
q
 and v′ =
 p′
q′

Here p, p′, q, q′ denote the following conditional probabilities:
p = probability player 1 plays e1 given player 2 played e1 in the previous round
q = probability player 1 plays e1 given player 2 played e2 in the previous round
p′ = probability player 2 plays e1 given player 1 played e1 in the previous round
q′ = probability player 2 plays e1 given player 1 played e2 in the previous round
The game is now repeated over and over again and players react stochastically ac-
cording to the probabilities identified above. If we define
sn, sn′ ∈ {e1, e2} (2.1)
as the action chosen in period n by players 1 and 2 respectively and define
Xn =
 sn
s′n

then (Xn) can be formally considered as a discrete time Markov chain with four
states, for which transition probabilities can be computed in terms of p, p′q, q′. In
principal the following construction can be realized assuming an arbitrary number of
strategies ei. However, we stick to the case of two strategies and assume a finite time
horizon T , which could possibly correspond to a financial year, a business cycle or a
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different unit of time, but will essentially assume that within this period the game is
repeated infinitely many times. This interpretation is not inessential for the classical
setup, but crucial in our adaptation in the next section. Hofbauer now proceeds by
introducing the unconditional probabilities
cn = Prob (sn = e1)
c′n = Prob (s
′
n = e1) .
and considering their limits for n → ∞. These limits can be computed as follows.
Note that it follows from Bayes formula that
c′n+1 =p
′cn + q′(1− cn)
cn+2 =pc
′
n+1 + q(1− c′n+1)
and by cross-substitution
cn+2 =p(p
′cn + q′(1− cn)) + q(1− p′cn − q′(1− cn))
=q + p(q′ + (p′ − q′)cn)− q(q′ + (p′ − q′)cn)
=q + (p− q)(q′ + (p′ − q′)cn)
and similar for c′n+2. Under the assumption −1 < p − q < 1 or −1 < p′ − q′ < 1
convergence of these sequences is guaranteed. Substitution of
c = lim
n
cn
c′ = lim
n
c′n
above gives
c(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′)) =q + q′(p− q)⇔ c = q + q
′(p− q)
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′)
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In a similar way we get an expression for c′. In summary we obtain the following
expressions for c and c′ as functions of p, q, p′ and q′:
c = q+q
′(p−q)
1−(p−q)(p′−q′) (2.2)
c′ = q
′+q(p′−q′)
1−(p−q)(p′−q′) .
The vectors (c, 1−c)t and (c′, 1−c′)t can be interpreted as (long run) mixed strategies,
and Hofbauer argues, that if the payoff in the first round is rather insignificant, a
payoff for the whole period can be defined as
PH1
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = (c, 1− c)A
 c′
1− c′

PH2
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = (c, 1− c)B
 c′
1− c′

where the superscript H indicates Hofbauer-payoffs. Strategy spaces in this setup
are given by [0, 1] × [0, 1]. While not expressed in Hofbauer, it is natural to think
of the strategies in terms of (p, q) and (p′, q′) as genotypic strategies, while e1 and
e2 or alternatively on the level of mixed strategies c and c
′, are their phenotypic
realizations.
However, if one only believes in finitely many sub periods, the question arises
how fast this convergence really is. To give a little intuition let’s have a look at the
following table. For some quite natural choices of the parameters (p = p′ = 0.7 and
q = q′ = 0.4) such as some starting values (c1 = 0.8 and c′1 = 0.7) we see a rather
quick convergence to our c and c′, which are both given by 0.571428571. Even at sub
period 4 the relative error is not much more than one percent!
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Sub period: c: rel. error c: c’: rel. error c’:
1 0.8 0.285714286 0.7 0.183673469
2 0.61 0.06323185 0.64 0.107142857
3 0.592 0.034749035 0.583 0.019848076
4 0.5749 0.006038317 0.5776 0.010684606
5 0.57328 0.003229536 0.57247 0.001819185
6 0.571741 0.000546451 0.571984 0.000971056
7 0.5715952 0.000291515 0.5715223 0.000163998
8 0.57145669 4.92051E − 05 0.57147856 8.74723E − 05
2.2 Stochastic Reactive Strategies : Accumulated
Discounted Payoffs
An important point in the classical setup of stochastic reactive strategies as pre-
sented by Hofbauer is that payoffs are formally obtained after an infinite number of
subperiods is played, and in addition that these payoffs only depend on the expected
payoff in period infinity. In many economic situations however payoffs are obtained
period by period and accumulated over time. Also these payoffs need to be properly
discounted and in fact the equilibrium of the new game may crucially depend on
the individual agents time preference rate. In order to adapt Hofbauers model in
this way, we proceed as follows. Let us first assume that the game is repeated for
N -periods each of length ∆T = T
N
. If sn, s
′
n ∈ {e1, e2} denote the realization, i.e.
the stochastic choice at time t, then we assume that payoffs are obtained in each
period from the payoff matrix A, scaled with respect to the length of the period and
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accordingly discounted to present value term, i.e.
N∑
n=0
stnAs
′
n∆T
(1 + r1∆T )n
resp.
N∑
n=0
stnBs
′
n∆T
(1 + r2∆T )n
Here r1 and r2 denote the individual discount-rates. The process (sn, s
′
n)
t can for-
mally be considered as a Markov process with four possible states and transition
probabilities can easily be computed from the values p, p′, q, q′ from above. Then the
expected payoff over the N -periods in the interval [0, T ] for player 1 is given by
E
(
N∑
n=0
stnAs
′
n∆T
(1 + r1∆T )n
)
=
N∑
n=0
(cn, 1− cn)A
 c′n
1− c′n
∆T
(1 + r1∆T )n
.
A similar formula holds for the expected payoff of player 2, with B replacing A
and r2 replacing r1. It is clear that the probabilities cn and c
′
n can be computed as
functions of p, q, p′ and q′. Rather than replacing cn and c′n by their limits c and c
′
which corresponds to the Hofbauer setup, we will later derive explicit formulas of
these functions. The result of this construction is a game which is played over N
periods of length ∆T with payoffs
PN1
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = N∑
n=0
(cn, 1− cn)A
 c′n
1− c′n
∆T

(1 + r1∆T )n
PN2
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = N∑
n=0
(cn, 1− cn)B
 c′n
1− c′n
∆T
(1 + r2∆T )n
.
Now we let N go to infinity, while keeping T fixed, which is equivalent to letting
∆T = T
N
go to zero. The result is a two player game with strategy sets [0, 1]× [0, 1]
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and payoffs according to
P1
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = lim
N→∞
N∑
n=0
(cn, 1− cn)A
 c′n
1− c′n
 T
N
(1 + r1
T
N
)n
P2
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = lim
N→∞
N∑
n=0
(cn, 1− cn)B
 c′n
1− c′n
 T
N
(1 + r2
T
N
)n
.
We show in the following section that these limits exist and in fact relate to the
Hofbauer payoffs (non-symmetrically) scaled by an appropriate discount factor.
2.3 The Relation between Classical and Accumu-
lated Payoffs
In order to proceed in relating the classical Hofbauer payoffs with the payoffs defined
in the previous section we need the following technical Lemmas:
Lemma 2.3.1 (cn-representation)
c2n = c+ (c0 − c)(p− q)n(p′ − q′)n ; c2n+1 = c+ (c1 + c)(p− q)n(p′ − q′)n
and
c′2n = c
′ + (c′0 − c′)(p− q)n(p′ − q′)n ; c′2n+1 = c′ + (c′1 + c)(p− q)n(p′ − q′)n
As there will arise discounted sums in the proof of the main result of this section
we should first mention them:
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Lemma 2.3.2 (discounted sum) For any non negative discount rate r and any
y ∈ (−1, 1) the following two statements hold true:
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
(
1(
1 + r
N
))n = 1
r
(
1− e−r)
and
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
(
y(
1 + r
N
)2
)n
= 0
Proposition 2.3.3 given some finite time interval T and fixed strategies v and v′
with their corresponding unconditional long run probabilities c and c′ then
P1
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = 1
r1T
(1− e−r1T )(c, 1− c)A
 c′
1− c′
 (2.3)
and
P2
 p
q
 ,
 p′
q′
 = 1
r2T
(1− e−r2T )(c, 1− c)B
 c′
1− c′
 (2.4)
Where A and B such as r1 and r2 denote each players payoff matrix and discount
factor.
Proof:
We have to show that
lim
N→∞
N∑
n=0
T
N(
1 + rT
N
)n (cn, 1− cn)A
 c′n
1− c′n
 = 1
rT
(1− e−rT )(c, 1− c)A
 c′
1− c′

holds for any arbitrary matrix
A =
 α β
γ δ

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Without loss of generality we assume T = 1. Then
N∑
n=0
1
N
(1 + r
N
)n
(cn, 1− cn)A
 c′n
1− c′n
 = N∑
n=0
1
N
(1 + r
N
)n
[δ + (β − δ)cn + (γ − δ)c′n]
+
N∑
n=0
1
N
(1 + r
N
)n
(α + δ − β − γ)cnc′n
=
δ
N
N∑
n=0
(
1
1 + r
N
)n
+
β − δ
N
N∑
n=0
cn(
1 + r
N
)n + γ − δ
N
N∑
n=0
c′n(
1 + r
N
)n
+
α + δ − β − γ
N
N∑
n=0
cnc
′
n(
1 + r
N
)n
By Lemma 2.3.2 we know that the first summand converges to
δ
r
(1− e−r)
Next to consider the last summand: Using the representations of Lemma 2.3.1 and
denoting (p− q)(p′ − q′) by y we see
2N∑
n=0
cnc
′
n
1
2N(
1 + r
2N
)n = 1
2N
2N∑
n=0
cc′
(1 + r
2N
)n
+
1
2N
[
(c0 − c)(c′0 − c′)
N∑
n=0
y2n
(1 + r
N
)2n
+ (c′(c0 − c) + c(c′0 − c′))
N∑
n=0
yn
(1 + r
2N
)2n
]
+
1
2N
[
(c1 − c)(c′1 − c′)
1 + r
N
N−1∑
n=0
y2n
(1 + r
N
)2n
+
c′(c1 − c) + c(c′1 − c′)
1 + r
N
N−1∑
n=0
yn
(1 + r
2N
)2n
]
Again by Lemma 2.3.2 (second statement) and since −1 < y < 1 by assumption we
know that the last two expressions converge to zero as N tends to∞. A very similar
result holds true for 2N + 1. Hence
lim
N→∞
N∑
n=0
cnc
′
n
1
N(
1 + r
2N
)n = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
cc′
(1 + r
N
)n
=
cc′
r
(1− e−r)
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In an analogous way one can show the following
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
cn
(1 + 1
N
)n
=
c
r
(1− e−r)
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
c′n
(1 + 1
N
)n
=
c′
r
(1− e−r)
Therefore we have
lim
N→∞
N∑
n=0
T
N(
1 + rT
N
)n (cn, 1− cn)A
 c′n
1− c′n
 = 1
r
(1− e−r)
[
δ + (β − δ)c
+(γ − δ)c′ + (α + δ − β − γ)cc′
]
=
1
r
(1− e−r)(c, 1− c)A
 c′
1− c′

which is the statement for r1, r2 > 0. If r1 = 0 or r2 = 0 the result follows from
1−e−rT
rT
r→0−→ 1.

The following proposition states that discount factors do not have an immediate
effect on the equilibria. We note however that they may very well be significant in a
more dynamic setup, where they relate to the speed of adjustment, and possibly to
the stability of the equilibria.
Proposition 2.3.4 The discount rates r1, r2 have no effect on the equilibrium strate-
gies, i.e. a pair of stochastic reaction strategies (v, v′) is a Nash-equilibrium for dis-
count factors r1, r2 if and only if it is a Nash-equilibrium for discount factors r˜1, r˜2.
Proof:
This follows immediately from Proposition 2.3.3 and the invariance of Nash-equilibria
under positive affine transformation, see for example (Weibull 1995).
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
As a consequence of Proposition 2.3.4 we can without loss of generality assume
that r1, r2 = 0 in the reminder of this chapter, as long as we are only interested in
the equilibria itself.
2.4 The Model
In this section we apply the formal setup developed in the previous sections to the
original Barro Gordon game as it is stated as a one shot game in (Barro & Gordon
1983b). In contrast to (Barro & Gordon 1983b) we assume that this particular game is
played repeatedly for infinitely many times within the original period [0, T ] according
to some fixed stochastic reaction strategies. Whenever the game was played a payoff
for each player arises. These infinitely many payoffs are discounted and accumulate
over time to produce a payoff for the whole period as described in the previous
section. If one only believe in finitely many sub periods (e.g. four) our concept is
still reasonable by the fast convergence as shown in the previous table. We now have
to specify the matrices A and B that correspond to the original Barro and Gordon
game. To be consistent with game theoretic standards we would like to deal with
welfare functions rather than cost functions. Furthermore, we set the parameters a
and b equal to 1. Hence by (A.1) and (A.2) we get
Zt := (pit − piet )−
1
2
pi2t (2.5)
for the central bank and
−(pit − piet )2 (2.6)
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for the private agents. Under these assumptions, the discretionary rate, obtained
when optimizing equation (2.5) is given by 1. The payoff the monetary authority gets
then equals 1
2
if the private agents choose piet = 0 respectively −12 if the private sector
chooses piet = 1. If the central bank chooses pi = 0 it gets 0 (for pi
e
t = 0) respectively
−1 given piet = 1. The private agents on the other hand get 0 if they were right and
−1 if not. In particular we have:
Strategy Payoff
Bank Private Agents Bank Private Agents
zero zero 0 0
zero discretion −1 −1
discretion zero 1
2
−1
discretion discretion −1
2
0
For convenience we multiply the payoffs of the monetary authority by two. As
this is a positive affine transformation it does not affect the Nash-equilibria at all.
Hence suitable payoff matrices for the bank and the private agents are given by
A :=
 0 −2
1 −1
 and B :=
 0 −1
−1 0
 (2.7)
Though the game is started by the private agents, in the following we think of the
bank to be player one and the private agents to represent player two (i.e. the mon-
etary authority’s strategy is denoted by v, whilst v′ is the strategy of the private
agents). Let us re-emphasize however, that for the original one-shot game it does in
fact not matter whether the game is started by the private agents or played simul-
taneously. The concrete interpretation of p, q, p′, q′ in this case is given as follows:
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(MA=monetary authority, PA= private agents)
p = MA sets inflation low given PA expected low inflation in the previous round
q = MA sets inflation low given PA expected high inflation in the previous round
p′ = PA expect low inflation given MA delivered low inflation in the previous round
q′ = PA expect low inflation given MA delivered high inflation in the previous round
For a fixed set of probabilities, i.e. fixed strategies v =
 p
q
 and v′ =
 p′
q′
, the
payoffs are given by
P1(v, v′) = (c, 1− c)
 0 −2
1 −1
 c′
1− c′
 = 2c′ − c− 1 (2.8)
and
P2(v, v′) = (c, 1− c)
 0 −1
−1 0
 c′
1− c′
 = 2cc′ − c− c′ (2.9)
where c and c′ are given as functions of p, q, p′ and q′ as in (2.2). It is worth noting
that the private agents’ optimal payoff is given by 0.
Lemma 2.4.1 The payoff for the private agents never exceeds 0. It will be equal to
0 if and only if either c = c′ = 0 or c = c′ = 1 holds.
Proof:
Clearly c, c′ ∈ [0, 1] implies that
2cc′ − c− c′ = c(c′ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
) + c′(c− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
)
with equality if and only if c = c′ = 0 or c = c′ = 1. The statement therefore follows
from equation 2.9.
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
So far we have motivated the use of stochastic reaction strategies and have devel-
oped a concrete model based on the original Barro and Gordon game. We will now
focus on particular Nash-equilibria of this game.
2.5 The Discretionary Nash Equilibrium
We indicated before that we can think of the strategies v = (p, q)> and v′ = (p′, q′)>
as being on the genetic level, while they relate to phenotypic strategies c, c′, which
in fact relate to mixed strategies in the original Barro-Gordon game, i.e. mixed in
discretion and zero-inflation. In this section we study under which conditions the
discretionary phenotype, i.e. high inflation delivered by the monetary authority and
high inflation expected by the private agents, can be realized as a Nash-equilibrium
on the genotypic level. We will show that this poses rather restrictive assumption on
the behavior of the private agents. First of all we note that (pure) discretion is the
case if and only if c = c′ = 0. To start with, we need to identify the genotypes which
belong to the phenotype discretion.
Lemma 2.5.1 Discretionary phenotypes always require q = q′ = 0. More precisely
we state that c = c′ = 0 implies q = q′ = 0 and furthermore if p < 1 or p′ < 1 then
q = q′ = 0 implies c = c′ = 0.
Proof:
Looking at the formulas for c and c′ (2.2) the second statement is obvious. Now
suppose c, c′ and q are equal to zero. Then we conclude from pp′ < 1 and (2.2)
0 =q′ + q(p′ − q′)
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Similarly, assuming that q′ = 0 we find that q = 0. Hence suppose q 6= 0 and q′ 6= 0.
Then
0 = q + q′(p− q) and 0 = q′ + q(p′ − q′)
⇒ p− q = − q
q′
and p′ − q′ = −q
′
q
⇒ p− q = 1
p′ − q′ .
The only two strategies satisfying this relation are (1, 0, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 0, 1). As can
be easily verified, (0, 1, 0, 1) never delivers c = c′ = 0. Hence q = q′ = 0.

The following Corollary states that each players payoff under discretionary behavior
is independent of the values p and p′. This fact will play an important part in the
proof of our first main theorem.
Corollary 2.5.2 Assume that 0 ≤ p+ p˜, p′ + p˜′ and either p+ p˜ < 1 or p′ + p˜′ < 1.
Then we have
P1(p, 0, p′, 0) = P1(p+ p˜, 0, p′ + p˜′, 0) = −1
P2(p, 0, p′, 0) = P2(p+ p˜, 0, p′ + p˜′, 0) = 0.
Proof:
By the previous Lemma c and c′ are zero for any choice of p and p′ as long as
q, q′ = 0 and p, p′ < 1 holds. The result then follows directly from (2.8) and (2.9).

An immediate consequence is that in our setup, discretion can no longer be realized
as a strict Nash-equilibrium. The next theorem shows that there are in fact genotypic
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strategies which lead to discretion, but do not represent a Nash-equilibrium. This
in turn gives scope for evolutionary drift away from a high inflation state on the
phenotypic level. The following theorem contains our first main result.
Theorem 2.5.3 Among all the strategies leading to discretionary behavior only those
represent Nash equilibria, which satisfy that p′ ≤ 1
2
.
Proof:
We have to show the following:
P1(p, 0, p′, 0) ≥ P1(p˜, q˜, p′, 0) ∀p˜, q˜ ∈ [0, 1] (2.10)
respectively
P2(p, 0, p′, 0) ≥ P2(p, 0, p˜′, q˜′) ∀p˜′, q˜′ ∈ [0, 1] (2.11)
if and only if p′ ≤ 1
2
. Equation (2.11) is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.5.1 and
Lemma 2.4.1. Let us therefore turn to equation (2.10). It follows from Corollary
2.5.2 that
P1(p, 0, p′, 0) = P1(p˜, 0, p′, 0).
In order to establish equation (2.10) it therefore suffices to show that the function
q˜ 7→ P1(p˜, q˜, p′, 0)
is monotonically decreasing in q˜ ∈ [0, 1]. Using the formulas (A.6) and (A.12) from
the appendix it is easy to verify that
∂
∂q˜
P1(p˜, q˜, p′, 0) = (2p′ − 1) 1− p˜p
′
(1− (p˜− q˜)p′)2 .
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Note that neither 1 − p˜p′ nor (1 − (p˜ − q˜)p′)2 can ever be negative. Under the
assumption that p′ ≤ 1
2
the derivative above is therefore negative for all q˜ ∈ [0, 1] and
equation (2.10) holds. On the other hand if p′ > 1
2
, a positive derivative at q˜ = 0
implies that (2.10) can not hold, which concludes the proof.

Let us remind ourselves for the moment that p′ denotes the conditional probability
that private agents expect low inflation given that the monetary authority delivered
low inflation in the previous round. The level of p′ can therefore be interpreted as
a trust parameter, which on a different time scale than considered here, may have
been arisen from an effect of reputation of the monetary authority. The condition in
Theorem 2.5.3 that p′ ≤ 1
2
can then be interpreted, that discretion can only persist
as a Nash-equilibrium in our setup, if the reputation of the monetary authority and
hence the trust of the private agents in the monetary authority has been significantly
damaged.
2.6 The Zero Inflation Equilibrium
In this section we study how low inflation can arise as a Nash-equilibrium on the
phenotypic level. It will turn out, that the analysis is very similar to the one carried
out in the previous section. For matter of completeness and illustration though, we
include all necessary arguments. First of all note that the zero inflation phenotype
corresponds to the case c = c′ = 1. In analogy to Lemma 2.5.1 the following Lemma
helps us to identify those genotypic strategies which correspond to the phenotype
zero inflation and can be achieved if and only if p = p′ = 1:
Stochastic Reaction Strategies 64
Lemma 2.6.1 Zero-inflation phenotypes require p = p′ = 1. Furthermore if q > 0
or q′ > 0 then p = p′ = 1 implies c = c′ = 1.
Proof:
The second statement follows directly from the formulas for c and c′ (see (2.2)).
In order to see that the first implication holds, let us assume for the moment that
q > 0 or q′ > 0 holds. Then c = 1 implies
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) = q + q′(p− q)
⇔ 1− p′(p− q) = q
⇔ 1− pp′ = q(1− p′)
⇔ 1− q = p′(p− q).
For p < q and p′ > 0 the last expression has no solution, whereas p > q implies p′ ≥ 1
with equality if and only if p = 1. For p = q the above expression can only be fulfilled
if p = q = 1. On the other hand c′ = 1 yields
1− q′ = p(p′ − q′),
which reduces to 1 = p′ if p = 1 as required. To cover the case q = q′ = 0 note that
c and c′ are equal to zero whenever pp′ < 1. Hence p = p′ = 1 must hold.

We will later need the following result which is proved in complete analogy to Corol-
lary 2.5.2.
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Corollary 2.6.2 Assume that q + q˜, q′ + q˜′ ≤ 1 and either q + q˜ > 0 or q′ + q˜′ > 0,
then the following holds
P1(1, q, 1, q′) = P1(1, q + q˜, 1, q′ + q˜′)
P2(1, q, 1, q′) = P2(1, q + q˜, 1, q′ + q˜′).
The following Theorem includes our second main result.
Theorem 2.6.3 Among all strategies leading to zero inflation only those are a Nash
equilibriums, which satisfy q′ ≤ 1
2
.
Proof:
Similar as in the proof of Theorem ?? we have to show that
P1(1, q, 1, q′) ≥ P1(p˜, q˜, 1, q′) ∀p˜, q˜ ∈ [0, 1] (2.12)
P2(1, q, 1, q′) ≥ P2(1, q, p˜′, q˜′) ∀p˜′, q˜′ ∈ [0, 1] (2.13)
if and only if q′ ≤ 1
2
. Let us note that P2(·) equals zero whenever p = p′ = 1 and
that this is optimal for the private agents. Therefore the inequality (2.13) holds in
any case. Now, considering inequality (2.12), we note that from Corollary 7.2. we
can conclude that
P1(1, q, 1, q′) = P1(1, q˜, 1, q′)
and that (2.12) would therefore hold, if the function
p˜ 7→ P1(p˜, q˜, 1, q′)
is monotonically increasing in p˜ ∈ [0, 1]. Now using equations (A.5) and (A.11) in
the appendix it can be easily verified that
∂
∂p˜
P1(p˜, q˜, 1, q′) = (1− 2q′) q
′ + q˜(1− q′)
(1− (p˜− q˜)(1− q′))2 .
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Note that the nominator and denominator of the fraction are both positive and
therefore that the derivative is positive as long as q′ ≤ 1
2
, which establishes inequality
(2.12). On the other side if q > 1
2
a negative derivative at p˜ = 1 implies that (2.12)
can not hold, which concludes the proof.

As in the previous section let us briefly elaborate on the meaning of the condition
in Theorem 2.6.3. We have that q′ is given by the conditional probability that private
agents expect low inflation given that the monetary authority delivered high inflation
in the previous round. Therefore q′ can be interpreted as some kind of ignorance of
the private agents with respect to observed behavior of the monetary authority. The
interpretation of Theorem 2.6.3 is therefore, that as long as the level of ignorance is
sufficiently low q′ ≤ 1
2
, zero-inflation can very well be realized as a Nash-equilibrium.
Combining this result with Theorem 2.5.3, we can state that under the assumption
that the reputation of the monetary authority resp. the private agents trust in the
monetary authority is not significantly damaged while on the other hand, the private
agents are not blind and ignorant toward the monetary authorities action, zero infla-
tion is realized as a Nash equilibrium, while the classical Barro-Gordon high inflation,
discretionary policy is not.
Finally we remark, that we can not exclude further equilibria on the genotypic
level, which in fact correspond to mixed strategies in the original Barro-Gordon game.
The analysis in this chapter was mainly motivated by establishing the impossibility
of discretion and the possibility of zero-inflation as a Nash equilibrium in a (modified)
Barro-Gordon framework.
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Figure 2.1: On the left the discretionary equilibrium: q = q′ = 0 and p′ ≤ 1
2
! On the
right the zero inflation equilibrium: p = p′ = 1 and q′ ≤ 1
2
!
2.7 Conclusion
In the original Barro Gordon game (the one shot game version) discretion is the only
one Nash equilibrium. Furthermore it is a strict Nash equilibrium. As we have seen
in the last two sections this is not longer the case for our continuous time version
of the game. Furthermore we have seen that there are strategies p, q and p′, q′ that
lead to discretion resp. to zero inflation. Among those there are strategies such that
discretion (resp. zero inflation) is a Nash equilibrium (for p′ ≤ 1
2
resp. q′ ≤ 1
2
). In
this sense discretion and zero inflation are now of the same quality (see Figure 2.1).
Discretion as a Nash equilibrium becomes even more unlikely if one assumes a
strategy more likely to Tit For Tat for the private agents. In particular the private
agents tend not to believe in zero inflation again when they just see discretion. On
the other hand they are more likely to believe in zero inflation if zero inflation is
the case right now. In other words the private agents would always have a strategy
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such that q′ < 1
2
and p′ > 1
2
. Under this restriction by Theorem 2.5.3 we know that
discretion is never a Nash equilibrium, whilst by Theorem 2.6.3 we know that zero
inflation is always a Nash equilibrium.
Chapter 3
Inflation Linked Bonds from a
Central Bank’s Perspective
Previously we have seen how a change in the central bank’s and private agent’s
strategy can explain lower inflationary equilibria. This and the next chapter raises
the question in how far financial markets might play a role. To this end we consider a
continuous time framework in which the central bank can dynamically adjust inflation
similar as in a repeated Barro and Gordon type model but in addition to that,
can issue inflation linked bonds, which it sells on the open market. The central
bank’s objective is to maximize a functional, which measures the classical trade-off
between output and inflation in Barro and Gordon style, but aggregated in time,
plus income from the sale of inflation linked bonds and payments for the liabilities
that the inflation linked bonds produce at maturity. In this context we derive an
analytical pricing formula for inflation linked bonds and study the consequences that
the sales have on the observed inflation rate and price level. To the best of our
knowledge, this chapter presents the first pricing formula for inflation linked bonds
69
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in which monetary policy is integrated. Classical financial mathematical models like
in (Jarrow & Yilderim 2003) or (Braun 2008) assume inflation as given by a pure
exogenous stochastic process.
3.1 Setting up the Model
This section is aimed to provide us with the basic underlying optimization problem in
its most general form. We use the New Classical Phillips curve approach as intruduced
in section I.2.5. It provides us with the relation
yt = y
n
t + aˆ(pit − piet )
between real output growth yt, natural real output growth y
n
t , actual inflation pit and
expected inflation piet . The central bank is tempted to increase inflation pit in order to
generate more output. In a first order approximation the central banks accumulated
gains (in real terms) over the time interval [t, T ] following the policy pit is given by
Y nt
∫ T
t
aˆ(pis − pies)ds,
where Y nt is (absolute) natural real output. In the following we assume for simplicity
that Y nt is constant. Alternatively one can think of the the central bank optimizing
relative to natural output. For notational simplicity and in order to avoid introducing
an extra parameter, we also keep writing aa for the expression Y nt aˆ, i.e. by default we
multiply the Phillips curve slope parameter with natural real output at a reference
time. This results in the relation
Yt = Y
n
t + a(pit − piet ) (3.1)
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between output and inflation, now in absolute and real terms.
On the social level however, high inflation is perceived as a bad thing and we
therefore include a social cost term, which we assume to be quadratic of type λ˜
2
pi2t .
These costs are measured in real monetary terms too. The central bank’s instanta-
neous benefit function that is classically used in Barro and Gordon type analysis is
then derived from (3.1) subtracting social costs:
a(pit − piet )−
λ˜
2
pi2t = a
(
pit − piet −
λ
2
pi2t
)
, (3.2)
with λ := λ˜
a
. Note that expression (3.2) can be identified with a monetary payoff in
real terms. We take this point of view in the remainder of this chapter.
Further we assume that private agents build their expectation on the actual in-
flation rate, following an adaptive learning process
dpiet = γ(pit − piet )dt, (3.3)
where the parameter γ is a measure for the speed of adjustment of expected inflation
to actual inflation. This linear rule to adapt inflationary expectation is also used in
(Cohen-Cole & Cosmaciuc 1999) and was invented by Phelps in (Phelps 1967). For
a general discussion see also (Evans & Honkapohja 2001). More precisely we assume
that actual inflation is given by
pit = ut + σW˙t, (3.4)
where ut is the inflation rate chosen by the central bank and W˙t is a white noise
process, i.e. the continuous time analogue to an i.i.d sequence of independent normal
distributed random variables in a discrete time model. The white noise process W˙t
satisfies the relationship
∫ t
0
W˙sds = Wt with Wt a standard Brownian motion, which
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will lead us into a Wiener process based framework. Using this, substitution of (3.4)
into (3.3) leads to
dpiet = γ(ut − piet )dt+ γσdWt. (3.5)
We note that the variance of W˙t is infinite, and therefore in order to guarantee that
the instantaneous payoff function (3.2) has finite expectation, we need to replace
pi2t , which would have been a more natural candidate otherwise, with u
2
t . We can
say though, that the infinite variance part of pit does not depend on ut and would
affect the instantaneous payoff functional (3.2) always in the same way, independent
of what value for ut is chosen. Under this perspective we do not really change the
optimization problem (3.2) by replacing pi2t with u
2
t . By r we denote the central bank’s
time preference parameter for measuring future against current objectives. Note that
in general r does not have to coincide with the market interest rate, which we will
later denote by ri.
Hence the underlying optimization problem in a stochastic framework over a finite
period of time [s, T ] is then given as:
max
ut
E
∫ T
s
e−rt
(
pit − piet −
λ
2
u2t
)
dt = max
ut
E
∫ T
s
e−rt
(
ut − piet −
λ
2
u2t
)
dt, (3.6)
where we have used
E
∫ T
s
pitdt = E
∫ T
s
ut + σW˙tdt = E
∫ T
s
ut + σEWT = E
∫ T
s
utdt.
It is not hard to solve this problem using a standard HJB-approach. With the results
provided in the appendix (also see the derivation of equations (3.20) and (3.21) later)
it is not difficult to see that the optimal control is given by
u∗t =
1
λ(γ + r)
(
γe(γ+r)(t−T ) + r
)
.
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So far we have set up the central banks optimization problem without including an
inflation linked bond (ILB). Once the central bank shorts an ILB it faces an additional
(negative) terminal payoff. According to definition I.1.1 we interpret the inflation as
a rate of the price level which will be denoted by Pt. By definition of an instantaneous
rate it is obvious that
dPt =Ptpitdt = Pt(utdt+ σdWt), (3.7)
and hence
PT =Pse
∫ T
s pitdt = e
∫ T
s utdt−σ
2
2
(T−s)+σWT−s .
The payoff of an inflation linked bond is linked to the price level in the following way:
Definition 3.1.1 (Inflation Linked Bond) An inflation linked bond (ILB) that is
issued at time s, with maturity time T and face value one Dollar is a financial contract
that pays off PT
Ps
· 1 Dollar at time T . Where Ps is the price level at time s < T .
Alternatively, one could say that an ILB is a contract that pays off 1 Dollar in
terms of today’s money. If today’s price level Ps is normed to unity this coincides
with real terms. Note that the notional has been normed to one here in terms of
today’s money, not necessarily in terms of goods if Ps deviates from one. However
in reality different notional may exist. We assume that the central bank sells ILB’s,
such as it is the case in the UK and the USA. Assuming the bank sells a number N of
ILB’s, which for simplicity we assume are all of the same maturity T , the central bank
enters a liability of a dollar payment of N · PT
Ps
at time maturity T . In the following
we will assume a structuring approach as it is common use in financial industry:
At time s < T any of the individual ILB’s can be structured into an ordinary zero
coupon bond Bs with face value 1 dollar and the inflation compensation
PT−Ps
Ps
· 1$.
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We assume that the market interest rate ri is deterministic, and hence an ordinary
zero coupon bond is valued at Bs = e
−ri(T−s). We further assume that the central
bank buys such zero coupon bonds from private banks, which will take them out of
the balance sheet of the central bank. The inflation compensation of PT−Ps
Ps
dollars
however remains as the central bank’s liability. In fact, what the central bank is then
left with is another financial derivative:
Definition 3.1.2 (Inflation Linked Forward Contract) An inflation linked for-
ward contract (ILFC) that is issued at time s, with maturity time T and face value
1 Dollar is a financial contract that pays off PT−Ps
Ps
· 1 Dollar at time T . where Ps is
the price level at time s.
By this structuring approach the central bank can hedge its obligation as we
should see:
• The ILB pays off PT
Ps
· 1$ at maturity time T .
• The ordinary zero coupon bond with face value one Dollar plus the ILFC (when
structured as above) also pays off 1$ + PT−Ps
Ps
· 1$ = PT
Ps
· 1$ at maturity time T .
Each of these payments can be converted into today’s money via the factor Ps
PT
and into real money (i.e. goods) via the factor 1
PT
. Hence the ILB’s payoff measured
in terms of today’s money is Ps
PT
· PT
Ps
· 1$ = 1$ respectively in terms of real money (i.e.
goods) it is given as 1
PT
· PT
Ps
· 1$ = 1
Ps
goods. Further the ILFC’s payoff measured in
terms of today’s money is Ps
PT
· PT−Ps
Ps
· 1$ = PT−Ps
PT
· 1$, whilst in terms of real money
it is 1
PT
· PT−Ps
Ps
· 1$ = PT−Ps
PT
· 1
Ps
goods.
In our analysis, we assume that the central bank optimizes its obligation due to
the ILFC in real terms, which keeps us in line with the models of Barro and Gordon
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et al. The liability in real terms for the central bank from selling a number N of
ILB’s and in fact (after that structuring) being short the same number N of ILFC’s
then becomes
−N
Ps
PT − Ps
PT
= −N
Ps
(
1− Ps
PT
)
:= −N˜
(
1− Ps
PT
)
.
The central bank’s instantaneous real term payoff is given by (3.2). This one has
to be accumulated over time and measured against the terminal real term payoff from
above. Also note N˜ := N
Ps
determines just the number of ILFC’s measured in terms
of real money rather than in terms of today’s money, which is the same if Ps = 1.
Therefore the bank’s objective in this setup can hence be formulated as
Vˆ (s, pie, P,N) :=
max
ut
E
(
a
∫ T
s
e−rt
(
ut − piet −
λ
2
u2t
)
dt− e−r(T−s)N˜
(
1− Ps
PT
) ∣∣∣pies = pie, Ps = P) ,
(3.8)
subject to (3.3) and (3.7). The number of ILB’s (respectively ILFC’s) N for the
moment is assumed to be exogenously given, but will later become a choice variable
as well. Note that the case N = 0 corresponds to the case where no ILB’s (respectively
ILFC’s) are sold. Also note that the discount factor e−r(T−s) in (3.8) comes from
the central bank’s time preference, and is not a priori a financial discount factor.
Mathematically, problem (3.8) represents a stochastic optimal control problem, which
we will approach by classical HJB theory. In order to obtain a compact analytical
solution, we make the following simplifying assumption, which can be justified for
reasonable inflation rates of up to 8%:
1− Ps
PT
≈ log
(
PT
Ps
)
. (3.9)
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Using this approximation, the optimal control problem of the central bank be-
comes
V (s, pie, P,N) :=
max
ut
E
(
a
∫ T
s
e−rt
(
ut − piet −
λ
2
u2t
)
dt− e−r(T−s)N˜ log
(
PT
Ps
) ∣∣∣pies = pie, Ps = P) ,
(3.10)
subject to (3.3) and (3.7). Note that V is still in terms of real money as indicated
by (3.2). In addition note that V (s; pie;P ; 0) = Vˆ (s; pie;P ; 0) and that the quality of
the approximation also depends on the number N of ILB’s (respectively ILFC’s) sold.
We have not yet said anything about the price that the central bank will charge for
the ILB. For N > 0 in general we have that V (s; pie;P ;N) 6= V (s; pie;P ; 0). Clearly
the central bank would want to be appropriately compensated, and therefore charge
a price for the ILFC’s. This one would be given by the difference
Nps(ILFC) = V (s; pi
e;P ; 0)− V (s; pie;P ;N). (3.11)
That is because the right hand side of (3.11) determines the loss for the central bank
due to going short N of these ILFC’s. To price the ILB’s on top of that the central
bank has also to charge the present nominal value of the N zero coupon bonds it
buys from a normal bank. Hence
Nps(ILB) = V (s; pi
e;P ; 0)− V (s; pie;P ;N) +Ne−ri(T−s). (3.12)
Note that depending on the parameters the price for the ILFC can also be a nega-
tive number, possibly leading to arbitrage possibilities on the financial market. In
particular we will see the volatility σ should not be too large in order to guarantee a
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positive price. However, assuming a central bank only issuing inflation linked bonds
and no ILFC’s directly a negative value for (3.11) is also acceptable, as the bank
in addition will have to charge for the ordinary nominal zero coupon bond Bs - see
(3.12). As V is in real terms this then has to be converted by the actual price level
Ps into monetary terms.
Remark 3.1.3 Whatever ut looks like, from standard Itoˆ calculus we know
Pt =Ps exp
(∫ t
s
uνdν − 1
2
σ2(t− s) + σ(Wt −Ws)
)
and
piet =pi
e
se
−γ(t−s) + γ
∫ t
s
eγ(ν−(t−s))uνdν + γσ
∫ t
s
eγ(ν−(t−s))dWν
for some starting time s ≤ t and taking into account the SDEs for Pt and piet .
3.2 Optimal Monetary Policy with ILB’s
In this section we should discuss how optimal monetary policy is effected if the central
bank is short a certain number N of ILB’s respectively ILFC’s. Intuitively it should
be clear that the additional negative terminal payoff should force the central bank to
deliver lower inflation than without.
To do so in detail we start to solve our model given by (3.10). This can be done
completely analytically by an ordinary stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman approach.
Before we can actually start however there is one thing to mention:
In the previous section we set up (3.10). Implicitly there we always assumed the
case where the central bank looks at the value function V at starting time s as it
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is issuing the ILFC’s respectively the structured ILB’s. Therefore when mentioning
the terminal payoff it was sufficient to consider the term PT
Ps
in the log as the bank
got short the ILFC at time s and hence the terminal payment would depend on the
terminal price level PT and todays price level Ps. However we assume the central bank
to issue the N ILFC’s respectively structured ILB’s only once at some time s < T
and then holding the same portfolio for the whole period from s up to maturity T
but instantaniouosly delivering the optimal inflation control ut for all t ∈ [s, T ]. This
requires us to distinguish between the initial price level at time s (when the ILB’s
or ILFC’s were issued) and the current price level at some time t ∈ [s, T ] where the
central bank needs to determine the current value of its portfolio. For convenience
then we also divide the value function V from (3.10) by the parameter a. So for
t ∈ [s, T ] we get:
V˜ (t, pie, Pˆ , P,N) :=
1
a
V (t, pie, Pˆ , P,N) =
max
us
E
(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)
(
us − pies −
λ
2
u2s
)
ds− e−r(T−t) N˜
a
log
(
PT
Pˆ
) ∣∣∣piet = pie, Pt = P, Ps = Pˆ
)
.
(3.13)
Again note in the previous section we always had the special case of Ps = Pˆ =
P = Pt. Further as before then the central bank would need to choose the optimal
control us subject to the constraints (3.3) and (3.7). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation for this problem then is given by
0 = max
u
(
u− pie − λ
2
u2 + u
(
γV˜pie + V˜PP
)
− γV˜piepie
)
+
1
2
σ2
(
V˜PPP
2 + V˜piepieγ
2 + 2V˜piePPγ
)
+ V˜t − rV˜ ,
and by first order conditions of the right hand side the optimal policy u∗ is obtained
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to be
u∗ =
1
λ
(
1 + γV˜pie + V˜PP
)
.
Substituting this into the partial differential equation for the value function we get
0 =
1
λ
(
1 + γV˜pie + V˜PP
)
− pie − 1
2λ
(
1 + γV˜pie + V˜PP
)2
+
1
λ
(
1 + γV˜pie + V˜PP
)(
γV˜pie + V˜PP
)
− γV˜piepie + 1
2
σ2
(
V˜PPP
2 + V˜piepieγ
2 + 2V˜piePPγ
)
+ V˜t − rV˜
=
1
2λ
(
1 + γV˜pie + V˜PP
)2
− pie
(
1 + γV˜pie
)
+
1
2
σ2
(
V˜PPP
2 + V˜piepieγ
2 + 2V˜piePPγ
)
+ V˜t − rV˜ . (3.14)
The value function has to satisfy this PDE subject to the terminal condition
V˜ (T, pie, Pˆ , P,N) = −N˜
a
log
P
Pˆ
. (3.15)
While equation (3.14) may look intimidating, using the substitutions b := − N˜
a
, d :=
−b log(Pˆ ), x1 := P , x2 := pie and G(b) := D(N˜) by Lemma A1.2.1 it is not hard to
verify that a solution is given by
V˜ (t, pie, Pˆ , P,N) = −N˜
a
log
(
P
Pˆ
)
e−r(T−t) + Atpie + Ct +Dt(N), (3.16)
with
At =
1
γ + r
(
e−(γ+r)(T−t) − 1) (3.17)
Ct =
e−r(T−t)
λ(γ + r)2
[r
2
(
1 + er(T−t)
)− re−γ(T−t) (3.18)
+
γ2
2(2γ + r)
(
1− e−(2γ+r)(T−t))]
Dt(N˜) = e
−r(T−t)
[ N˜2
a22λr
(
1− e−r(T−t))+ N˜σ2
a2
(T − t)
− N˜
aλ(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − t) + γ (1− e−(γ+r)(T−t)))]. (3.19)
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For the optimal monetary policy we therefore conclude
u∗t (N˜) =
1
λ(γ + r)
+
(
γe−(γ+r)(T−t) + r
)− N˜e−r(T−t)
aλ
. (3.20)
Noting at this point that the case N = 0 corresponds to the case where the central
bank does not sell any ILB’s, we clearly see from (3.20) that the sale of ILB’s causes
the central bank to aspire lower inflation. It is also noteworthy to say, that the
optimal strategy above is deterministic and does not depend on feedback from piet or
Pt, no matter if ILB’s are sold or not. On the other hand it crucially depends on the
learning rate γ as we will see in more detail in section 3.4.
In the following we denote the corresponding processes of inflation, expected in-
flation, price level etc. under the optimal monetary policy u∗t with the superscript
∗.
For particular levels pies and Ps at time s we have
pi∗t (N˜) =
1
λ(γ + r)
+
(
γe−(γ+r)(T−t) + r
)− N˜e−r(T−t)
aλ
+ σW˙t, (3.21)
pie
∗
t (N˜) = pi
e
se
−γ(t−s) +
γ2e−(γ+r)T e−γ(t−s)
λ(γ + r)(2γ + r)
(
e(2γ+r)t − e(2γ+r)s)+ r
λ(γ + r)
(
eγt − eγs)
− N˜γe
−rT eγ(t−s)
aλ(r − γ)
(
e(r−γ)t − e(r−γ)s)+ γσe−γ(t−s) ∫ t
s
eγνdWν , (3.22)
and
logP ∗t (N) = logPs +
∫ t
s
piνdν − 1
2
σ2(t− s)
= logPs +
γ
λ(γ + r)2
(
e−(γ+r)(T−t) − e−(γ+r)(T−s))+ r(t− s)
λ(γ + r)
− N˜
aλr
(
e−r(T−t) − e−r(T−s))− 1
2
σ2(t− s) + σ (Wt −Ws) , (3.23)
with s ≤ t ≤ T .
From these three equations we conclude the following result:
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Theorem 3.2.1 If the central bank goes short an inflation linked bond (respectively
an inflation linked forward contract), this has an effect on both - The actual and the
expected inflation rate, such as the terminal price level are lower!
Proof:
This is directly seen from the above formulas!

It is noteworthy that this inflation reduction does not come at a cost to the central
bank, as long as it charges a price for the ILFC’s that is larger than V (s,pi
e,P,0)−V (s,pie,P,N)
N˜
per ILFC. In addition, as already mentioned the central bank would need to charge
for the ordinary zero coupon bond when placing ILB’s instead of the ILFC’s on the
market. The private sector is happy to buy a number of ILB’s (respectively ILFC’s),
as it provides inflation protections, from which the private sector will benefit when
making decision about labour employment and future salaries. In practice the amount
N of ILB’s will be determined from supply and demand, which we discuss in section
3.7. However to do so first we need to think about price setting for the ILB.
3.3 Some Investigations
Later on we want to derive pricing decisions for the central bank and financial market
participants. The bank has to weigh up utilities and costs that arise from issuing ILB’s
(respectively ILFC’s). Before we do so in this section we want to give some deeper
insight to the reader of what is actually going on in terms of utility and cost:
Lemma 3.3.1 When the central bank goes short N ILFC’s (or structured ILB’s)
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then from (3.23) we learn the expected terminal payoff for the bank depreciates by
E(suboptimal Payoff(N˜))
=− N˜E log
(
PT
Ps
)
= −N˜(E log(PT )− log(Ps))
=− N˜
(
1
λ(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ (1− e−(γ+r)(T−s)))− 1
2
σ2(T − s)
)
(3.24)
if the central bank sticks to its old policy and it changes by
E(optimal Payoff(N˜))− E(suboptimal Payoff(N˜)) = N˜
2
aλr
(1− e−r(T−s)) (3.25)
if the central bank adjusts its policy to the new optimal one taking the short sell of
the ILFC’s into account!
From this one can conclude the following result:
Lemma 3.3.2 Without resetting the policy in response of being short the ILFC’s at
time s the central bank’s portfolio value depreciates by the expected (according to the
old policy) and discounted terminal payoff the ILFC causes - this is also determined
by
aDs(N˜)− e−r(T−s) N˜
2
a2λr
(1− e−r(T−s)),
with Ds(N˜) given as by (3.17) for starting time s.
Proof:
Just compare aDs(N˜) − N˜2e−r(T−s)a2λr (1 − e−r(T−s)) and the discounted expected ter-
minal payoff in an suboptimal scenario as given by (3.24).

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As a corollary we get the following result concerning the ”profit” the central bank
can make by adjusting to its new policy once it is short the ILFC:
Corollary 3.3.3 Once the central bank is short N ILFC’s by adjusting its policy (to
a new optimal one) at some time s it can make a profit. This profit in expectation is
determined by
e−r(T−s)
N˜2
2aλr
(
1− e−r(T−s)) .
Proof:
By (3.16) the bank’s utility suffers by the term aDs(N) from being short the ILFC.
This was taking into account a new optimal control. On the other hand by the
previous Lemma we see it suffers by the term aDs(N) − e−r(T−s) N˜22aλr (1 − e−r(T−s)).
Hence
aDs(N˜)−
(
aDs(N˜)− e−r(T−s) N˜
2
2aλr
(1− e−r(T−s))
)
= e−r(T−s)
N˜2
2aλr
(
1− e−r(T−s)) .

On the other hand after adjusting to the new policy the expected terminal payoff
is given by (3.25) and therefore we can derive the following cost of adjustment for
the integral part of (3.10):
Corollary 3.3.4 Adjusting to a new (lower) optimal inflation policy when being short
N ILFC’s (respectively N structured ILB’s) is costly for the economy during the period
[s, T ] and the cost in expectation is determined by
e−r(T−s)
N˜2
2aλr
(
1− e−r(T−s)) .
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Proof:
In terms of the terminal payoff by (3.25) we know in expectation the central bank
benefits from adjusting its policy by the term for which the discounted present value
is given by
e−r(T−s)
N˜2
aλr
(1− e−r(T−s)).
On the other hand in the previous corollary we have seen by adjusting the bank’s
entire portfolio benefits by
e−r(T−s)
N˜2
2aλr
(1− e−r(T−s)),
and therefore the integral part of (3.10) has to suffer by the same amount.

We should close this section with a result regarding the expectation of the price
level PT as it is necessary for the next section where we want to have a closer look
at the number N . From the initial Lemma of this section we conclude the following
corollary:
Corollary 3.3.5 When the central bank goes short N ILFC’s (or structured ILB’s)
then, under the optimal policy u∗t (N) the expected terminal price level is given by
E
PT (N)
Ps
=e
1
λ(γ+r)2
(r(γ+r)(T−s)+γ(1−e−(γ+r)(T−s)))− N˜aλr (1−e−r(T−s)).
Furthermore its inverse is in expectation
E
(
Ps
PT (N)
)
=
Ps
EPT (N)
eσ
2(T−s)
=e
− 1
λ(γ+r)2
(r(γ+r)(T−s)+γ(1−e−(γ+r)(T−s)))+ N˜aλr (1−e−r(T−s))+σ2(T−s). (3.26)
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Proof:
Without loss of generality let us assume s = 0 for the moment. Since dPt = Ptpitdt =
Pt(utdt+ σdWt) we have
EPT (N) =Ee
∫ T
0 pit(N˜)dt− 12σ2T = Ee
∫ T
0 ut(N˜)dt− 12σ2T+σWT
and
E
(
1
PT (N)
)
=Ee−
∫ T
0 pit(N˜)dt+
1
2
σ2T = Ee−
∫ T
0 ut(N˜)dt+
1
2
σ2T+σWT .
By a standard result from probability theory we know EeσWT = e
σ2
2
EW 2T . This ex-
plains both, the lack of eσ
2T in the formula for EPT (N)
Ps
such as the factor eσ
2T in the
formula for E Ps
PT (N)
. The rest just follows by computing the deterministic integral∫ T
0
ut(N˜)dt!

3.4 On the Number N of short ILB’s resp. ILFC’s
In this section we discuss the impact the number of issued ILFC’s (respectively struc-
tured ILB’s) has for the central bank’s monetary policy. As we will see the number
N should not be too large. The reason for that is that with too much emphasis on
the terminal payoff the bank would be tempted to deliver negative inflation, which
can hardly be its objective. Depending on the discount rate r and the learning rate
γ it is not hard to determine a value for N where the expected terminal price level
becomes less than Ps. This is equivalent to say that log
(
EPT
Ps
)
≤ 0. From Corollary
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3.3.5 we know
log
(
Et
PT
Ps
)
=
(
1
λ(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ (1− e−(γ+r)(T−s)))− N˜
aλr
(
1− e−r(T−s)))
hence one needs
0 ≤ N ≤ Psar
(1− e−r(T−s))(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ(1− e−(γ+r)(T−s)))
not to have a negative inflation. In figure 3.1 below we see that the number N leading
to expected zero inflation depends more on the private agents’ learning rate γ than
on the bank’s discount rate r. This is because the central bank cannot expect a
long lasting positive effect to the economy via the term pit − piet if the private agents
adjustment rate is quite high. Hence implicitly (bond or no bond) the bank puts more
weight on the term −λ
2
pi2t and this leads to a lower inflation in the first place! However
also from this figure we see that for a high rate of adjustment γ = 10 N ≈ 100, 000
is still a suitable choice not leading to a negative expected inflation.
Another thing is todays value of the central bank’s portfolio if it is short some
ILFC’s (or structured ILB’s). By (3.14) we see that the value of the central bank’s
portfolio does not increase (or decrease) linearly in N . If the central bank is short
too many ILFC’s the expected terminal payoff (i.e. the modulus of N˜ is too big) (i.e
the N˜2-term) becomes dominant and the central bank is better off within the bond.
This is because if the central bank delivers a very high negative inflation during the
period then the bank can expect a high positive (monetary) payoff at maturity due
to the inflation linked puts the bank is long - note the forward contract (the ILFC)
the bank is short can be structured as a long call and a short put, both with strike
Ps. This one has to be quite high to compensate for the loss the central bank faces
in the integral term of (3.10). This means the bank is not better off as soon as a
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Figure 3.1: For a = 109 initial price level P0 = Ps = 1 and time to maturity T = 1
we see the number N that leads to an expected zero inflation rate highly depends on
the learning parameter γ and just slightly on the bank’s discount rate r!
negative inflation is delivered - it must be a fairly high negative inflation. Due to the
central bank’s logarithmic utility there occurs another factor σ
2
2
(T − s). In particular
if we solve the Ds(N˜) term from (3.14) for zero we get
0 ≤ N ≤ Ps2ra
(1− e−r(T−s))(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ(1− e−(γ+r)(T−s)))
− arPsλσ
2(T − s)
1− e−r(T−s) . (3.27)
Hence if there is no uncertainty (i.e. σ = 0) then we immediately see the central
bank is always worse off within the bond as long as expected inflation is not negative.
With uncertainty in general this is no longer true since the arPsλσ
2(T−s)
1−e−r(T−s) -term shifts
the curve upwards. If inflation is highly volatile (maybe caused by some exogenous
velocity shocks - or oil price shocks) then of course the bank faces a high loss due
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to the term λ
2
pi2t . But this loss is existent in either case (bond or no bond). On the
other hand the expected (negative) utility (the logarithm) of inflation (over the whole
period) is lowered by that term σ
2
2
(T − s). Therefore this utility term also increases
the value of the central bank’s portfolio. This effect can be seen in figure 3.2 where
we plot both curves:
Figure 3.2: The new (steeper) curve determines values for N , where the central bank
is indifferent to write an ILB or not.
The steeper curve refers to a value of N , where the central bank is indifferent to go
for the ILFC (respectively the structured ILB) or not. As a fixed volatility of inflation
we have chosen σ = 0.1 and as the central bank ’s initial inflation parameter we have
chosen λ = 40. As we see from this graph the uncertainty term is highly significant
for the change of the central bank’s payoff. In particular we see that for higher values
of γ the curve becomes negative which means the central bank will always improve
the portfolio value by going short the ILFC’s respectively the structured ILB’s.
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Finally we consider the turning point for N . This is the value for N when the
central bank’s portfolio value starts to increase with the absolute value of N . In other
words as long as the number of short ILFC’s is less than this the bank’s portfolio value
is decreasing in N (resp. increasing in −N). Beyond that point the portfolio value
increases in N (resp. decreases in −N). By simply considering first order conditions
of aDt(N˜) (with respect to N˜) we get
N∗ =
Psar
(1− e−r(T−s))(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ(1− e−(γ+r)(T−s)))
− Psarλσ
2(T − s)
2(1− e−t(T−s)) . (3.28)
If there is no stochastic shock (i.e. σ = 0) this coincides with the value for N
where the terminal price level equals the initial one (PT = Ps):
Theorem 3.4.1 If the central bank has perfect control over inflation then its portfolio
value starts to improve in the Notional of the ILFC’s (respectively structured ILB’s)
if and only if the price level at maturity starts to be less than the initial price level
Ps, i.e. prices have decreased over time.
We also should keep in mind the following remark:
Remark 3.4.2 Given uncertainty the plain in the figure 3.1 is shifted downwards.
So suppose N is already equal to N∗ then any further ILFC (resp. structured ILB)
the central bank writes increases the bank’s utility! This is not true if the central bank
has perfect control (i.e. σ = 0) over inflation!
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3.5 Pricing from a Central Bank’s Perspective
The pricing idea for the central bank comes along quite naturally: Previously we
have seen the central bank faces a loss in its utility V˜ (see (3.13)) respectively V (see
(3.10)) as long as (3.27) holds. Therefore the price the bank sets for the ILFC’s has
to compensate for this loss. Further on top of this the central bank has to charge for
the ordinary zero coupon bond. Previously we have mentioned that the central bank
would need to charge an aggregate amount of (3.11) dollar when issuing N ILFC’s
- equivalently the bank requires a compensation as given by (3.12) when selling N
ILB’s. Within the setup developed so far, now we see (3.11) is equivalent to
V˜ (s, pie, P,N)− V˜ (s, pie, P, 0) = Ds(N˜)
N
, (3.29)
with Ds(N˜) as defined in (3.17). To exclude expected deflation also from the previous
section we know that
0 ≤ N ≤ Psar
(1− e−r(T−s))(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ(1− e−(γ+r)(T−s))) . (3.30)
is required. This is a condition on the maximum number of ILFC’s (respectively
structured ILB’s) that the central bank can issue, without causing deflation. We
assume condition (3.30) for the remainder of this chapter. Choosing the number of
ILFC’s at the upper limit in (3.30) guarantees that the expected price level at time
T equals the actual price level Ps from the beginning.
Also in the previous section we have seen
Es
(
log
(
P ∗T (N˜)
Ps
))
= log
Es
(
P ∗T (N˜)
)
Ps
− 1
2
σ2(T − s). (3.31)
Therefore the optimal utility obtained by the central bank, given that it issues the
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maximum number of ILFC’s (respectively ILB’s) is given by
V˜ (s, pie, P,N) =E
(∫ T
s
e−rt
(
u∗t (N˜)− pie∗t (N˜)−
λ
2
(u∗t (N˜))
2
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ pies = pie, Ps = P)
+ e−r(T−s)
N˜
a
σ2(T − s)
2
.
Positivity of the second term makes it still possible, that the central bank is actually
doing better when issuing ILB’s, without receiving any payment for the inflation
compensation component of the bond. However as also seen in the previous section
this can be the case due to a high volatility (great value for σ2) in inflation or due to
a negative inflation. In particular we have seen for positivity of the above (3.27) has
to hold.
Note that there is still the zero coupon bond component Bs, for which the central
bank obviously needs to charge the buyer when issuing ILB’s rather than ILFC’s.
The loss in utility converted into goods per ILFC (or structured ILB) issued by the
central bank is given by
V (s, pie, P, 0)− V (s, pie, P,N)
N
= −aDs(N˜)
N
.
According to the current price level P at time s this has to be converted into nominal
money and therefore the nominal price for the ILFC-component yields
ps(ILFC) = Ps
V (s, pie, P, 0)− V (s, pie, P,N)
N
= −PsaDs(N˜)
N
. (3.32)
Note, here P equals the current price level Ps from the beginning, i.e. at time s.
On top of this the central bank has to charge the price of the zero coupon bond
component, leading to a minimum acceptable price for the ILB issued by the central
bank of
ps(ILB) = e
−ri(T−s) − PsaDs(N˜)
N
.
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This expression can be easily computed with help of equation (3.17), leading to
ps(ILB) =Ps
[
e−r(T−s)
(
1
λ(γ + r)2
[
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ (1− e−(γ+r)(T−s))]− σ2
2
(T − s)
)
− N˜e
−r(T−s)
a2λr
(
1− e−r(T−s))]+ e−ri(T−s). (3.33)
From this formula we achieve some results, which are worth to be formulated and
kept in mind:
Theorem 3.5.1 The price of the ILFC or an ILB is affine linear decreasing in the
number (N) of ILFC’s (respectively structured ILB’s) issued. In other words, the price
of ILFC’s or ILB’s is falling with supply, as one would expect to. It is also noteworthy
that the prices derived in (3.32) and (3.33) do not depend on the current (expected)
inflation rate. The reason for this is that in (3.13) the factor At does not depend on
N and hence cancels out in (3.29). However as seen in figure 3.2 it crucially depends
on private agents learning rate γ. This is intuitively clear since this parameter rather
than the actual level of expected inflation has an impact on the the bank’s policy. The
nominal price also depends on the current price level Ps.
Before considering the buyer perspectives in the remaining sections we should
close this section with some final remark about the central bank’s gain from choosing
the log-approximation for the terminal payoff:
Remark 3.5.2 Previously we mentioned to approximate PT−Ps
PT
by log
(
PT
Ps
)
and set
up the entire optimal control problem using log. However since the customer wants
a simple product we assume at maturity the central bank needs to pay N˜(PT − Ps)
(in monetary terms) respectively N˜ PT−Ps
PT
(in real terms) for the ILFC component.
Since log x ≥ x−1
x
in fact the bank pays slightly less than it has optimized for. This
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difference can be seen a slight profit the central bank makes. Further one can say the
bank does its optimization fairly conservatively!
3.6 Pricing from Market Participants’ Perspective
In the previous section we have seen how the central bank would set a price for an
ILB depending on the number of ILB’s issued. We now look at the demand side and
consider what people in the financial industry would acknowledge as a fair price. To
do so we need to set up a model for an underlying financial market which we assume
to exist, no matter whether ILB’s (respectively ILFC’s) are traded or not.
Before setting up this financial market it is worth to consider the following theorem
telling us that financial agents are indifferent between ILB’s and ILFC’s:
Theorem 3.6.1 From a financial agent’s point of view one is better off with an ILB
instead of an ordinary bond (with a high face value e−ri(T−s) − PsaDs(N˜)N ) if and only
if one is better off with an ILFC instead of an ordinary bond (with a low face value
−PsaDs(N˜)N )!
Proof:
At maturity time T the ILB pays off PT (N˜)
Ps
and the ILFC pays off PT (N˜)−Ps
Ps
. Hence
having some risk neutral pricing measure P˜s (to be constructed later on in this sec-
tion) financial agents would prefer the ILB over an ordinary bond with face value
e−ri(T−s) − PsaDs(N˜)N if
e−ri(T−s) − PsaDs(N˜)
N
≤ e−ri(T−s)E˜s
(
PT (N˜)
Ps
)
(3.34)
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holds. Note the left hand side is the price the central bank would set according to
the previous section. Using the same arguments we see that financial agents prefer
an ILFC over the ordinary bond with face value −PsaDs(N˜)N if
−PsaDs(N˜)
N
≤ e−ri(T−s)E˜s
(
PT (N˜)− Ps
Ps
)
(3.35)
holds. Obviously this inequality is equivalent to (3.34).

This result basically justifies to concentrate only on the ILB for the remainder of
this and the following section!
In the proof of the above theorem we used the risk neutral measure P˜s and the
corresponding expectation operator E˜s. To construct this one we consider a standard
Black Scholes type financial market with one risky asset St (think of a stock) and one
safe asset (in terms of money) Bt, that is the nominal bond. The return rate for the
bond is equal to the nominal interest rate ri. For the stock we assume a standard
geometric Brownian motion with some fixed drift µ > ri and fixed volatility σ˜ which
in general is different from the volatility σ of the price level. Note that the price level
itself is assumed to be non-tradeable. In particular we have:
dBt =Btridt
dSt =St (µdt+ σ˜dWt)
and as before
dPt =Pt (utdt+ σdWt) .
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Note that the stock St and the price level Pt are driven by the same Brownian motion
Wt. For the remainder of this chapter we will assume this for simplicity, though it is
possible to generalize the setup and allow for general correlation between St and Pt.
Under the risk free measure the Stock process is given by
dSt =St
(
ridt+ σ˜dW˜t
)
.
The market price of risk is given by ρ = µ−ri
σ˜
and hence given optimal behavior of
the central bank when N ILFC’s (respectively ILB’s) are sold, the price level process
under the risk neutral measure appears as
dPt =Pt
((
u∗t (N˜)− σρ
)
dt+ σdW˜t
)
⇔ P ∗T (N˜) =Pse
∫ T
s (u∗t (N˜)−σρ− 12σ2)dt+
∫ T
s σdW˜t .
As already mentioned the arbitrage free price of any derivative in this model has
to be computed as the discounted expected payoff under the risk neutral measure.
Hence with E˜s denoting the expectation under the risk neutral measure and Es
the expectation under the central bank’s subjective measure (both conditioned on
information available at time s) today’s fair price is given by
p˜s(ILB) =e
−ri(T−s)E˜s
(
P ∗T (N˜)
Ps
)
= e−ri(T−s)E˜se
∫ T
s (u∗s(N˜)−σρ− 12σ2)ds+
∫ T
s σdW˜t
=e−(ri+σρ)(T−s)e
∫ T
s u
∗
t (N˜)dt
=e−(ri+σρ)(T−s)Es
(
P ∗T (N˜)
Ps
)
.
Note here we used, that the optimal policy u∗ is deterministic. see (3.20). The
last formula covers the demand side. We now have formulas for the bank’s price
ps(N˜) (supply side) as well as the private agent’s price p˜s(N˜) (demand side) and we
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are ready to investigate for what N˜ (respectively N) market equilibrium in ILB’s is
obtained, i.e. ps(N˜) = p˜s(N˜).
3.7 Equilibrium in the Market for ILB’s
Concluding from the previous two sections there will be excess demand from the
financial sector for ILB’s as long as ps(N˜) ≤ p˜s(N˜). As previously seen the latter is
equivalent to (
e−ri(T−s) − aPsDs(N˜)
N
)
≤e−ri(T−s)E˜sP ∗T (N˜)
=e−ri(T−s)e−σ
µ−ri
σ˜
(T−s)EsP ∗T (N˜)
⇔ 0 ≤ e−ri(T−s)
(
E˜sP
∗
T (N˜)− 1
)
+Ps
(
aDs(N˜)
N
)
(3.36)
to hold. In Figure 3.3 we plot ps(N˜) and p˜s(N˜) for a realistic set of parameters a =
109;λ = 30;σ = 0.3; σ˜ = 0.4; r = 0.1; γ = 1;µ = 0.1; ri = 0.05;Ps = 1 and T − s = 1.
The red line corresponds to p˜s(N˜) whilst the blue line represents ps(N˜). There is
excess demand for an ILB whenever the red line is above the blue one, and excess
supply if the red line is below the blue one.
From this we learn that the smaller N , the more attractive the ILB’s are for the
private sector. This holds true for N not too large. In particular we see that (3.36)
holds with equality for N∗ ≈ 4.067∗108 which sets supply equal to demand and hence
can be understood as the equilibrium quantity of ILB’s issued by the central bank.
The equilibrium price ps(N
∗) = p˜s(N∗) in this case is given by 0.925 dollars. The
monetary value of ILB’s issued in this case is therefore given as 376.2 mio Dollar.
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Figure 3.3: There is excess demand for ILB’s whenever the Bank chooses N ≤
4.067 ∗ 108. Supply meets demand when N ≈ 4.067 ∗ 108.
Previously we have seen that E˜sP ∗T (N) = Pse
∫ T
s u
∗
v(N)dv and∫ T
s
u∗v(N)dv =
1
λ(γ + r)2
[
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ(1− e−(γ+r)(T−s))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:η
− N˜
aλr
(
1− e−r(T−s))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:x
.
Further using (3.17) and the notation of η and x introduced above we can write
a
Ds(N˜)
N
= e−r(T−s)
[
1
2
x+
σ2
2
(T − s)− η
]
,
and hence equality in equation (3.36) is equivalent to
0 =Pse
−(ri+σρ)(T−s)eηe−x − e−ri(T−s) + Pse−r(T−s)
(
1
2
x+
σ2
2
(T − s)− η
)
⇔ 0 =e−x + bx− c (3.37)
with
b =
e−r(T−s)
2eηe−(ri+σρ)(T−s)
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and
c =
1
eηe−(ri+σρ)(T−s)
[
e−ri(T−s)
Ps
+ e−r(T−s)
(
η − σ
2
2
(T − s)
)]
.
A solution of equation (3.37) is given by
x1,2 =
c
b
+W
(
−e
− c
b
b
)
=
2
Ps
e(r−ri)(T−s) + 2η − σ2(T − s)
+W
(
−2eηe(r−ri−σρ)(T−s)eσ2(T−s)− 2Ps e(r−ri)(T−s)−2η
)
, (3.38)
where W denotes the Lambert W-function, see (Abramowitz & Stegun 1964). The
subindices in x1,2 indicate that there are possibly two solutions. Mathematically
the reason for this is that for arguments − exp(−1) < x < 0 the Lambert function
delivers two values instead of one. The two possible values for x correspond to two
possible values for N (respectively N˜) via the relationship − N˜
aλr
(
1− e−r(T−s)) = x
introduced earlier. We argue in the following that economically only the smaller
of the two possible values is relevant. For this let f(x) denote the right hand side
of (3.37). Obviously f is a convex function in x with exactly one local minimum
which we denote with x∗. Hence there are solutions to (3.37) if and only if f(x∗) ≤ 0.
Furthermore f is obviously increasing in x for all x ≥ x∗ and decreasing for all x ≤ x∗.
If this is the case let x1 ≤ x∗ ≤ x2 denote the roots of f as given above. On the other
hand (as seen before) there is always demand if f(x) ≥ 0 and hence once x ≥ x2 for
any corresponding N there will always be demand. However there will be no demand
if N is such that x1 < x < x2, while there will be demand if x ≤ x1. In that sense
the central bank can start issuing ILB’s until N is such that x = x1 and a locally
stable equilibrium is attained - i.e. as long as N does not jump to x = x2 the bank
cannot issue more ILB’s. From this analysis we conclude the following:
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Proposition 3.7.1 Let us denote with x1 the smaller of the two values in equation
(3.38). If x1 > 0 then the equilibrium quantity of inflation linked bonds (if issued at
time s) is given by
N∗ =
aλr
(1− e−r(T−s))Ps
[ 2
Ps
e(r−ri)(T−s) + 2η − σ2(T − s)
+W
(
−2eηe(r−ri−σρ)(T−s)eσ2(T−s)− 2Ps e(r−ri)(T−s)−2η
)]
, (3.39)
where the value of the Lambert function is chosen as the smaller of the possibly two
values. The equilibrium price is determined by equation (3.33) as ps(N
∗).
In general it is not guaranteed that x1 ≥ 0. This highly depends on the parameters
- it also depends on the time to maturity T , what suggests that the central bank
would need to dynamically control the ILB supply. Note that while in our analysis
the time s at which the central bank can issue ILB’s is arbitrary, the central bank can
issue ILB’s only once. This of course does not mean that trade of ILB’s terminates
after the central bank has issued the ILB’s. In the contrary, ILB’s will be traded
on the secondary market among private agents and priced within the arbitrage free
framework developed in section 3.5. These trades however will not feed back into
inflation and therefore do not affect monetary policy. In an extension of the model
presented here, one could however allow the central bank to issue ILB’s at different
times consecutively and in fact let the central bank choose these times. We leave this
far more complicated analysis for future research.
In Figure 3.4 we plot N from equation (3.39) against the time to maturity for the
same parameters as before (the blue line). Further we plot the values of N determined
from equation (3.30) leading to a constant expected price level (the red line) against
time to maturity. We observe the following two facts:
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1. The equilibrium N is increasing in time (or decreasing in time to maturity) and
it starts to become positive for time to maturity of about 6.5.
2. There is always positive expected inflation - i.e. the blue line is always below
the red line.
However, both observations critically depend on parameter choice and in general they
do not remain true. For instance the situation dramatically changes when the bank’s
discount rate r is 0.05 instead of 0.1 - see Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.4: The number of ILB’s the bank can issue changes in time to maturity and
first becomes positive for approx. 6.5. However the equilibrium N will never lead to
an expected constant price level (red line is alway above the blue line).
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Figure 3.5: with slightly other parameters the situation changes dramatically. When
issuing the equilibrium N ILB’s with time to maturity of about 3 we observe decreas-
ing expected price level.
3.8 On the Perspective of Financial Agents
In the last two sections we implicitly assumed financial market participants to have
a pure monetary perspective as it is standard in mathematical finance. Under this
assumption we set up an underlying Black Scholes type financial market and found
that financial agents are indifferent between ILB’s and ILFC’s.
However as an ILB is to provide protection against an increase in the price level
one might raise the question whether the monetary perspective is the appropriate one
for market participants - the central bank was also assumed to think in real terms
rather than in money terms! Obviously agents having a real perspective should
drastically change our previous results. In particular we will see that theorem 3.6.1
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does not longer hold true. Furthermore we will see that going for an ILB instead of
an ordinary bond depends on the wealth one has.
First of all we should consider the following result as it might be quite surprising
at a first glance:
Lemma 3.8.1 If there is sufficient uncertainty in the model (i.e. σ2 large enough),
then at the same time for an ILFC one might expect a positive monetary payoff and
a negative real payoff!
Proof:
The payoffs for an ILFC are given by
monetary:
PT − Ps
Ps
and real:
PT − Ps
PsPT
=
1
Ps
− 1
PT
,
and therefore the expectations are given by
monetary: E
PT − Ps
Ps
and real:
1
Ps
− E 1
PT
=
EPT − Pseσ2T
PsEPT
, (3.40)
where the eσ
2T comes from Corollary 3.3.5. So given EPT > Ps for sufficiently large
σ it is possible that the expected real payoff is negative.

Remark 3.8.2 The above result may be surprising. Intuitively we would expect that
the real payoff is always smaller than the monetary one - but why is it possible that
the sign is different? If one thinks of an expectation as an integral over a whole
probability space due some density (here normal density) this result is not surprising
at all: we always have
PT − Ps
PsPT
≤ PT − Ps,
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with equality only for PT = Ps. So whenever ω ∈ Ω is such that the value for the real
perspective is positive then the value for the monetary perspective is also positive and
even greater. Whenever the real perspective is negative then the nominal one is also
negative but again still greater. In the expectational integral both values are measured
via the same density function, where the real perspective always (except on a set of
measure zero) has a lower value.
Someone having a real perspective and therefore buying a financial derivative
(such as an ILFC resp. an ILB) typically does so to be protected against an increase
in the price level. Obviously the value of protection increases with the wealth someone
has: Someone just buying the ILFC component and owning no further money he (or
she) is willing to keep, cannot participate on a lower inflation with this (non existing)
money. Hence here it makes a difference to buy the full ILB or just the cheap ILFC-
part. In particular theorem 3.6.1 does not hold true any more.
In this section we assume financial agents have some market opinion about in-
flation. This justifies to further assume financial agents to be fairly subjective and
therefore we will not deal with anything like a risk neutral measure etc.
An Equilibrium for the Case of an ILFC
Let us start with the ILFC-case. Previously we have seen the nominal price for the
ILFC set by the central bank is given by (3.32). Hence the price in terms of goods
(real money) looks like:
pˆs(N ILFC’s) := −aDs(N˜)
N
.
If the customer buys an ordinary bond for this (real) price pˆs(N ILFC’s) his
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(expected) real money payoff at maturity is given by
pˆse
−ri(T−s)
PT (0)
.
On the other hand the expected real payoff of the ILFC’s was given by (3.40). Hence
risk neutral customers having a subjective pricing measure face the following decision
problem:
pay − aDs(N˜)
N
bond−→ get Payoff(bond) = aPsDs(N˜)e
ri(T−s)
NEPT (0)
eσ
2(T−s)
pay − aDs(N˜)
N
ILFC−→ get Payoff(ILFC) = EPT (N)− Pse
σ2(T−s)
PsEPT (N)
.
Therefore the customer would prefer the ILFC’s over an appropriate ordinary bond
if and only if N is such that NPayoff(bond) ≤ NPayoff(ILFC). This is equivalent to
0 ≤− ex + bx+ c, (3.41)
where
x =
N˜
λar
(
1− e−r(T−s))
b =
e(ri−r)(T−s)
2
c =
(
eη−σ
2(T−s) + e(ri−r)(T−s)
(
σ2
2
(T − s)− η
))
,
with
η =
1
λ(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ(1− e−(γ+r)(T−s))) .
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And a solution of equation (3.41) (if it exists) can be given by
x1,2 =− c
b
−W
(
−e
− c
b
b
)
= −2
(
eη+(r−ri−σ
2)(T−s) + σ2(T − s)− η
)
−W
(
−2e(r−ri)(T−s)e−2
(
eη+(r−ri−σ
2)(T−s)+σ2(T−s)−η
))
⇒ N1,2 = aλrPs
1− e−r(T−s)
[
−2
(
eη+(r−ri−σ
2)(T−s) + σ2(T − s)− η
)
−W
(
−2e(r−ri)(T−s)e−2
(
eη+(r−ri−σ
2)(T−s)+σ2(T−s)−η
))]
. (3.42)
As in the previous section there may be none, one or two real solutions given by
the right hand side of the (3.42). However we should note that here things are slightly
different. The right hand side of (3.41) is concave in x and not convex as (3.37) was.
Therefore when seeking for an equilibrium number N of ILFC’s we need to choose
the greater solution of (3.42)! So let this one be denoted by N2 in the following. Then
we hope N2 to be greater zero. Otherwise there will not be any supply and demand
equilibrium. The existence of such an equilibrium is quite sensitive in the volatility
σ as we can see in figure 3.6:
The read line is the expected real money payoff of an ILFC and the blue line is
the corresponding expected payoff of a normal bond. Hence as in the previous section
there is excess demand whenever the red line is above the blue line, excess supply
whenever vice versa and an equilibrium is attained where both lines cross. As can
be seen by figure 3.6 there is no equilibrium if the volatility is too high (greater than
or equal to 5%). For the other relevant parameters we have chosen the same values
as in the previous section: a = 109;λ = 30; σ˜ = 0.4; r = 0.1; γ = 1; ri = 0.05;Ps =
1 and T − s = 1. As we can see for σ = 4% then an equilibrium is attained for
N ≈ 2.25107.
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Figure 3.6: The less volatile the inflation rate pi is the more it makes sense to invest
into an ILFC instead into a nominal bond.
The Case of ILB
In the case of an ILB rather than an ILFC the Customer can participate on low
inflation due to the underlying notional money he holds. As we will see this makes
him fairly digital in his decision - the amount of money he has is the dominant factor.
Further in this situation there will be no supply-demand equilibrium!
The decision problem a financial agent now faces is as follows:
pay
1
Ps
e−ri(T−s) − aDs(N˜)
N
bond−→ get 1− Psae
ri(T−s)Ds(N˜)
N
EPT (0)
eσ
2(T−s)
pay
1
Ps
e−ri(T−s) − aDs(N˜)
N
ILB−→ get 1
Ps
.
Again the ILB is preferable if and only if
1− Psaeri(T−s)Ds(N˜)
N
≤ e−σ2(T−s) EPT (0)
Ps
.
This leads us to the following result:
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Theorem 3.8.3 From a real value perspective it is worth going for an ILB instead
of an ordinary bond if and only if the underlying Notional is greater than
2aλrPs
1− e−r(T−s)
[(
1− eη−σ2T
)
e(r−ri)(T−s) + η − σ
2
2
(T − s)
]
.
Proof:
This is clear by the above inequality and Corollary 3.3.5 where we can see
log
(
EPT (0)
Ps
)
=
1
λ(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − s) + γ (1− e−(γ+r)(T−s))) .

From this we find that the question to go for an ILB instead of an ordinary
bond highly depends on the relation between nominal market interest rate ri and the
central banks discount rate r:
Corollary 3.8.4 If the central bank has perfect control over inflation (i.e. σ = 0)
and its discount rate r is at least ri then one would always prefer an ILB instead of
an ordinary bond!
Proof:
All the terms with a σ in it vanish and by definition of the exponential series we
see:
(1− eη) e(r−ri)(T−s) + η =
(
1−
∞∑
n=0
ηn
n!
)
e(r−ri)(T−s) + η = η
(
1− e(r−ri)(T−s))− ∞∑
n=2
ηn
n!
.
Obviously log
(
PT (0)
Ps
)
is greater than zero and therefore the whole expression in the
theorem becomes negative whenever r ≥ ri. Hence any non negative Notional makes
it worth going for the ILB.
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
As theorem 3.8.3 has some severe implications we should close this section men-
tioning them:
Remark 3.8.5 Theorem 3.8.3 basically tells us there can never be an equilibrium of
the quality as we had it for ILFC’s or ILB’s under a monetary perspective. There will
be always infinite excess demand as soon as N is above some number. If this number
is smaller or equal than zero ILB-customers will buy as many ILB’s as possible -
i.e. as many as the central bank has issued. If this number is greater than zero, no
individual agent having a rather small budget will buy any ILB. However big player
agents (i.e. someone owning sufficient money and willing to keep it) will have an
incentive to go for (sufficiently many) ILB’s. Ones this (first) step is done all other
customers would follow as then they are better off with an ILB than with a normal
bond. However in that case at least one big player is needed to do this first step.
Alternatively one can think of many (low budget) agents playing an cooperative game
against the bank to reach the critical value of ILB’s issued by the central bank.
3.9 The Incentives for Trade and Conclusion
In the last two sections we have seen under which conditions (i.e. the model parame-
ters, monetary or real (value) perspective, holding a lot of money or not) and to what
extend financial Agents have an incentive to go for an ILB resp. an ILFC instead
of an ordinary nominal bond. For the central bank on the other hand in section 3.5
we assumed an utility indifference approach for pricing the ILB’s respectively the
ILFC’s. This justifies the central bank’s incentive to sell these securities. Further in
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section 3.1 we approximated the terminal real term payoff (i.e. see (3.9). For this
note
1− Ps
PT
≤ log
(
PT
Ps
)
,
with equality for PT
Ps
= 1. Hence when using the above approximation the central
bank is slightly more conservative than necessary. Furthermore the utility indifference
pricing was done with respect to a utility functional V˜1 taking this approximation into
account. In other words the bank can always expect slightly more utility than what
it optimizes and prices for. This results in a slight utility improvement for the central
bank when selling these ILB’s respectively ILFC.
How about the normal bank where the central bank buys the structuring ordinary
bond from? This bank has to pay back the face value (e.g. one dollar) at maturity
in monetary terms. Therefore from a monetary perspective there is nothing wrong
for that bank and the central bank can be treated like a normal customer. From a
real value perspective however things look different for that bank. In the previous
section we have seen that going for an ILB instead of an ordinary bond depends on
the wealth (i.e. the N) the customer has. Obviously the opposite is true for the
normal bank as it suffers from a lower inflation - it has to pay back more (goods) to
the central bank at maturity. To exclude this third party one might rather consider
the case of the ILFC instead of the ILB. For monetary market participants from 3.6.1
we know there is no difference. For the real value case on the other hand we do not
have to consider the player’s problem and our equilibrium story still holds true.
So all in all we have seen how selling ILB’s respectively ILFC’s to the financial
market can make the central bank more inflation averse. The result is a lower inflation
rate pit and in response to that (as private agents form their expectation adaptively)
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a lower expected inflation rate piet . Along the period we look at this comes at some
cost to the economy. However this cost (as we have seen) in expectation is more
than outweighed by the monetary profit (measured in real money) the central bank
has made on the financial market. This money could be used in some other way to
stimulate the economy. Further for future periods the central bank profits from a
lower expected inflation rate piet from the beginning.
Chapter 4
The Value of Credibility
In the previous chapter we have seen how the introduction of an inflation linked
bond (ILB) can force the central bank to deliver a more moderate inflation. In this
continuous time setting (with private agents learning adaptively) the central bank
faced a trade off between its old cost function and an additional obligation payoff at
maturity.
What if private agents’ expectation of future inflation is not formed adaptively but
rationally? To this end in this chapter we extend the standard quadratic inflation
targeting model (I.9) as introduced in (Barro & Gordon 1983a) in the following
way: Before agents announce their expectation the central bank may choose to issue
inflation linked calls (ILC’s) to the financial market. Going short the ILC’s changes
the bank’s loss function due to an additional monetary payment it has to make to
financial agents at maturity when inflation was too high. Private agents knowing this
will choose a more moderate expectation for the inflation rate accordingly. As the
price the bank can get on the market does not compensate for the expected monetary
payoff at maturity the central bank expects a financial loss. However, on the other
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hand the original cost function is decreased due to the reduction of private agents’
inflation expectation. This has to be weighed up against the expected monetary loss.
In that sense we can say the central bank buys credibility. Finally we will find an
optimal price for an ILC the bank should set.
4.1 The Original Game
In section I.2.5 we have seen that by equation (I.9) a reasonable cost function is given
for the central bank. To remind the reader, this one is given by:
V =
1
2
λ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2, (4.1)
where λ denotes a preference parameter, pi delivered inflation, y is output, yn the
natural rate of output and k is some adjustment value - i.e. the goal from the first
term would be to stabilize output around yn + k.
For this chapter the above equation will form the basis of our model. It was also
employed by Carl Walsh in (Walsh 1995), today best known as the Walsh contract.
Next we will derive formulas for the optimal and expected inflation rate in the
face of a one shot game. To this end we do an analogous approach as we did in the
end of section I.2.5 for the cost function (I.8): As it is standard private agents are
considered first to commit their expectation about future inflation not taking into
account the stochastic shock ε, since they cannot see it. Then the central bank can
choose the inflation to be delivered, also taking into account the stochastic shock,
which first is observed by the bank. First order conditions for the bank then are
given by
aλ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k) + pi = 0,
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and hence
pi =
a2λpie + aλ(k − ε)
1 + a2λ
.
On the other hand the private agents are supposed to know the central bank’s loss
function (without the shock term). Therefore we get
pie =
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
,
what yields pie = aλk > 0. Substituting this into the formula for pi we get
pi = aλk −
(
aλ
1 + a2λ
)
ε.
In (Barro & Gordon 1983a) and (Barro & Gordon 1983b) or in (Walsh 1995) there
is nothing said about the actual meaning of inflation. However it is worth thinking of
it and according to definition I.1.1 for the reminder of this chapter we should think
of pi as an average (one period) inflation rate.
4.2 Inflation Linked Call - Subjective and Risk
Neutral Pricing
We will consider two different points of view in determining the present value of this
financial instrument. This will be crucial later as this pricing asymmetry will lead us
to a supply (from the central bank’s side) and demand (from the financial industry’s
side) equilibrium. However first of all we should define it:
Definition 4.2.1 By an Inflation linked Call (ILC) at time s with face value one
(e.g.) dollar, strike K and time to maturity T − s we mean a financial derivative
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that pays off a monetary transfer payment given by(
log
(
PT
Ps
)
−K
)+
$ = (pi(T − s)−K(T − s))+ $
at maturity time T .
In the following we denote by N the number of ILC’s the bank has issued. As
it should become clear later the value of N does have some influence on the bank’s
inflation policy. Therefore by pi(N) and PT (N) we denote the corresponding inflation
rate and price level (after the period T −s) respectively. As the central bank has per-
fect control1 over inflation it is quite natural to think of the bank having a subjective
view. After all the central bank tries to solve an optimization problem. The bank
has to take into account the original utility function, where economic shocks occur
exogenously. In fact what the central bank then does is to transfer economic shocks
into inflationary shocks. In that sense pi(N) and PT (N) are still random variables.
Hence the amount of money the bank has to pay after that one period is uncertain
and therefore (in terms of money) the expected discounted value of the payoff at time
s is given by
M(N) := e−ri(T−s)E (pi(N)(T − s)−K(T − s))+ ,
where ri denotes the market interest rate. M(N) determines the additional expected
monetary loss according to one ILC the central bank faces when being short N
ILCs. Hence M(N) determines the price the central bank would like to set to be
compensated.
1Note within our model we do not consider any velocity shocks.
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On the demand side on the other hand financial agents are used to thinking in
terms of a financial market and pricing by the no arbitrage principle. To this end we
introduce a standard Black-Scholes type financial market. This financial market is
assumed to exist no matter if an ILC is traded or not. In its most simple form such a
market consists of one risky asset St (think of a stock) and a risk free asset Bt (think
of a nominal zero coupon bond issued by the government). The return rate for the
bond equals the nominal interest rate ri and the stock is assumed to be driven by a
standard Brownian Motion with some fixed drift µ > ri and fixed volatility σS. Note
that the price level itself is assumed to be non-tradeable. In particular we have:
dBt =Btridt
dSt =St(µdt+ σSdWt).
Under the risk neutral measure P˜ the stock price process is given by
dSt = St(ridt+ σSdW˜t),
with W˜t a standard Wiener process under P˜.
In the following we assume a zero mean normally distributed economy-wide shock.
Furthermore we assume perfect correlation between the shock ε and the driving Brow-
nian Motion for the stock St. In particular under the central bank’s subjective mea-
sure the shock can be represented as ε = σecon (WT −Ws).2 Under the risk free
measure P˜ of financial agents on the other hand the economy-wide shock is a non
zero mean random variable. By ρ := µ−ri
σS
we denote the market price of risk of the
stock. Further let WS := σS(WT −Ws) denote the shock to the risky asset. Given
2we assume this just for simplicity - it would be straight forward to construct an arbitrary
correlation between the two!
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optimal behavior of the central bank (and private agents) when N ILC’s are sold as
ε = σecon(WT −Ws) we get ε ∼ N (−ρ˜, σ2econ) with ρ˜ := σeconρ = µ−riσS σecon. The price
for an ILC on the financial market equals the discounted expected payoff under the
risk neutral measure P˜. Hence the arbitrage free price is given by
p(N) =e−ri(T−s)E˜ (pi(N)(T − s)−K(T − s))+ . (4.2)
As ρ˜ > 0 and ε ∼ N (−ρ˜, σ2econ) under the risk free measure P˜ it is an easy exercise
to see that the price p(N) on the financial market for the ILC can never compensate
the central bank for the expected monetary loss M(N) when it sells a certain amount
N of ILC’s. In particular in monetary terms the central bank looses N(M(N)−p(N)).
In the following we should see how this monetary loss can be weighed up against the
initial loss function (4.1).
4.3 Introducing an ILC
In this section we add an inflation linked call to the central bank’s inflation targeting
loss function. Before private agents form their expectation of inflation pie, the central
bank can think of trading an Inflation linked Calls (ILC) with strike K on the financial
market.
Before we consider the central bank’s trading decision we should investigate what
happens to monetary policy once the bank is short a certain amount of ILC’s. As we
assume private agents to be perfectly informed, this will also have some impact on
their expectation pie.
In the following we will assume that the central bank faces a linear cost (or
equivalently a negative utility) in the amount of money it has to pay at time T due
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to the ILC it is short. The bank measures this cost relative to the costs of the original
game as given by equation (4.1) via a preference parameter d of dimension utility
money
. If
the central bank is short N ILCs the number dN determines the weight the bank
puts on (pi(T − s) − K(T − s))+ (in terms of utility) relative to the original cost
function V from (4.1). Further suppose in reaction to this private agents have built
their expectation pie(N) and after that the bank observes the economy shock ε. Then
the central bank has to choose actual pi to minimize the following function:
V1 =
1
2
λ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN(pi(T − s)−K(T − s))+.
Note this function is not differentiable any more. However using the following
Lemma it is not hard to overcome this problem:
Lemma 4.3.1 Let
V2 =
1
2
λ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2
and
V3 =
1
2
λ(a(pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN(pi(T − s)−K(T − s))
denote the original loss function (i.e. without the ILC) and an extended loss function
(i.e. the bank always faces a payoff in pi) respectively. Then
1. V1 attains its minimum for some pi < K if and only if V2 attains its minimum
for that particular pi.
2. V1 attains its minimum for some pi > K if and only if V3 attains its minimum
for that particular pi.
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Proof:
First of all we should note that all three functions V1, V2 and V3 are convex in pi
for λ > − 1
a2
(just check second order derivatives). The latter should be always as-
sumed in the following. Therefore each function has exactly one global minimum and
no local maximum.
Furthermore let
ξ :=
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
− aλε
1 + a2λ
; ψ :=
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
− aλε
1 + a2λ
− dN(T − s)
1 + a2λ
denote the values for pi to minimize V2 (ξ) and V3 (ψ) respectively. In particular we
see V2 is always minimized for greater values of pi than V3 and therefore there is no
contradiction within the above conditions.
For the first statement note that V2(pi) ≤ V1(pi) with equality for all pi ≤ K.
Hence if V2 is minimal for some pi
∗ ≤ K then V1 is also minimal for pi∗. For the other
direction suppose there is some pi∗ < K to minimize V1. Then there exists a ε > 0
such that V2(pi) = V1(pi) for all pi ≤ pi∗ + ε. Hence pi∗ minimizes V2 over the interval
(−∞, pi∗ + ε] and by the above convexity argument we know this one is the unique
global minimum of V2.
The second statement can be shown simultaneously using V3(pi) ≤ V1(pi) with
equality for all pi ≥ K, whilst for the other direction we use the convexity of V3(pi).

Given the values of strike K expected inflation pie and the actual value of the
shock ε the next corollary provides us with the optimal rule how to optimally choose
the actual inflation rate - in fact we see the optimal pi is equal to K as long as the
shock ε is in some range:
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Corollary 4.3.2 For given parameters, such as given strike K, expected inflation pie
and shock ε the optimal choice for actual inflation pi is
pi∗(ε) =
{ ξ if ξ ≤ K ⇔ ε ≥ η
K if ψ ≤ K ≤ ξ ⇔ θ ≤ ε ≤ η
ψ if ψ ≥ K ⇔ ε ≤ θ,
where
ξ :=
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
− aλε
1 + a2λ
; ψ :=
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
− aλε
1 + a2λ
− dN(T − s)
1 + a2λ
and
η := apie + k − (1 + a
2λ)K
aλ
; θ := apie + k − dN(T − s) + (1 + a
2λ)K
aλ
.
Proof:
By the previous Lemma the optimal choice for V1 is ξ if ξ ≤ K and ψ if ψ ≥ K. If
the shock is such that ψ ≤ K ≤ ξ the first statement of the Lemma tells us pi∗ ≥ K
while the second statement tells us pi∗ ≤ K, which implies pi∗ = K.

So far we know how the central bank would optimally choose the inflation rate
given a certain number of ILC’s it is short, the announced expected Inflation rate
pie and the economy shock ε. Since we assume that private agents have complete
knowledge of the bank’s cost function (i.e. they know everything but the specific
outcome of the shock) now they are in a position to form their rational expectation.
In this framework the actual value of the economy shock ε is not known by private
agents, however its distribution is. As private agents form their expectation rationally
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they use the same subjective measure P as the central bank.This is in contrast to the
original model. Here just assuming ε is zero in expectation is not sufficient because
of the non linearity of the contract. In fact when forming the rational expectation
private agents would have to choose Epi := pie such that
pie =P(ε ≥ η)E(ξ|ε ≥ η) + P(θ ≤ ε ≤ η)K + P(ε ≤ θ)E(ψ|ε ≤ θ). (4.3)
This is a direct consequence of Corollary 4.3.2.
Remark 4.3.3 It is worth mentioning the case N = 0, as then there is no cost
obtained from ILC’s: If N = 0 then ξ and ψ such as θ and η are the same. Hence the
middle summand vanishes and the two integrals add up to one over the whole range
which (by definition of the shock) is zero. Therefore the only term remaining on the
right hand side is
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
.
As this then has to equal pie it is easily obtained that
pie = aλk, (4.4)
and we are in the same situation as for the original game (see (Barro & Gordon
1983a)).
All the above results hold true for any distribution of the economy shock ε one
can think of. Equation (A.19) in the appendix provides us with a general analytical
formula for (4.3) for T − s = 1. However in the previous section we assumed the
special case of a normal distributed shock ε. In that case Corollary A1.4.2 gives a
corresponding formula. In particular if there is no shock then Epi = pie = pi∗ has to
hold. Together with Corollary 4.3.2 we get:
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Corollary 4.3.4 In a deterministic scenario we always have
pi∗ = pie =
{ aλk if aλk ≤ K
K if aλk − dN(T − s) ≤ K ≤ aλk
aλk − dN(T − s) if aλk − dN(T − s) ≥ K.
Useful is also the next Lemma since it tells us where in general we can actually
expect the rational expectation to be:
Lemma 4.3.5 The rationally expected inflation rate pie is a decreasing function in
the amount N of ILC’s the central bank is short and an increasing function in the
strike K. Further it is bounded from below by aλk − dN and bounded from above by
aλk. In particular:
aλk − dN(T − s) ≤ pie ≤ aλk ; pie K→−∞−→ aλk − dN(T − s).
Lemma 4.3.5 can be illustrated by figure 4.1.
Now given some value for pie and knowing the distribution of the shock it is not
hard to compute the expected payoff of the ILC. This can be done taking the central
bank s optimal behavior into account as give by Corollary 4.3.2. In particular the
central bank expects to loose
E (pi(T − s)−K(T − s))+ = P(ε < θ)E(ψ(T − s)−K(T − s)|ε < θ), (4.5)
while financial agents (using their risk neutral pricing measure P˜) expect to win
E˜ (pi(T − s)−K(T − s))+ = P˜(ε < θ)E˜(ψ(T − s)−K(T − s)|ε < θ) (4.6)
per ILC that is traded.
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Figure 4.1: The rationally expected inflation rate as a function of the strike K. The
blue line refers to the deterministic case - i.e. no shock, while for the green line we
have assumed ε ∼ N (0, 1). For the other parameters we have chosen T − s = 1,
λ = a = k = 1 and dN = 2.
Note that the expectations in (4.5) and (4.6) are strictly decreasing functions
of N . However before we go on we should mention the central bank’s whole loss
function.
The central bank’s loss function consists of three summands:
• The payoff loss caused by the ILC: dN(pi(T − s)−K(T − s))+.
• The quadratic loss term due to deviation of inflation from zero: 1
2
pi2.
• The quadratic loss term due to deviation of output form the target: 1
2
λ(y −
yn − k)2.
In expectation the first summand is covered by (4.5) while Epi2 is given by
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Epi2 =P(η ≤ ε)E(ξ2|η ≤ ε) + P(θ ≤ ε ≤ η)K2 + P(θ ≥ ε)E(ψ2|θ ≥ ε). (4.7)
Again general explicit formulas for (4.5), (4.7) and E(y − yn − k)2 (provided
T − s = 1) are given by (A.21) (A.20) and (A.22) in the appendix. Also for the
special case of a normally distributed shock Corollary A1.4.2 gives special formulas.
We should close this section with some finite deterministic result. In Corollary
4.3.4 we have seen explicit formulas for pi∗ = pie for the absence of shocks. Using this
it is not hard to compute explicit formulas for the terminal payoff such as the whole
cost function V1:
Corollary 4.3.6 In the absence of a shock ε and under rational expectation pie = pi∗
always holds. Further the ILC’s payoff is given by
(pi(T − s)−K(T − s))+ =
{
0 if K ≥ aλk − dN(T − s)
aλk − dN(T − s)−K if K ≤ aλk − dN(T − s).
Furthermore the whole cost function reads
V1 =V2 =
1
2
λk2 +
1
2
(aλk)2 if aλk ≤ K
V1 =V2 =
1
2
λk2 +
1
2
K2 if aλk − dN(T − s) ≤ K ≤ aλk
V1 =V2 + dN(aλk(T − s)− dN(T − s)2 −K(T − s))
=
1
2
λk2 +
1
2
(aλk − dN(T − s))2 + dN(T − s)(aλk(−dN(T − s)−K) else.
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4.4 The Incentives for Trade
In section 4.2 we have seen how financial agents would price such ILCs on the one
hand and how the central bank would determine the present monetary value of ILCs
according to its subjective measure on the other hand. Financial industry participants
would like to buy ILCs as long as they consider the price as fair - i.e. the price is
equal to the discounted expected payoff of the derivative under the agent’s risk neutral
measure. In the previous section we have seen that pie increases in K and decreases
in N . Further the bank’s incentive to deliver a more moderate inflation decreases in
K and increases in N . That is true if the economy-wide shock is sufficiently negative
whilst there is no incentive to deviate from the bank’s behavior if the shock is highly
positive. Hence intuitively the expected payoff E˜ (pi(N)(T − s)−K(T − s))+ is also
decreasing in K and N . This means when the central bank sets a certain strike K
and a certain price p for the ILCs on the financial market there will be demand for
ILCs until N is such that the price equals the discounted expected payoff. Then from
the financial market side an equilibrium is attained. Such demand curves are given
by figure 4.2.
However we have seen that the central bank always expects a monetary loss when
it sells ILC’s on the market for an (in financial terms) appropriate price. This price
cannot compensate the central bank for her (subjectively) expected monetary loss
due to the obligation at maturity to pay the holders of the ILC’s. Hence there seems
to be no incentive for the bank to sell ILC’s. The key is the credibility the bank
obtains when issuing ILC’s. Previously we have seen that private agents will choose
a smaller pie when they know the bank’s obligation at maturity. This then gives the
bank the opportunity to do output stabilization (i.e. the parameter k in V2) at a
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lower cost coming along from the term pi2 in V2. Hence
Theorem 4.4.1 The central bank faces an incentive to trade the ILC since this in-
creases its credibility as a conservative central bank. In particular we see
selling ILCs⇒ N ↑⇒ pie ↓⇒ The loss function V2 ↓ .
In that sense the parameter d is more than just a trade off parameter between economic
cost and monetary payoff aversion. As it also determines the expected monetary loss
for the central bank d implicitly evaluates the value of credibility to the bank. However
d has to be a reasonable (small, but greater zero) number.
This gain in the V2-part of V1 has to be traded off with the (expected) monetary
loss described above. In fact, when making the pricing decision and setting the strike
K the central bank faces the loss function
V˜1 :=
1
2
λE(a(pi(N,K)− pie(N,K)) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
Epi(N,K)2 + dN(M(N)− p(N))
=
1
2
λE(a(pi(N,K)− pie(N,K)) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
Epi(N,K)2
+ dNe−ri(T−s)
(
E (pi(N,K)(T − s)−K(T − s))+ − E˜ (pi(N,K)(T − s)−K(T − s))+
)
.
The actual parameters given to the central bank are the price p and the strike K.
Each combination results in a specific demanded number N . Therefore what is left
to the bank are N ILC’s, each with strike K. Hence the optimal inflation rate is a
function of N and K. This justifies the notation pi(N,K) from above.
Now we are in a position to set up the whole game of our model in detail:
• There are three different players
– The central bank
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– Financial market agents
– Private agents
• In the beginning there is no information asymmetry - i.e. each parameter in the
bank’s loss function is known by the bank and also by the other two players.
Also no one knows the outcome of the shock ε, however everyone knows its
distribution.
• The bank sets the strike K and the price for the derivative optimally - it opti-
mizes V˜1.
• The number N of the sold ILC’s affects the central bank’s preference via the
linear factor d.
• Since financial agents know that private agents form their expectation ratio-
nally they expect pie to be such that (4.3) holds. The solution to this is a
function of N and d. This pie(N) then determines the expected terminal payoff
E(pi∗(N)(T − s) −K(T − s))+. As already seen this payoff then is a decreas-
ing function of N . Therefore market participants will choose N such that
p = e−ri(T−s)E˜(pi∗(N)(T − s)−K(T − s))+ holds. Here p is the price set by the
central bank and E˜ is the expectation formed with respect to the risk neutral
measure P˜.
• Then after trading private agents form their rational expectation pie as antici-
pated by financial agents. Further the central bank observes the actual shock ε
and delivers the actual optimal inflation pi∗ (with Epi∗ = pie). Financial agents
then get their transfer payment, which under risk neutral expectation equals
the price they have payed in the beginning.
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In fact from the diagram below we can see: At first the central bank makes a
move (i.e. to set price p and strike K), then market participants make the next move
(i.e. to buy N ILC’s). After that private agents make a move (i.e. they choose and
announce pie) and last but not least the central bank makes her second move (i.e.
to observe the shock and deliver pi∗ accordingly). So once the first move has been
done any further move by any of the players such as the outcome of the game is
predetermined up to the actual value of the shock. Hence the whole problem reduces
to one question: What is the optimal first move (i.e. setting price p and strike K)
for the central bank?
central bank sets price p and strike K
?
9
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6
financial agents buy N ILC’s to match an equilibrium
monetary obligation for the central bank
decrease in private agents’ expectation
central bank chooses actual inflation rate pi∗
economy shock ε observed by the central bank
To avoid any confusion for the reader we should definitely emphasis the following
remark:
Remark 4.4.2 In our argument we said the central bank sets the strike K and the
price p to minimize its cost function V˜1. In particular this means the price set by the
The Value of Credibility 128
bank is not due to a utility indifference argument. The latter would mean the bank lets
financial agents participate on the gain coming along with the higher credibility as a
conservative central bank. However there is no reason why the central bank should let
financial agents participate. Furthermore, as we should see later, the surprising story
of this chapter is that the central bank can increase its over all utility by issuing these
ILC’s. This is in contrast to utility indifference pricing, where the over all utility is
unchanged. In fact, this explains why the central bank would be extremely keen to sell
ILC’s, as it is utility improving.
4.5 Some Simulations - some Deterministic Re-
sults
In section 4.4 we have seen the expected (monetary) payoff for financial agents is
given by (4.6). Furthermore we have seen this is a decreasing function in the number
(N) of ILC’s the central bank is short. Hence when setting some strike K and some
price p the demand N will be such that
p = e−ri(T−s)E˜ (pi(N)(T − s)−K(T − s))+ (4.8)
holds. For the deterministic case equation (4.8) implicitly determines N as function
of strike K and price p and from Corollary 4.3.6 we easily obtain
N =
1
d(T − s) max(0, aλk −K − e
ri(T−s)p). (4.9)
In the presence of a stochastic economy-wide shock there is no analytic formula
available. However figure 4.2 provides an intuition - for simplicity we assumed a zero
interest rate (i.e. ri = 0) and used the preference parameter b := dN(T − s) on the
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z-axis. Further for this plot (as for the remaining plots in this section) we used the
following parameters: a = λ = k = 1 and T − s = 1. Since the central bank only
sells these derivatives a negative value for b (that would be equivalent to a negative
N) does not make sense. Therefore the function in the figure is bounded from below
by zero. What is seen in the figure is that for low prices (i.e. p close to zero) b
(and hence N) is very sensitive in the volatility. Intuitively this should be clear as
for p = 0 and σecon > 0 the demand would be infinite. This is because in the face
of a shock there will be a chance that the derivative at maturity pays off something
positive and by definition it never pays off something negative. This is consistent
with standard arbitrage pricing theory (e.g. Black Scholes model) of plain vanilla
options (e.g. European Call and Put) where the price is an increasing function of the
volatility.
So far by equation (4.9) and Figure 4.2 we have seen that b is a function of K
and p. On the other hand Lemma 4.3.5 and figure 4.1 respectively show that pie is a
function of K and N (respectively b). Hence pie can also be considered as a function
of K and p - the actual tools the central bank holds in its hands. Again it is quite
easy to find an analytical expression for the deterministic case
Corollary 4.5.1 In the absence of shocks optimal inflation pi∗ and expected inflation
pie always coincide and
pi∗ = pie =
{
aλk if p ≥ e−ri(T−s) (aλk −K)
K + eri(T−s)p if p ≤ e−ri(T−s) (aλk −K) .
Also again in general there is no analytical expression available. However we can
provide the reader with figure 4.3, mentioning the case of a standard normal shock ε.
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Figure 4.2: The preference parameter b as a function of strike K and price p for the
derivative. The upper surface is in the face of a standard normally distributed shock
ε. The lower plain refers to the deterministic case.
Now we are in a position to address the final question of section 4.4 - i.e. which
combination of price p and strike K minimizes V˜1?
Again for the general case we can not answer this questions analytically. However
it can be done for the less plausible deterministic scenario. First let’s consider the
next little Corollary
Corollary 4.5.2 In a deterministic scenario the market price of risk must be zero -
i.e. ri = µ. Hence the central bank and financial agents have the same deterministic
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Figure 4.3: The expected inflation rate pie as a function of strike K and price p for
the derivative. This is done for a standard normal shock ε - For the deterministic
case the picture would look similar but less smooth
measure and therefore we get:
V˜1 =
{
V2 =
1
2
λk2 + 1
2
(aλk)2 if p ≥ e−ri(T−s)(aλk −K)
V2 + dN (M(N)− p) = 12λk2 + 12
(
K + eri(T−s)p
)2
+ dN (M(N)− p) else.
This give us the following (quantitative) result:
Theorem 4.5.3 In a deterministic scenario the optimal non negative price the cen-
tral bank should choose is p = −eri(T−s)K, where the strike K ∈ (−∞, 0] has to be
some non positive number.
Proof:
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This is obvious by the previous Corollary when minimizing V2 resp. V˜1 with respect
to K and p under the constraint p ≤ e−ri(T−s)(aλk −K).

For the standard normal scenario the cost functions V˜1 and V2 are shown in Figure
4.4. As in theorem 4.5.3 for the deterministic scenario we see that V2 does not attain
a single local Minimum, but so does V˜1 for K ≈ −0.38 and p ≈ 0.44. Both curves
are plotted using ri = 0 and for ρ˜ we have used −0.03.
Figure 4.4: The cost V˜1 (upper plain) resp. V2 (lower plain) as a function of Strike
K and price p for a standard normal scenario.
From this we see that an increased volatility causes a shift of the optimal strike
K to a negative number. This is due to the smoothing effect the volatility has on
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the plot - i.e. V2 reaches its minimum value for less moderate values of K and p if
the volatility is higher (see also Figure 4.4). To get some more intuition on how the
increase of volatility shifts the optimal strike to the left see Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: The optimal choice of price p (green line) and Strike K (blue line). The
higher the volatility the less moderate are the optimal parameters.
One last question should be the value of expected inflation pie in the ILC-trading
scenario. The following Corollary telling us it is always zero in the deterministic case
does not generally hold in the face of uncertainty.
Corollary 4.5.4 In the absence of any shocks the optimal choice of p and K causes
pi∗ = pie = 0 - no matter what the other parameters in V2 were!
Proof:
Just combine Corollary 4.5.1 and Theorem 4.5.3.

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In the face of a shock the above Corollary does not hold true any more. Choosing
the same parameters as in our plot of Figure 4.4 numerical results show that for
optimal p and K the expected inflation pie ≈ 0.06. This is still above zero but much
lower than pie = 1 as rational expectation would indicate without trading the ILCs.
4.6 More Realistic Derivatives
In all the previous sections so far we have motivated and derived our results for
a specific financial derivative which we called an Inflation Linked Call (ILC). The
monetary payoff was assumed to be one to one with the difference of some inflation
rate pi and some predetermined strike K. Furthermore we assumed the central bank
to have a linear utility in the monetary payoff of the ILC. The main story of this
work is the increase of credibility as a conservative central bank leading to lower
pie via a financial derivative the central bank is short. To keep things simple and
easy to understand we chose the above mentioned derivative and assumptions. We
also argued the ILC is the most intuitive plain vanilla financial derivative a financial
agent would think of - maybe except a bond type derivative. However the latter is
not really true. Someone buying a call option typically does so to be compensated for
an increase in the price level. Therefore a monetary payoff linear in the difference of
the price level (not the inflation rate) and some strike K˜ := 1
T−se
K(T−s) seems more
realistic:
(PT − K˜(T − s))+ =
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s))+ . (4.10)
Furthermore since here we have a call on a general price index instead of a specific
good one might ask if a financial agent should have a utility in terms of todays money
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of the payoff - in fact
(PT − K˜(T − s))+
PT
=
(
1− eK(T−s)−pi(T−s))+ . (4.11)
Intuitively the latter should also be true for the central bank. In principle one can
think of many different derivatives with different payoff structures and utilities. One
can even think of different utilities for a central bank and an financial agent in the
monetary payoff. Qualitatively they would all tell the same story of an increase in
responsibility for the bank. However, of course they will lead to different quanti-
tative results. In this section we want to pick some other, what (from a financial
market perspective) we consider as more realistic derivatives. In particular we look
at derivatives and perspectives to the central bank according to (4.10) and (4.11)
respectively.
4.6.1 The Case of a Price Index Based Call with Monetary
Perspective
At a first glance we treat a derivative with a monetary payoff as initially described -
i.e. the utility in the terminal payoff is linear in (4.10) for both, financial agents and
the central bank. In particular in the following we deal with
V1 :=
1
2
λ (a (pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s))+
V2 :=
1
2
λ (a (pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2
and
V3 :=
1
2
λ (a (pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s)) .
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Further for the central bank’s expected discounted value of the payoff at time s
analogous to section 4.2 we get
M(N) =e−ri(T−s)E
(
epi(N)(T−s) − eK(T−s))+ ,
whilst the fair price under the risk neutral measure is given by
p(N) =e−ri(T−s)E˜
(
epi(N)(T−s) − eK(T−s))+ .
The discrete time framework we chose is simple enough to provide numeric results
for this. A key result was Lemma 4.3.1. With K := log(K˜) it also holds true in the
situation here. It can be proved in the very same way using that again V2 and V3 are
convex in pi. In particular the corresponding Corollary 4.3.2 here takes the following
form:
Corollary 4.6.1 For any given parameters, such as given strike K and expected
inflation rate pie the optimal choice for the actual inflation rate pi as a function of the
shock ε is given by
pi∗(ε) =
{ ξ if ξ ≤ K ⇔ ε ≥ η
K if ψ ≤ K ≤ ξ ⇔ θ ≤ ε ≤ η
ψ if ψ ≥ K ⇔ ε ≤ θ,
where
ξ :=
a2λpie + aλk
1 + a2λ
− aλε
1 + a2λ
; ψ := ξ − 1
T − sW
(
dN(T − s)2eξ(T−s)
1 + a2λ
)
and
η :=apie + k − (1 + a
2λ)K
aλ
; θ := η − dN(T − s)e
K(T−s)
aλ
.
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Here W denotes the Lambert function - i.e. it is the inverse of f(x) = xex. For
some more information of the Lambert function we should refer to Lemma A1.4.3
(see Appendix) - see also (Abramowitz & Stegun 1964).
Proof:
Just note that ψ minimizes V3 and again ξ minimizes V2. The rest again is clear
by Lemma A1.4.3.

Some Analytical Results for the Deterministic Case
Now we are ready to give precise formulas for pi and pie for a purely deterministic
setup:
Corollary 4.6.2 If there is no shock at all pie and the actual optimal pi coincide and
we have
pie(N) = pi∗(N) =
{ aλk if aλk ≤ K
K if aλk − 1
T−sW(dN(T − s)2eaλk(T−s)) ≤ K ≤ aλk
aλk − 1
T−sW(dN(T − s)2eaλk(T−s)) else.
Proof:
The first equation is the result of some simple computation following from pie = ξ(pie).
The second one should also be clear. To conclude the third equation without loss of
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generality let’s assume T − s = 1. Then one needs to compute
ψ
(
pie = aλk −W (dNeaλk))
=
a2λ
(
aλk −W (dNeaλk))+ aλk
1 + a2λ
−W
(
dN
1 + a2λ
e
a2λ(aλk−W(dNeaλk)+aλk)
1+a2λ
)
= aλk − a
2λW
(
dNeaλk
)
1 + a2λ
−W
(
dN
1 + a2λ
e
aλk−
a2λW(dNeaλk)
1+a2λ
)
= aλk −W (dNeaλk)+ W (dNeaλk)
1 + a2λ
−W
(
dNeaλk
1 + a2λ
e
−
a2λW(dNeaλk)
1+a2λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by Corollary A1.4.4.
Hence ψ = pie = pi∗ if the above expression is greater or equal to the strike K.

With risk neutral financial agents the price the central bank can set on the market
when it wants to sell N ILC is
p(N) = e−ri(T−s)E(epi(N)(T−s) − eK(T−s))+.
Hence analogous to (4.9) then we get
N =
1
d(T − s)2 max
(
0,
aλk(T − s)− log (eK(T−s) + eri(T−s)p)
eK(T−s) + eri(T−s)p
)
, (4.12)
and the analogous of Corollary 4.5.1 is given by the following result:
Corollary 4.6.3 In the absence of shocks optimal inflation pi∗ and expected inflation
pie always coincide and
pie(p,K) = pi∗(p,K) =
{
aλk if p ≥ γ
aλk − 1
T−sW
(
aλk(T−s)−log(eK(T−s)+eri(T−s)p)
eK(T−s)+eri(T−s)p e
aλk(T−s)
)
else,
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where
γ =
eaλk(T−s) − eK(T−s)
eri(T−s)
.
The analogous representation for function V˜1 from the previous section now is
Corollary 4.6.4
V˜1 =
{
V2 =
1
2
λk2 + 1
2
(aλk)2 if P ≥ γ
V2 + dN(M(N)− p)
=
1
2
λk2 +
1
2
(
aλk − 1
T − sW
(
aλk(T − s)− log (eK(T−s) + eri(T−s)p)
eK(T−s) + eri(T−s)p
eaλk(T−s)
))2
+ dN(M(N)− p) if P ≤ γ.
So far our deterministic investigations for the monetary perspective!
Some Restricted Simulations
This subsection is to provide us with some quantitative results for an optimal choice
of the price for the ILC. The strike K for simplicity we will assume not be set by
the central bank and equal to two per cent - i.e. the rate K = 2%. We do so for
simplicity on the one hand. More important to us is that by doing so we can achieve
more realistic results: For instance the European central bank has approximately 2%
as her inflation target (for the period of one year). On the other hand in that sense
the strike sends a strong signal and (as can be seen in figure 4.6) private agents’
expectation converges to something close to (but smaller than) K if N tends to
infinity. Private agents expectation is below K since the central bank is harmed
strongly (if N is great) to deliver some inflation rate above K even in the face of a
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far negative shock ε. On the other hand if the shock is positive there is nothing that
prevents the central bank from delivering a negative inflation rate to offset the shock.
As previously mentioned we will assume a normally distributed economy-wide
shock ε. In section 4.2 we have seen how many ILC’s the central bank can sell when
it sets a certain price p. The key was equation (4.2). However we cannot apply
this one directly as pi∗(N) and therefore the expected payoff of the ILC depends on
pie(N). Hence at first we need to find values pie given the central bank is short a
certain number of ILC’s. To this end we need to solve (4.3) for a specific choice
of parameters. As we have seen a solution for pie = aλk is easy to find if N = 0.
However there is no analytical way to solve (4.3) for pie if N > 0. In that case
we need to employ some root finding methods to obtain a numerical solution. For a
specific choice of parameters (and strike K = 0.02) this is done in figure 4.6: We have
assumed a normally distributed shock ε with some fixed volatility σecon = 0.09 = 9%.
The slope of the Phillips curve a we set equal to 3, the output target k we assumed
to be equal to 0.15 = 15% and the parameter λ to be 1
9
. Therefore the expected
inflation rate at a first glance is pie = aλk = 0.05 = 5%. As a weight parameter for
the monetary payoff at maturity we have chosen d = 10−11. As seen in figure 4.6 the
expected inflation rate is a decreasing function in N and turns less than the strike
K = 2% for N ≈ 6× 109.
Now knowing pie(N) using the same distribution for the shock ε and using the
same parameters as before one can compute the corresponding expected payoff for
the ILC’s. In section 4.2 we have seen that the fair price on the financial market
is equal to the discounted expected terminal payoff according to the risk neutral
measure. Hence when the central bank sets a price p on the financial market there
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Figure 4.6: The expected inflation rate is decreasing in the number of ILC’s the
central bank has sold.
will be demand such that
p = e−ri(T−s)E˜
(
epi(N)(T−s) − eK(T−s))
holds. Hence this equation determines the number N the central bank can place on
the market when choosing a particular price (and strike K - again note we have fixed
K = 2%). For suitable values T − s = 1 and ri = 0.05 and µ = 0.15 (i.e. ρ˜ = 0.03)
figure 4.7 shows the demand curve according to the price p set by the central bank:
In particular we see that there are no ILC’s sold when the price is greater than
or equal to 0.03 per ILC with face value 1. On the other hand the demand will be
infinite if the price is zero. As the price for which the central bank can sell each
ILC on the market is smaller than the expected obligation payoff at maturity the
bank expects a financial loss. In particular if the central bank places N ILC’s on the
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Figure 4.7: The demanded number N of ILC’s as a function of the price p set by
the bank. Demand is negatively correlated with the price.
market the over all expected loss for the bank is given by
N(M(N)− p(N)) =Ne−ri(T−s)
(
E
(
epi(T−s) − eK(T−s))+ − E˜ (epi(T−s) − eK(T−s))+) .
In figure 4.8 we plot the expected monetary loss for the central bank. This one
has to be weighed up against the credibility gain decreasing the loss in the V2-part
of the central bank’s loss function. The latter is represented by the blue line in
figure 4.9. In fact as we have seen the central bank needs to choose the price as to
minimize V˜1, which is represented by the red line in the figure. From this we see the
optimal amount of ILCs the central bank would like to sell is N ≈ 5.25× 109 - that
is an aggregate face value of approximately 5.25 billion (e.g.) dollars. According to
figure 4.7 then the central bank would need to set a price p ≈ 0.001925 per ILC. This
results in an income for the central bank or round about 10 million (e.g.) Dollar in the
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the first place. However the present value of the central bank’s expected repayment
at maturity then is larger than this. From figure 4.8 we see the central bank (in
expectation) looses round about 1.5 million (e.g.) dollars when setting the above
price.
The central bank is (more than) compensated for that as private agent’s expec-
tation for the inflation rate then is given by pie ≈ 0.02067 = 2.067% instead of 5%.
This can be seen from figure 4.6.
Figure 4.8: When the central bank sets the price p it expects a monetary loss
accordingly.
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Figure 4.9: The loss for the central bank (in terms of utility) is minimal for an
average inflation close to 2%. This is true for both the V2-part of the utility (blue
curve) and also taking into account the monetary loss (red curve).
4.6.2 The Case of a Price Index Based Call with Real Per-
spective
Finally we want to assume the central bank has a real perspective - i.e. the cost
arising from the terminal (nominal) payoff due to the ILCs the bank is short now is
linear in (4.11). Therefore according to (4.11) the corresponding cost functions now
are given by
V1 :=
1
2
λ (a (pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN
(
1− eK(T−s)−pi(T−s))+
V2 :=
1
2
λ (a (pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2
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and
V3 :=
1
2
λ (a (pi − pie) + ε− k)2 + 1
2
pi2 + dN
(
1− eK(T−s)−pi(T−s)) .
Further we have
M(N) = e−ri(T−s)E˜
(
1− eK(T−s)−pi(N)(T−s))+
and
p(N) = e−ri(T−s)E˜
(
epi(N)(T−s) − eK(T−s))+ .
For financial market participants we keep our previous assumption of a purely
monetary perspective.3 We have to emphasize here that V3 (and V1) is no longer
convex in pi! Therefore Lemma 4.3.1 does not hold any more. In fact here we have
to replace it with the following, weaker result:
Lemma 4.6.5 1. V1 attains its minimum for some pi < K if and only if V2 attains
its minimum for that particular pi.
2. If there is some pi > K minimizing V3 on the interval [K,∞), then V1 is also
minimal for that particular pi.
The proof can be found in the appendix! However it is worth noting the following:
Remark 4.6.6 As already mentioned V3 is no longer a convex function! Furthermore
it is not hard to see that
V3(pi)
pi→∞−→ ∞ and V3(pi) pi→−∞−→ −∞,
3We do so to be more consistent with the arbitrage pricing idea we introduced in section 4.2.
However this asymmetry might be considered as unrealistic.
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and its derivative with respect to pi is as follows:
∂V3
∂pi
=
(
1 + a2λ
)
pi − a2λpie − aλk + dn(T − s)eK(T−s)−pi(T−s).
Setting this equal to zero and solving for the optimal pi∗ yields:
ψ :=pi∗ = ξ +
1
T − sW
(−dN(T − s)2e(K−ξ)(T−s)
1 + a2λ
)
,
where again
ξ :=
a2λpie + aλk − aλε
1 + a2λ
optimizes V2. This may have no, one or two real solutions. By Lemma A1.4.3 we
know
• There is no solution if −dN(T−s)2e(K−ξ)(T−s)
1+a2λ
< −e−1. This is the case when V3
has no local extremum.
• There are two solutions if −dN(T−s)2e(K−ξ)(T−s)
1+a2λ
> −e−1. That is when V3 has two
local extrema, one maximum and one minimum. By the above property we know
the maximum is always left from the minimum! Since we are always interested
in the local minimum rather than the maximum (V1 and V2 are cost functions
the central bank wants to minimize) this is consistent with the convention to
choose the greater solution when writing W(a) for some a ∈ (−e−1, 0). See also
Lemma A1.4.3.
• And there is exactly one solution if −dN(T−s)2e(K−ξ)(T−s)
1+a2λ
= −e−1. Here again V3
has no local extrema but there is a turning point at ψ.
If V3 has two extrema it may happen that the minimum is left from the strike K.
In that case we have no problem since V1 does not coincide with V3 in that point. If
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the local minimum of V3 is right from K then a priory we do not know if V3 (and
therefore V1) is smaller at K or in the local minimum point of V3. That’s why the
analogous of Corollary 4.3.2 (respectively of Corollary 4.6.1) here looks a bit more
complicated:
Corollary 4.6.7 For given parameters, such as given strike K, expected inflation pie
and shock ε the optimal choice for actual inflation pi is
pi∗ =
{ ξ if ξ ≤ K
K if ψ ≤ K ≤ ξ or V3(K) ≤ V3 (ψ) and K ≤ ψ
ψ if K ≤ ψ and V3(K) ≥ V3 (ψ) .
Proof:
The first and fourth equation are direct consequences of statement one and two in
the above Lemma. The third equation should also be trivial and hence it remains
to show the second one: Suppose ψ ≤ K ≤ ξ. Then V1(pi) = V2(pi) ≥ V2(K) =
V1(K) ∀pi ≤ K and V1(pi) = V3(pi) ≥ V3(K) = V1(K) ∀pi ≥ K.

Note, as we still assume financial market participants to have a monetary per-
spective again the demanded number of ILCs is given by (4.12).
Previously at this point we investigated the deterministic situation and concluded
precise formulas for rationally expected values of pi. As it turns out now even consid-
ering the deterministic case is not so easy. In fact generally results would look quite
fuzzy and are no longer always distinct. However we can come up with some nice
results when we assume dN ≤ 1 and T − s = 1:
The Value of Credibility 148
Corollary 4.6.8 If there is no shock at all pie and the actual choice pi coincide.
Furthermore if T − s = 1 and dN ≤ 1 we have
pie = pi∗ =
{ aλk if aλk ≤ K
K if aλk − b ≤ K ≤ aλk
aλk − b if K ≤ aλk − b.
Again the proof for this can be found in the Appendix. One major problem one
has when dealing with general b is that the b = W
(
beb
)
for b < 0 generally does not
hold.
4.7 Conclusion
The original model by Barro Gordon suggests a high (too high) inflationary outcome,
whilst Walsh’s linear contract model has zero inflation as the optimal outcome. The
latter is because of the linear structure of the transfer payment which is optimized
according to the actual value of the economic shock ε posteriori. When we assume
our model to be deterministic we end up with the same result (i.e. zero inflation).
However in our model the security is traded before the shock occurs. In that sense
the optimal transfer payment (according to the ILC) is designed according to an
expectation value coming along with the shock rather than the actual value.
In chapter 3 we introduced an inflation linked call (ILB) to increase the incentive
for the central bank to deliver a more moderate inflation. This came at some cost for
the economy as the bank deviates from the (formally) optimal policy - the new policy
was suboptimal with respect to the initial optimization functional. This cost then was
more than outweighed by the monetary profit the bank can make on the financial
market - utility indifference pricing. In this chapter we have kind of an inverse
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result: In fact we have shown that a central bank being short financial derivatives (in
particular an ILC) expects a financial loss. On the other hand the bank can increase
its credibility as a conservative central bank. This increase in credibility is so strong
that it compensates for any monetary cost coming along with the security. The
crucial point here is that we have assumed rational expectation for private agents.
Furthermore we have shown how the bank has to choose its parameters (price and
strike) to minimize its loss function.
Chapter 5
Optimal Monetary Policy under
Filtered Partial Information
The initial paper by Barro and Gordon gave a nice intuition why a suboptimal out-
come (i.e. the inflation bis) was observed in the economy. However as mentioned
before their paper (Barro & Gordon 1983a) suggested a too high inflationary equi-
librium. Therefore not being satisfied with their work they came up with (Barro &
Gordon 1983b). They introduced reputation concerns to the central banker in a multi
period model. This concern forces the banker to (at least in the beginning) deliver
more moderate inflation. On the other hand private agents knowing this new and
extended model would also have a more moderate inflationary expectation. Also in
that article Barro and Gordon considered the slope of the Phillips curve at as varying
over time.
In this chapter we pick up both of the above ideas. In particular we will model
at as a Markov chain, i.e. a process that may jump over time. There is a finite state
space for at, which is known by private agents. However they do not know the current
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value of the Phillips curve, but as in (Barro & Gordon 1983b) the central bank does.
Instead agents have some expectation a˜t they form as a probability weighted average
of possible at’s: a˜t =
∑n
i=1 pia
i
t, where pi = P(at = ai) denote the probability weights
agents put on the possibility that the Markov chain at is in state i. Hence having an
expectation a˜t based on that agents can form their expectation pi
e
t .
For agents having the appropriate weights pi is equivalent with having some expec-
tation of the Phillips curve slope. We consider a continuous time framework, where
agents instantaneously adjust their expectation according to the Wonham filtering
technique. In particular agents observe log-output, some noisy signal. However as
they know their own recently announced expectation piet this allows them to conclude
something about pit and at.
In section 5.5 we will consider the case where the banker’s preference parameter λ
from (I.9) rather than the Phillips curve slope is the jumping process. This illustrates
the tradeoff for the banker’s sudden preferences on the one hand and his reputation
concern on the other hand. Suppose pie is quite low and the central banker has a high
preference on output (i.e. λ is great). Then he would like to deliver high inflation
soon. However this would quickly destroy his reputation as a conservative banker and
hence the effect from the Phillips curve also vanishes. Therefore he needs to be more
moderate. On the other hand suppose a high piet and a newly announced conservative
banker. This one would like to deliver low inflation suddenly. However due to the
high value of piet this would be very costly for the economy. Hence this banker is also
forced to bring down inflation quite slowly.
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5.1 The Model
We consider an infinite time horizon framework where the central bank’s instanta-
neous cost function is given by (I.9). As previously mentioned we think of a as a
parameter which may vary over time. In particular let µt denote some continuous
time Markov chain with state space {e1, . . . , en}, where ei denotes the i−th standard
unit vector in Rn. Then the time dependent parameter a is given by at := βµt for
some line vector β = (β1, . . . , βn). Hence over time the central bank’s utility is given
by ∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
λ
2
(βµt(pit − piet )− k)2 +
1
2
pi2t
)
dt, (5.1)
where r denotes the central bank’s discount rate. In that sense pit can be seen as the
bank’s control which also should have an influence on piet , whilst there is no effect on
µt respectively βµt which we assume to be exogenously given. However depending
on the current state of the Markov chain (that is the actual value of βµ) the central
bank would choose another optimal pi∗t . So for the remainder of this chapter let pi
i
t
(and pii
∗
t ) denote the chosen pit (and the optimal pi
∗
t respectively) given the Markov
chain is in state ei. Further by Yt we should denote the filtration according to the
private agent’s partial information accumulated up to time t 1. As agents have to
rely on this partial information when forming their inflationary expectation obviously
piet is measurable with respect to Yt. The same holds true for each of the piit. In the
following we will use the notation ut := (pi
1
t , . . . , pi
n
t ) and as each pi
i
t is Yt-measurable
so is ut.
2
This measurability of ut, respectively of each pi
i
t is crucial for this chapter. In fact
1We will give a precise definition of Y in the next section
2Later in section 5.3 we will see in detail why u is Y-adapted.
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it means that private agents always know what the central bank would optimally
do according to each possible state of the chain. However they do not know about
the state of the Markov chain. Instead they have to rely on some expectation µˆt
they have - i.e. µˆt represents the partial information of µt agents have. Given that
partial information and knowing ut the rational expectation approach suggests to
choose piet equal to utµˆt. So the question remains how private agents would form
their expectation µˆt. In the next section we will see how this can be done when
observing the log output process. Given this observation applying stochastic filtering
techniques (in particular the HMM-Filter, also referred to as the Wonham-Filter - see
(Elliot, Aggoun & Moore 1995), (Elliot 1993), (Sass 2007), (Putscho¨gl & Sass 2008),
(Sass & Hausmann 2004)) gives the µˆt.
5.2 A Hidden Markov Model
To go on with the optimal control technique in section 5.3 we first need a model for
private agent’s expectation of the Markov chain µt. As previously stated we want
to assume private agent’s partial information to be built via observing the log real
output process driven by the following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dyt =at (pit − piet ) dt+ dεt = βµt (utµt − piet ) dt+ dεt,
=
n∑
i=1
βi
(
piit − piet
)
1µt=eidt+ dεt
=(ut − piet1′n)Diag(β)µtdt+ dεt. (5.2)
By Diag(β) we mean some n × n-matrix B with Bii = βi and Bij = 0 whenever
i 6= j. Further εt denotes some exogenous economy shock - i.e. for each t one has
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εt+h− εt ∼ N (0, σ2h). So technically εt := σWˆt is a Brownian Motion with zero drift
and some constant volatility σ.
Remark 5.2.1 Again here we should emphasize that in our model the central bank
does not react on the stochastic shocks εt! Alternatively one might assume some
limited reaction to these shocks, not completely smoothing out the εt. This then would
decrease the σ. However for this work some σ > 0 is essential!
In such a situation it is most evident to think of filtering techniques. In case of
linear Gaussian dynamics one would choose the famous Kalman filter as it is done
in (Cohen-Cole & Cosmaciuc 1999). This is described by some stochastic differential
equation for the filter and some partial differential equation for the second centralized
moment. However here we are not in the situation of Kalman filtering. The under-
lying process µt is a hidden Markov chain. In that case the Wonham filter can be
described by only one stochastic differential equation. So far we have not said much
about what we actually mean by a continuous time Markov chain. To make things
clearer for the remainder of the chapter we should rely on the following definition:
Definition 5.2.2 (Continuous time Markov chain) A continuous time Markov
chain µt is a state process with discrete state space the standard unit vectors {e1, . . . , en}.
It is further characterized by its rate matrix Q ∈ Rn×n, where Qkl is the jump rate
or transition rate from ek to el - i.e. Qkl = limt→0 1tP(µt = el|µ0 = ek) for k 6= l.
Moreover, −Qkk =
∑n
l=1,l 6=kQkl is the rate of leaving ek. So the waiting time for the
next jump is exponentially distributed with parameter −Qkk and the probability that
the chain jumps to el when leaving ek (l 6= k) is given by Qkl−Qkk .
As the private agent’s observation process is characterized by (5.2) the corre-
sponding filtration of observation can be defined as Yt = σ(ys|s ≤ t). Next we
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would like to apply classical HMM-filtering. To this end we need to show that
bt := (ut − piet1′n)Diag(β) is Yt-measurable. However this should be clear as ut and
piet = utµˆt both are Yt-measurable.
So we can write
dyt = btµtdt+ σdWˆt,
with bt a Yt-measurable process. Next let us define the martingale density process
Z = (Zt)t∈[0,T ] by
Zt = exp
(
− 1
σ
∫ t
0
bsµsdWˆs − 1
2σ2
∫ t
0
(bsµs)
2 ds
)
,
and the equivalent reference measure P˜ by dP˜ = ZTdP . Then by Girsanov’s Theorem
we know
W˜t := Wˆt +
1
σ
∫ t
0
bsµsds, t ∈ [0, T ],
is a P˜ -Brownian Motion and yt = σW˜t. Hence W˜ is Y-adapted and we are in the
situation of classical HMM-filtering with signal µ and observation y - see (Elliot 1993)
or (Elliot et al. 1995). Our aim is to determine a filter for µˆt := E(µt|Yt), which
implicitly via the relation piet = utµˆt also determines a filter for the public’s expected
inflation process. Now it is convenient to rely on the following definition:
Definition 5.2.3 The so called unnormalized filter ξt for µt and the conditional den-
sity process ζt are given as
ξt = E˜
[
Z−1T µt|Yt
]
and ζt = E [Zt|Yt] .
By Bayesian law we get
ξt =
E
[
ZTZ
−1
T µt|Yt
]
E [ZT |Yt] =
E [µt|Yt]
ζt
= ζ−1t µˆt.
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Remark 5.2.4 It is noteworthy that
∑n
i=1 µˆ
i
t = 1 and µˆ
i
t ∈ [0, 1] for all t and i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Further we have ∑ni=1 ξit = ζ−1t . In that sense the expected Markov chain
vector µˆt can be interpreted as a probability vector where each µˆ
i
t determines the
public’s expected probability for µt being in state ei. In particular this means an n-
dimensional µˆt has n − 1 degrees of freedom. We will make extensively use of this
in section 5.4, where we consider the case n = 2. So the whole situation then will
reduces to a simple one dimensional optimal control problem.
The following result is taken from (Sass & Hausmann 2004), which is an extension
of Theorem 4 in (Elliot 1993) to a stochastic but Y-adapted bt replacing some static
B.
Theorem 5.2.5 The unnormalized filter ξ is given by
dξt = Q
′ξtdt+
1
σ
Diag(ξt)b
′
tdW˜t.
Proof:
For this we refer to (Elliot et al. 1995), (Elliot 1993) and (Sass & Hausmann 2004).

As a special case we also get the following result:
Corollary 5.2.6 ζ and ζ1 :=
(
ζ−1t
)
t∈[0,T ] are continuous Y-martingales with respect
to P and P˜ respectively. Furthermore, ζ−1t = E˜
[
Z−1t |Yt
]
and
dζ−1t =
1
σ
btξtdW˜t.
Optimal Monetary Policy under Filtered Partial Information 157
Proof:
The martingale properties can by shown using standard martingale representation
results, whilst the equation for ζ−1 follows from Theorem 5.2.5 using ζ−1t = 1
′
nξt and
Q1n = 0!

Finally using this and the relation µˆt = ζtξt we get the filter equation for µˆt:
Theorem 5.2.7 (The Wonham Filter) The HMM-Filter for private agent’s ex-
pectation of µt is determined by
dµˆt =Q
′µˆtdt+
1
σ
(Diag (µˆt)− µˆtµˆ′t) b′tdWt, (5.3)
with the innovation process
dWt := dW˜t − 1
σ
btµˆtdt =
1
σ
(dyt − btµˆtdt)
being a standard Brownian Motion under the reference measure P !
Proof:
For the scalar process ζ−1t by Itoˆ’s Lemma we get
dζt = ζ
3
t
1
σ2
(btξt)
2 dt− ζ2t
1
σ
btξtdW˜t.
Hence using µˆt = ζtξt and the product rule we get
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dµˆt =ζtdξt + ξtdζt + d[ζt, ξt]
=ζtQ
′ξtdt+ ζt
1
σ
Diag(ξt)b
′
tdW˜t + ξtζ
3
t
1
σ2
(btξt)
2 dt− ξtζ2t
1
σ
btξtdW˜t
− 1
σ2
Diag(µˆt)b
′
tbtµˆtdt
=Q′µˆtdt+
1
σ
Diag(µˆt)b
′
tdW˜t − µˆt
1
σ
btµˆtdW˜t + µˆt
1
σ2
(btµˆt)
2 dt
− 1
σ2
Diag(µˆt)b
′
tbtµˆtdt
=Q′µˆtdt+
1
σ
(Diag(µˆt)b
′
t − µˆtµˆ′tb′t) dW˜t + µˆt
1
σ2
(btµˆt)
2 dt
− 1
σ2
Diag(µˆt)b
′
tbtµˆtdt
=Q′µˆtdt+
1
σ
(Diag (µˆt)− µˆtµˆ′t) b′tdWt.

For the remainder of this chapter equation (5.3) is what the central bank takes
into account when optimizing its utility (5.1).
5.3 The Optimal Control Problem
Now we are in the position to do an analogue approach as it is done in (Rieder &
Ba¨uerle 2005). We set the bank’s optimization problem up as an ordinary stochastic
control problem using standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman technique. In fact, given
some (initial) values for µ and µˆ let
J(µ, µˆ) := E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
λ
2
(βµt(utµt − utµˆt)− k)2 + 1
2
(utµt)
2
)
dt
∣∣∣µ0 = µ, µˆ0 = µˆ]
Optimal Monetary Policy under Filtered Partial Information 159
denote the central bank’s cost functional. Then the bank needs to minimize this
subject to (5.3) and
dµt =X(µt)dNt(µt).
By Nt(µt) we denote a standard Poisson process with jumps of size one and arrival
rate −Qii given µt is in state ei. X(µ) is some independent discrete random variable
with values in {e1− µ, . . . , en− µ}. Further P(X(µ) = 0) = 0 for all µ ∈ {e1, . . . , en}
and P(X(ei) = ej − ei) = Qij−Qii whenever i 6= j. So let us define the value function by
V (µ, µˆ) := inf
ut∈A(µ,µˆ)
J(µ, µˆ),
where A denotes the set of admissible controls: One might think of ut as a control
for the central bank, freely to choose given µˆt and µt. We assume that private agents
can figure out the possible controls pikt (for each possible state k of the Markov chain)
but that they cannot observe the chain µt itself. Hence agents need to estimate pit via
their expectation µˆt - i.e. pi
e
t = utµˆt with ut = (pi
1
t , . . . , pi
n
t ) = (pit(µt = e1), . . . , pit(µt =
en)). Hence if the chain is in some specific state ek all the central bank can do is
to choose the optimal pik, taking all the other pii as given into account. Therefore it
follows that the control ut is Yt-measurable and the HJB-equation for Poisson jumps
Optimal Monetary Policy under Filtered Partial Information 160
then is obtained by
rV (µ = ek, µˆ) = inf
pik
[λ
2
(βk(pik − uµˆ)− k)2 + 1
2
(pik)
2 +
∂V
∂µˆ
Q′µˆ
+
1
2σ2
tr
(
∂2V
∂µˆ2
(Diag(µˆ)− µˆµˆ′)b′tbt(Diag(µˆ)− µˆµˆ′)
)
−QkkE (V (µ+ dµ, µˆ)− V (µ, µˆ)|jump in µ)
]
= inf
pik
[λ
2
(βk(pik − uµˆ)− k)2 + 1
2
(pik)
2 +
∂V
∂µˆ
Q′µˆ
+
1
2σ2
tr
(
∂2V
∂µˆ2
(Diag(µˆ)− µˆµˆ′)b′tbt(Diag(µˆ)− µˆµˆ′)
)
+
n∑
l 6=k
Qkl (V (el, µˆ)− V (ek, µˆ))
]
,
where ∂V
∂µˆ
is short notation for the row vector
(
∂V
∂µˆ1
, . . . , ∂V
∂µˆn
)
, whilst ∂
2V
∂µˆ2
denotes
some n× n-matrix with
(
∂2V
∂µˆ2
)
ij
= ∂
2V
∂µˆi∂µˆj
. Next one can show:
∂
∂pik
tr
(
∂2V
∂µˆ2
(Diag(µˆ)− µˆµˆ′)b′tbt(Diag(µˆ)− µˆµˆ′)
)
=
∑
nlij
∂2V
∂µˆn∂µˆl
AinAljβiβj
(
2µˆkuµˆ− µˆk(pij + pii) + δikpij + δjkpii
)
=
∑
nlij
∂2V
∂µˆn∂µˆl
AinAljβiβj
(
2µˆ2kpi
k + 2µˆk
∑
m6=k
µˆmpi
m − µˆk(pij + pii) + δikpij + δjkpii
)
,
with A := Diag(µˆ) − µˆµˆ′ - i.e. Aij = δijµˆi − µˆiµˆj, where δij denotes the Kronecker
delta. Hence by first order conditions the optimal pik has to be such that
0 =
1
2σ2
∑
nlij
∂2V
∂µˆn∂µˆl
AinAljβiβj
(
2µˆ2kpi
k + 2µˆk
∑
m6=k
µˆmpi
m − µˆk(pij + pii) + δikpij + δjkpii
)
+ λβk(1− µˆk)
(
βk
(
(1− µˆk)pik −
∑
m 6=k
µˆmpi
m
)
− k
)
+ pik (5.4)
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holds.
In principle now it is straight forward to solve this equation for pik to obtain the
optimal inflation rate given µ = ek. Then we immediately see that the optimal pi
k is
a function of β, µˆ, ∂
2V (ek,µˆ)
∂µˆ2
and all other pim! However as this has to hold for each k
in fact equation (5.4) determines a system of linear equations for the pik respectively
for u = (pi1, . . . , pin). Therefore having solved this one gets that the optimal u such
as each pik
∗
is a function of β, µˆ, ∂
2V
∂µˆ2
. In particular as µˆt is Yt-measurable then so is
ut.
5.4 Special Case - the two State Markov Chain
In this section we suppose the Markov chain µ has only two possible states e1 and
e2. Hence any expected state vector µˆt is of the form
µˆt =
 νt
1− νt

for some νt ∈ [0, 1] and
(Diag(µˆt)− µˆtµˆ′t) b′t =νt(1− νt)
 1 −1
−1 1
 β1(pi1t − piet )
β2(pi
2
t − piet )

=νt(1− νt)(β1(pi1t − piet )− β2(pi2t − piet ))
 1
−1
 .
Further according to definition 5.2.2 in two dimensions the rate matrix reduces to
Q =
 −q1 q1
q2 −q2
 ⇒ Q′ =
 −q1 q2
q1 −q2
 ,
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and therefore the filtering equation (5.3) reads
d
 νt
1− νt
 =
 dνt
−dνt
 = ((1− ν)q2 − νq1)
 1
−1
 dt
+
1
σ
ν(1− ν)(β1(pi1 − pie)− β2(pi2 − pie))
 1
−1
 dWt.
Obviously the first and the second line of the above SDE are the same and therefore
the whole problem further reduces to a simple one dimensional SDE for νt given by
dνt =((1− νt)q2 − νtq1)dt+ 1
σ
νt(1− νt)(β1(pi1t − piet )− β2(pi2t − piet ))dWt.
With piet = νtpi
1
t + (1− νt)pi2t this can be written as
dνt =((1− νt)q2 − νtq1)dt+ 1
σ
νt(1− νt)(β1(1− νt)(pi1t − pi2t )− β2νt(pi2t − pi1t ))dWt
=((1− νt)q2 − νtq1)dt+ 1
σ
νt(1− νt)(pi1t − pi2t )(β1(1− νt) + β2νt)dWt.
Therefore the HJB-equation given the Markov chain is in state 1 is given by
rV (µ = e1, ν) = min
pi1
[λ
2
(
β1(1− ν)(pi1 − pi2)− k
)2
+
1
2
(
pi1
)2
+ ((1− ν)q2 − νq1) ∂V (e1, ν)
∂ν
+
1
2σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (pi1 − pi2)2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
+ q1 (V (µ = e2, ν)− V (µ = e1, ν))
]
. (5.5)
Equivalently if the chain is in state 2 one gets
rV (µ = e2, ν) = min
pi2
[λ
2
(
β2ν(pi
2 − pi1)− k)2 + 1
2
(
pi2
)2
+ ((1− ν)q2 − νq1) ∂V (e2, ν)
∂ν
+
1
2σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (pi1 − pi2)2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
+ q2 (V (µ = e1, ν)− V (µ = e2, ν))
]
. (5.6)
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The first order condition for (5.5) is
0 =λβ1(1− ν)
(
β1(1− ν)(pi1 − pi2)− k
)
+ pi1
+ (pi1 − pi2) 1
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
=pi1
(
1 + λβ21(1− ν)2 +
1
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
)
− pi2
(
λβ21(1− ν)2 +
1
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
)
− λkβ1(1− ν), (5.7)
whilst the first order conditions for (5.6) is
0 =λβ2ν
(
β2ν(pi
2 − pi1)− k)+ pi2
+ (pi2 − pi1) 1
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
=pi2
(
1 + λβ22ν
2 +
1
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
)
− pi1
(
λβ22ν
2 +
1
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 (β1(1− ν) + β2ν)2 ∂
2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
)
− λkβ2ν. (5.8)
Both equations, (5.7) and (5.8) have to hold true at the same time and hence
pi2
[
1 + λ
(
β21(1− ν)2 + β22ν2
)
+ η
(
∂2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
+
∂2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
)]
=pi1
[
1 + λ
(
β21(1− ν)2 + β22ν2
)
+ η
(
∂2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
+
∂2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
)]
+ λk (β2ν − β1(1− ν))
That is equivalent to
pi2 =pi1 + λk
β2ν − β1(1− ν)
1 + λ (β21(1− ν)2 + β22ν2) + η
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
) , (5.9)
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and
pi1 =pi2 − λk β2ν − β1(1− ν)
1 + λ (β21(1− ν)2 + β22ν2) + η
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
) . (5.10)
Substituting (5.10) into (5.5) yields
pi1 =λkβ1(1− ν) + λk
(β2ν − β1(1− ν))
(
λβ21(1− ν)2 + η ∂
2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
)
1 + λ (β21(1− ν)2 + β22ν2) + η
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
) ,
and substituting (5.9) into (5.6) yields
pi2 =λkβ2ν − λk
(β2ν − β1(1− ν))
(
λβ22ν
2 + η ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
)
1 + λ (β21(1− ν)2 + β22ν2) + η
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
) .
5.5 The Case of a Jumping Central Banker
So far we have mentioned the slope of the Phillips curve to jump over time. Now we
want to consider the preference parameter λ to follow the Markov chain, whilst a is
assumed to be fixed (and known).
As agents do not know the current value of λ the bank’s optimization problem
they take into account is given by:
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
βµt
2
(a(pit − piet )− k)2 +
1
2
pi2t
)
dt,
and their observation process looks like:
dyt = btµtdt+ σdWˆt,
where bt = a(ut − piet1n).
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Using the same notation and doing the analogous derivations as in the previous
section for the two dimensional case we get
0 =pi1
(
1 + λ1a
2(1− ν)2 + a
2
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 ∂
2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
)
− pi2
(
λ1a
2(1− ν)2 + a
2
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 ∂
2V (e1, ν)
∂ν2
)
− λ1ka(1− ν),
and
0 =pi2
(
1 + λ2a
2ν2 +
a2
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 ∂
2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
)
− pi1
(
λ2a
2ν2 +
a2
σ2
(ν(1− ν))2 ∂
2V (e2, ν)
∂ν2
)
− λ2kaν.
Also analogous to the previous section this gives
pi2 =pi1 + ak
λ2ν − λ1(1− ν))
1 + λ1a2(1− ν)2 + λ22a2ν2 + a2σ2 (ν(1− ν))2
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
)
and
pi1 =pi2 − ak λ2ν − λ1(1− ν))
1 + λ1a2(1− ν)2 + λ22a2ν2 + a2σ2 (ν(1− ν))2
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
) ,
which further yields
pi1 =λ1ak(1− ν) + ak
(λ2ν − λ1(1− ν))
(
λ2a
2ν2 + a
2
σ2
(ν(−1ν))2 ∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
)
1 + λ1a2(1− ν)2 + λ22a2ν2 + a2σ2 (ν(1− ν))2
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
)
(5.11)
and
pi2 =λ2akν − ak
(λ2ν − λ1(1− ν))
(
λ2a
2ν2 + a
2
σ2
(ν(−1ν))2 ∂2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
)
1 + λ1a2(1− ν)2 + λ22a2ν2 + a2σ2 (ν(1− ν))2
(
∂2V (e1,ν)
∂ν2
+ ∂
2V (e2,ν)
∂ν2
) .
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5.6 Discussion
Unfortunately we are not able to solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman problem to the
end. The resulting differential equations are not solvable. The latter is true in
an analytical sense at least. But even numerically it would be very hard and we
decided not to try this. Therefore we cannot come up with some nice and final result.
However, when looking at the formulas for pi1 and pi2 in the two dimensional case it
is worth to note the following:
If the chain is in ei it is optimal to do what is optimal in the one shot game (see
chapter 4) times the probability weight agents put on the opposite state of the chain
plus/minus some other term. Without loss generality let us assume λ1 > λ2. From
a pure technical point of view we have no idea about that second term, even not
in a pure qualitative sense. However we suspect it is a negative number: If agents
completely believe in a conservative central banker (i.e. ν = 0), whilst the banker is
not (i.e. λ1 is true) then from (5.11) we see the optimal policy is λak (as in the one
shot game) plus something (that is the second term). As argued in the beginning
of this chapter intuitively we would expect the banker to be less discretionary as he
is also concerned about his reputation as a conservative central banker. Therefore
this second term needs to be negative. The story works analogous if ν = 1 and λ2 is
true.
Appendix A1
Formulas and other Used Results
A1.1 Formulas to Chapter 2
Z˜ :=
a
2
pi2 − b(pi − pie). (A.1)
(pi − pie)2 (A.2)
C,C’
c =
q + q′(p− q)
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) (A.3)
c′ =
q′ + q(p′ − q′)
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) (A.4)
Derivatives 1
∂c
∂p
=
q′ + q(p′ − q′)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 (A.5)
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∂c
∂q
=
1− q′ − p(p′ − q′)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 (A.6)
∂c′
∂p′
=
q + q′(p− q)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 (A.7)
∂c′
∂q′
=
1− q − p′(p− q)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 (A.8)
Derivatives 2
∂c
∂p′
= (p− q) q + q
′(p− q)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 = (p− q)
∂c′
∂p′
(A.9)
∂c
∂q′
= (p− q) 1− q − p
′(p− q)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 = (p− q)
∂c′
∂q′
(A.10)
∂c′
∂p
= (p′ − q′) q
′ + q(p′ − q′)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 = (p
′ − q′)∂c
∂p
(A.11)
∂c′
∂q
= (p′ − q′) 1− q
′ − p(p′ − q′)
(1− (p− q)(p′ − q′))2 = (p
′ − q′)∂c
∂q
(A.12)
A1.2 Results to Chapter 3
Lemma A1.2.1 Consider the following partial differential equation:
0 =
1
2λ
(
1 + γ
∂
∂x2
f(t, x1, x2) +
∂
∂x1
f(t, x1, x2)x1
)2
−
(
1 + γ
∂
∂x2
f(t, x1, x2)
)
x2 +
1
2
σ2
(
∂2
∂x21
f(t, x1, x2)x
2
1 +
∂2
∂x22
f(t, x1, x2)γ
2
)
+ σ2
∂2
∂x1∂x2
f(t, x1, x2)x1γ +
∂
∂t
f(t, x1, x2)− rf(t, x1, x2)
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with terminal condition
f(T, x1, x2) = d+ b log x1
Then the solution to this problem is given by the following function:
f(t, x1, x2) = (d+ b log x1) e
−r(T−t) + Atx2 + Ct +Gt(b)
where
At =
1
γ + r
(
e−(γ+r)(T−t) − 1)
Ct =
e−r(T−t)
λ(γ + r)2
[r
2
(
1 + er(T−t)
)− re−γ(T−t) (A.13)
+
γ2
2(2γ + r)
(
1− e−(2γ+r)(T−t))]
Gt(b) =e
−r(T−t)
[ b2
2λr
(
1− e−r(T−t))+ bσ2
2
(T − t)
− b
λ(γ + r)2
(
r(γ + r)(T − t) + γ (1− e−(γ+r)(T−t)))] (A.14)
Proof:
Obviously AT = 0, CT = 0 and GT (b) = 0 and hence f(T, x1, x2) = d + b log x1.
Furthermore it is straight forward to check that V fulfills the desired PDE:
A˙t =(γ + r)At + 1 (A.15)
C˙t − rCt =− e
−r(T−t)
λ(γ + r)2
[
r2
2
er(T−t) + rγe−γ(T−t) +
γ2
2
e−(2γ+r)(T−t)
]
=−
[
1
2λ
+
γAt
λ
+
γ2A2t
2λ
]
(A.16)
G˙t(b)− rGt(b) =e−r(T−t)b
[
r + e−(γ+r)(T−t)
λ(γ + r)
− b
2λ
e−r(T−t) − 1
2
σ2
]
=e−r(T−t)b
[
1
λ
+
γAt
λ
− b
2λ
e−r(T−t) − 1
2
σ2
]
(A.17)
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Hence using the short notation fy for the partial derivatives of f with respect to y
we get
1
2λ
(1 + γfx2 + fx1x1)
2 − (1 + γfx2)x2
+
1
2
σ2
(
fx1x1x
2
1 + f˜x2x2γ
2 + 2fx1x2x1γ
)
+ ft − rf˜
=
1
2λ
(
1 + γAt − be−r(T−t)
)2 − x2 (1 + γAt)
+
1
2
σ2be−r(T−t) − br(d+ log (x1))e−r(T−t) + A˙tx2 + C˙t + G˙t(b)
− r [−b(d+ log (x1))e−r(T−t) + Atx2 + Ct +Gt(b)]
=
1
2λ
(
1 + γAt − be−r(T−t)
)2
+ (A˙t − (γ + r)At − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
)x2
+
1
2
σ2be−r(T−t) + C˙t − rCt + G˙t(b)− rGt(b)
=
1
2λ
(
1 + 2
(
γAt − be−r(T−t) − γAtbe−r(T−t)
)
+ γ2A2t + b
2e−2r(T−t)
)
+
1
2
σ2be−r(T−t) + C˙t − rCt + G˙t(b)− rGt(b)
=−e−r(T−t)b
[
1
λ
+
γAt
λ
− b
2λ
e−r(T−t) − 1
2
σ2
]
+ G˙t(b)− rGt(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
1
2λ
+
γAt
λ
+
γ2A2t
2λ
+ C˙t − rCt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=0 (A.18)

Corollary A1.2.2 Without discounting and no learning (i.e. r = γ = 0) the above
PDE is given by
0 =
1
2λ
(
1 +
∂
∂x1
V (t, x1, x2)x1
)2
− x2 + 1
2
∂2
∂x21
V (t, xx, x2)x
2
1σ
2 +
∂
∂t
V (t, x1, x2)
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and its solution is
V (t, x1, x2) =a+ b log x1 − (T − t)x2 + 1
2λ
(T − t)
+
b
λ
(T − t) + b
2
2λ
(T − t)− bσ
2
2
(T − t)
Proof:
Just set r, γ = 0 and note that limr→0 1r (1− er) = −r.

A1.3 Formulas to Chapter 4
pie =P(e ≥ η)E(ξ|e ≥ η) + P(θ ≤ e ≤ η)K + P(e ≤ θ)E(ψ|e ≤ θ)
=
∫
R
ξ(x)dP(x ∩ {x ≥ η}) + P(θ ≤ e ≤ η)K +
∫
R
ψ(x)dP(x ∩ {x ≤ θ}) (A.19)
Epi2 =
1
(1 + a2λ)2
(
(1− φ(η))(a2λpie + aλk)2 − 2(a2λpie + aλk)aλ
∫ ∞
η
xϕ(x)dx
+ a2λ2
∫ ∞
η
x2ϕ(x)dx
)
+ (φ(η)− φ(θ))K2
+
1
(1 + a2λ)2
(
φ(θ)(a2λpie + aλk − b)2 − 2(a2λpie + aλk − b)aλ
∫ θ
−∞
xϕ(x)dx
+ a2λ2
∫ θ
−∞
x2ϕ(x)dx
)
(A.20)
with φ and ϕ being the shocks distribution and density function respectively!
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E (pi −K)+ =P(e < θ)E(ψ −K|e < θ)
=P(e < θ)(
a2λpie + aλk − b
1 + a2λ
−K)− aλ
1 + a2λ
∫ θ
−∞
xϕ(x)dx
=φ(θ)(
a2λpie + aλk − b
1 + a2λ
−K)− aλ
1 + a2λ
∫ θ
−∞
xϕ(x)dx (A.21)
E(a(pi − pie) + e− k)2 =
P(η ≤ e)
(1 + a2λ)2
(
(k + apie)2 − 2(k + apie)E(e|η ≤ e) + E(e2|η ≤ e))
+P(θ ≤ e ≤ η) (aK − apie − k)2 + 2(aK − apie − k)E(e|θ ≤ η) + E(e2|θ ≤ e ≤ η)
+
P(θ ≥ e)
(1 + a2λ)2
(
(k + apie + ab)2 − 2(k + apie + ab)E(e|θ ≥ e) + E(e2|θ ≥ e))
1
(1 + a2λ)2
(
(1− φ(η))(k + apie)2 − 2(k + apie)
∫ ∞
η
xϕ(x)dx+
∫ ∞
η
x2ϕ(x)dx
)
+(φ(η)− φ(θ))(aK − apie − k)2 + 2(aK − apie − k)
∫ η
θ
xϕ(x)dx+
∫ η
θ
x2ϕ(x)dx
+
1
(1 + a2λ)2
(
φ(θ)(k + apie + ab)2 − 2(k + apie + ab)
∫ θ
−∞
xϕ(x)dx+
∫ θ
−∞
x2ϕ(x)dx
)
(A.22)
with φ and ϕ being the shocks distribution and density function respectively!
Proof:
First note
(a(ξ − pie) + e− k)2 = 1
(1 + a2λ)2
(
(k + apie)2 − 2(k + apie)e+ e2)
(a(K − pie) + e− k)2 =(aK − apie − k)2 + 2(aK − apie − k)e+ e2
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and
(a(ψ − pie) + e− k)2 = 1
(1 + a2λ)2
(
(k + apie + ab)2 − 2(k + apie + ab)e+ e2)
Hence
E(a(pi − pie) + e− k)2 =P(η ≤ e)E ((a(ξ − pie) + e− k)2|η ≤ e)
+ P(θ ≤ e ≤ η)E ((a(K − pie) + e− k)2|θ ≤ e ≤ θ)
+ P(θ ≥ e)E ((a(ψ − pie) + e− k)2|θ ≥ e)

A1.4 Results to Chapter 4
Formulas under normal distribution
Lemma A1.4.1 let X ∼ N (µ, σ2) and θ ≤ η ∈ R then:
P(θ ≤ X ≤ η) =φ
(
η − µ
σ
)
− φ
(
θ − µ
σ
)
E(X|θ ≤ X ≤ η) = σ√
2pi
e−
(θ−µ)2
2σ2 − e− (η−µ)
2
2σ2
φ
(
η−µ
σ
)− φ ( θ−µ
σ
) + µ
E(X2|θ ≤ X ≤ η) = σ√
2pi
θe−
(θ−µ)2
2σ2 − ηe− (η−µ)
2
2σ2
φ
(
η−µ
σ
)− φ ( θ−µ
σ
) + σ2
+
µσ√
2pi
e−
(θ−µ)2
2σ2 − e− (η−µ)
2
2σ2
φ
(
η−µ
σ
)− φ ( θ−µ
σ
) + µ2
where φ denotes the distribution function of a standard normal distribution.
The proof of this can be found under Proofs. However from this Lemma it follows
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Corollary A1.4.2 Let the shock e ∼ N (0, σ2). Then
Epi =
1
1 + a2λ
[(
1− φ
(η
σ
))
(a2λpie + aλk)− aλσe
− η2
2σ2√
2pi
]
+
(
φ
(η
σ
)
− φ
(
θ
σ
))
K
+
1
1 + a2λ
[
φ
(
θ
σ
)
(a2λpie + aλk − b) + aλσe
− θ2
2σ2√
2pi
]
(A.23)
Epi2 =
1
(1 + a2λ)2
[(
1− φ
(η
σ
))
((a2λpie + aλk)2 + a2λ2σ2)
− 2(a2λpie + aλk)aλ σ√
2pi
e−
η2
2σ2 + a2λ2
ση√
2pi
e−
η2
2σ2
]
+
(
φ
(η
σ
)
)− φ
(
θ
σ
))
K2
+
1
(1 + a2λ)2
[
φ
(
θ
σ
)
((a2λpie + aλk − b)2 + a2λ2σ2)
+ 2(a2λpie + aλk − b)aλ σ√
2pi
e−
θ2
2σ2 − a2λ2 σθ√
2pi
e−
θ2
2σ2
]
(A.24)
E((pi −K)+) =P(e < θ)E(ψ −K|e < θ)
=φ
(
θ
σ
)(
a2λpie + aλk − b
1 + a2λ
−K
)
+
aλ
1 + a2λ
1√
2pi
σe−
θ2
2σ2 (A.25)
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E(a(pi − pie) + e− k)2 =
1
(1 + a2λ)2
((
1− φ
(η
σ
)) (
(k + apie)2 + σ2
)
+
η − 2(k + apie)√
2pi
σe−
η2
2σ2
)
+
(
φ
(η
σ
)
− φ
(
θ
σ
))(
(aK − apie − k)2 + σ2)
+
σ√
2pi
(
2(aK − apie − k)
(
e−
θ2
2σ2 − e− η
2
2σ2
)
+
(
θe−
θ2
2σ2 − ηe− η
2
2σ2
))
+
1
(1 + a2λ)2
(
φ
(
θ
σ
)(
(k + apie + ab)2 + σ2
)− θ − 2(k + apie + ab)√
2pi
σe−
θ2
2σ2
)
(A.26)
About the Lambert function
Lemma A1.4.3 1. The Lambert function has no real solution on the interval
(−∞,−e1).
2. The Lambert function is injective on [0,∞) ∩ {−e−1} and W(a) ≥ 0 ∀a ≥ 0
with equality for a = 0.
3. There are two negative solutions on the interval (−e−1, 0) - if nothing else is
said, as it is standard, we will always mean the greater solution when we write
W(a) with a ∈ (−e−1, 0).
4. For any a ≥ −e−1 we have a = W(a)eW(a).
5. For every a ∈ R there is a solution to W (aea) ≥ a, with equality for all a ≥ −1.
For a < −1 equality does not hold any more due to our convention to choose
the greater solution when we write W (a) with a ∈ (−e−1, 0).
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6. The derivative of the Lambert function with respect to its argument is given by
∂W(x)
∂x
= W(x)
x(1+W(x))
Corollary A1.4.4
W(x)
1 + c
−W
(
x
1 + c
e−
cW(x)
1+c
)
= 0 ∀x ≥ −1
Proof:
By the above Lemma x = W(x)eW(x) holds true. This is equivalent to
W(x)
1 + c
e
W(x)
1+c =
x
1 + c
e−
cW(x)
1+c ⇔ W(x)
1 + c
= W
(
x
1 + c
e−
cW(x)
1+c
)

Appendix A2
Proofs
A2.1 Proofs to Chapter 2
Proof (of Lemma 2.3.1):
We only prove the the statement for c2n. An analogue argument applies for the other
cases. The result is clear for n = 0. So let’s assume it holds true for some n. Then
c2n+2 =c
′
2n+1(p− q) + q = (c2n(p′ − q′) + q′) (p− q) + q
=c(p− q)(p′ − q′) + (c0 − c)(p− q)n+1(p′ − q′)n+1 + q′(p− q) + q
=
q + (p− q)q′
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) + (q + (p− q)q
′) + (c0 − c)(p− q)n+1(p′ − q′)n+1
=
q + (p− q)q′
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) + (c0 − c)(p− q)
n+1(p′ − q′)n+1

Proof (of Lemma 2.3.2):
177
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N∑
n=0
(
1(
1 + r
N
))n = 1−
(
1
1+ r
N
)N+1
1− 1
1+ r
N
=
(
1 +
r
N
) 1− ( 1
1+ r
N
)N+1
1 + r
N
− 1
=
N
r
[(
1 +
r
N
)
−
(
1
1 + r
N
)N]
=1 +
N
r
(
1−
(
1 +
r
N
)−N)
Hence
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=0
1
(1 + r
N
)n
= lim
N→∞
1
N
+
1
r
(
1− (1 + r
N
)−N
)
=
1
r
(1− e−r)
To proof the second statement it suffices to show that
lim
N→∞
N∑
n=0
(
y
(1 + r
N
)2
)n
<∞
So
N∑
n=0
(
y(
1 + r
N
)2
)n
=
1−
(
y
(1+ rN )
2
)N+1
1− y
(1+ rN )
2
=
(
1 +
r
N
)2 1− ( y(1+ rN )2
)N+1
(
1 + r
N
)2 − y
=
N2
(N + r)2 − yN2
((
1 +
r
N
)2
− yN+1
((
1 +
r
N
)N)−2)
Obviously this converges to 1
1−y for |y| < 1, which is finite.

Proof (Correct Proof For (2.2)):
We have seen
cn+2 =q + (p− q)(q′ + (p′ − q′)cn)
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Hence for k ∈ N we get
cn+2k =q + (p− q)(q′ + (p′ − q′)[q + (p− q)(q′ + (p′ − q′)[
. . . (q′ + (p′ − q′)cn) . . . ])])
=q
k−1∑
i=0
((p− q)(p′ − q′))i
+ (p− q)q′
k−1∑
i=0
((p− q)(p′ − q′))i + ((p− q)(p′ − q′))kcn
=(q + q′(p− q))
k−1∑
i=0
((p− q)(p′ − q′))i + ((p− q)(p′ − q′))k
∗
=(q + q′(p− q))1− ((p− q)(p
′ − q′))k
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) + ((p− q)(p
′ − q′))kcn
k→∞−→ q + q
′(p− q)
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′)
where ∗ such as the last convergence is true by the assumption that −1 < (p−q)(p′−
q′) < 1 holds. It it is easy to check that the very same can be done for c′. Hence we
are done.

A2.2 Proofs to Chapter 4
Proof (of Corollary 4.3.4):
Since pie = Epi∗ by definition of rational expectation it is obvious that pi∗ = pie in
a purely deterministic setup. The rest is a direct consequence of Corollary 4.3.2:
Suppose pie = aλk − x for some x ≥ 0 and K is such that aλk ≤ K. Then
ξ =
a2λ(aλk − x) + aλk
1 + a2λ
= aλk − a
2λx
1 + a2λ
≤ aλk ≤ K
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By Corollary 4.3.2 we know the optimal pi∗ is given by
ξ = aλk +
a2λx
1 + a2λ
Since a, λ > 0 this is equal to pie if and only if x = 0. Next suppose pie = aλk− b+ x
and K is such that K ≤ aλk. Then
ψ =
a2λ(aλk − b+ x) + aλk − b
1 + a2λ
= aλk − b+ a
2λx
1 + a2λ
≥ aλk − b ≥ K
Again by Corollary 4.3.2 we know the optimal pi∗ is given by
ψ = aλk − b− a
2λx
1 + a2λ
which (by the same arguments as above) is equal to pie if and only if x = 0. Finally
suppose K is such that aλk− b ≤ K ≤ aλk then Corollary 4.3.2 tells us pi∗ = K and
therefore pie = K.

Proof (of Corollary 4.5.1):
If P ≥ e−rM (aλk −K) the price exceeds the discounted payoff and Agents have
no incentive to buy any of the ILCs. Hence N = b = 0 and Remark 4.4 applies telling
us pie = aλk.
If P ≤ e−rM (aλk − K) then by (4.9) we know b = aλk − K − erMP and hence
since the price P is never negative we always have
aλk − b = K + erMP ≥ K
and therefore by Corollary 4.3.4 we know pie = aλk − b = K + erMP .

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Proof (of Lemma 4.6.5):
The first statement is just a repetition of Lemma 4.3.1. To prove the second one
let’s keep in mind the following:
V2 ≤ V1 with V2 = V1 ∀pi ≤ K
V3 ≤ V1 with V3 = V1 ∀pi ≥ K
and we have
V3 < V2 ∀pi < K ; V3 > V2 ∀pi > K ; V3 = V2 for pi = K
Furthermore ξ is given as usual while by the above remark V3 has a local minimum
at
ψ = ξ +W
(−beK−ξ
1 + a2λ
)
Hence suppose ψ ≥ K and V3(ψ) ≤ V3(K) then obviously V1 is minimal in ψ on
the interval [K,∞). However since ξ ≥ ψ we also know V1(pi) = V2(pi) ≥ V2(K) =
V1(K) ∀pi ≤ K and therefore V1 is minimal in ψ for the whole range!

Proof (of Corollary 4.6.8):
The first equation should be clear by the first statement in Lemma 4.6.5. To show
the third one we make extensively use of point 4 in Lemma A1.4.3. First let us note
the following:
ψ (pie = K) =ξ (pie = K) +W
(−beK−ξ(pie=K)
1 + a2λ
)
=
a2λK − aλk
1 + a2λ
+W
( −b
1 + a2λ
e
K−aλk
1+a2λ
)
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and rational expectation is given by
pie =aλk +W
(−beK−aλk)
The existence of both expressions is ensured by the assumption K ≤ aλk − b since
−b
1+a2λ
e
K−aλk
1+a2λ ≥ −b
1+a2λ
e
−b
1+a2λ and by Lemma A1.4.3 we know everything greater than
the right hand side is always in the domain of W.
To show that the second expression represents rational expectation just see the
following:
ψ
(
pie = aλk +W
(−beK−aλk))
=
a2λ
(
aλk +W
(−beK−aλk))+ aλk
1 + a2λ
+W
(
−b
1 + a2λ
e
K−
a2λ(aλk+W(−beK−aλk)+aλk)
1+a2λ
)
= aλk +
a2λW
(−beK−aλk)
1 + a2λ
+W
(
−b
1 + a2λ
e
K−aλk−
a2λW(−beK−aλk)
1+a2λ
)
= aλk +W
(−beK−aλk)+W(−beK−aλk
1 + a2λ
e
−
a2λW(−beK−aλk)
1+a2λ
)
− W
(−beK−aλk)
1 + a2λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by Corollary A1.4.4
And it is an easy exercise to show that under the assumption b ≤ 1 and forK = aλk−b
we have ψ(pie = K) = K holds. Next we need to show two things:
• If private agents choose to believe in K - i.e. pie = K, then the central bank is
better off choosing ψ(pie = K).
• If private agents choose to believe in ψ - i.e. pie = ψ(pie = ψ), then the central
bank is also better off choosing ψ.
For the first point let us consider
G(K) :=V3(pi
e = K, pi = ψ(pie = K))− V3(pie = K, pi = K)
=
1
2
λ (a(ψ(pie = K)−K)− k)2 + 1
2
ψ(pie = K)2 − 1
2
K2 − 1
2
λk2 + b
(
1− eK−ψ(pie=K))
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We are done if we can show G(K) ≤ 0 for all K ≤ aλk − b. Since
ψ
(
pie = aλk +W
(−beK−aλk)) = ψ (pie = aλk − b) = ψ (pie = K)) = K for K = aλk − b
it is easily seen that G(K = aλk−b) = 0. To show that G(K) < 0 for all K < aλk−b
we form the derivative and show that it is positive on the interval (−∞, aλk − b):
∂G(K)
∂K
=
aλk −K
1 + a2λ
+W
(
−beaλk−K1+a2λ
1 + a2λ
)
By our assumption K ≤ aλk − b. Hence
K − aλk
1 + a2λ
e
K−aλk
1+a2λ ≤ −b
1 + a2λ
e
K−aλk
1+a2λ ⇒ K − aλk
1 + a2λ
≤W
( −b
1 + a2λ
e
K−aλk
1+a2λ
)
⇒ 0 ≤aλk −K
1 + a2λ
+W
( −b
1 + a2λ
e
K−aλk
1+a2λ
)
One can compute
∂H(K)
∂K
=− (1 + a
2λ)(aλk −K) + (a2λ+ aλk −K + 1 +W (−beK−aλk))W (−beK−aλk)
1 +W (−beK−aλk)
and
∂2H(K)
∂K2
=
(2 + a2λ (1 + aλk −K))W (−beK−aλk)+ (1 + a2λ)(1 +W (−beK−aλk)2)
(1 +W (−beK−aλk))3
One can show that the roots of ∂H(K)
∂K
are given by aλk − b and aλk − log(b) +
log(1 + a2λ) − (1 + a2λ). However we should note that the latter is relevant only if
−1 < a2λ < 0, what is not the case for us - this is because of point 4 in Lemma
A1.4.3. Hence the only candidate for an extreme point for H is K = aλk − b. On
the other hand it is straight forward to check that H(K = aλk − b) = 0. Therefore
we are done if we can show that K = aλk − b is a local minimum. However this can
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be done by showing that the second derivative of H is always positive:
∂2H(K = aλk − b)
∂K2
=
(1 + a2λ)(1 + b2)− (2 + a2λ(1 + b)) b
(1− b)3
=
1 + b2 + a2λ+ a2λb2 − 2b− a2λb− a2λb2
(1− b)3
=
(1 + b)(1− b) + a2λ(1− b)
(1− b)3 =
1 + a2λ+ b
(1− b)2 ≥ 0

Proof (of Lemma A1.4.1):
The density function of X is given by ϕ(x) = 1√
2piσ
exp
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
. Hence
P(θ ≥ X ≤ η) = 1√
2piσ
∫ η
θ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx =
1√
2pi
∫ η−µ
σ
θ−µ
σ
e−
x2
2 dx
The density function of X given one knows θ ≤ X ≤ η is given by
ϕ˜(x) =
ϕ(x)
P(θ ≤ X ≤ η) =
1
φ
(
η−µ
σ
)− φ ( θ−µ
σ
) 1√
2piσ
e
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
; if θ ≤ X ≤ η
ϕ˜(x) =0 ; else
Hence we can write
E(Xn|θ ≤ X ≤ η) =
∫ η
θ
xnϕ˜(x)dx =
1
φ
(
η−µ
σ
)− φ ( θ−µ
σ
) 1√
2piσ
∫ η
θ
xne
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
dx
Obviously ∂
∂x
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 = µ−x
σ2
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
and therefore∫ η
θ
xne−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx =
∫ η
θ
xn−1xe
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
dx
=− σ2
∫ η
θ
xn−1
∂
∂x
e
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
dx+ µ
∫ η
θ
xn−1e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx
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Hence for n = 1 and by the first result we get∫ η
θ
xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx = σ2
(
e−
(θ−µ)2
2σ2 − e− (η−µ)
2
2σ2
)
+
√
2piσµ
(
φ
(
η − µ
σ
)
− φ
(
θ − µ
σ
))
and for n = 2 we get∫ η
θ
x2e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx =− σ2
∫ η
θ
x
∂
∂x
e
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
dx+ µ
∫ η
θ
xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx
=µσ2
(
e−
(θ−µ)2
2σ2 − e− (η−µ)
2
2σ2
)
+
√
2piσµ2
(
φ
(
η − µ
σ
)
− φ
(
θ − µ
σ
))
+ σ2
(
θe−
(θ−µ)2
2σ2 − ηe− (η−µ)
2
2σ2
)
+
√
2piσ3
(
φ
(
η − µ
σ
)
− φ
(
θ − µ
σ
))
Now the assertion is easily obtained by multiplying the coefficient of (A.19) and
(A.20) with the two last results.

Index
Bounded Rationality, 36
Calvo
Calvo model, 14
Central Limit Theorem, 29
functional, 29
Cost function, see Loss function
costly price adjustment, 13
Deflation, 4
Discretion, 58
Disinflation, 4
Donsker’s invariance principle
seefunctional Central Limit Theorem,
29
equilibrium
Nash, 43
strict, 43
Expectation
adaptive, 34
rational, 35
static, 34
stochastic, 32
conditional, 32, 33
tower property, 32
Filter
Kalman, 38
Kalman Bucy, 39
filtration, 33
game
prisoner’s dilemma, 44
games
asymmetric, 43
cooperative, 44
evolutionary, 45
symmetric, 43
ILB, see Inflation Linked Bond
ILC, 113
ILFC, see Inflation Linked Forward Con-
tract
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Index 187
Inflation
Indexed Forward Contract, see Infla-
tion Linked Forward Contract
Core, 8, 10
Indexed Bond, see Inflation Linked Bond
intuitive definition, 3
Linked Bond, 73
Linked Forward Contract, 74
rate
accumulated, 3
actual, 3
average, 4
Lambert function, 137, 175
Learning
adaptive, see adaptive Expectation
Loss function
linear, 58
quadratic, 22, 112
with short ILC, 117, 117, 123, 135,
139, 144, 145
Lucas
aggregate supply function, 19
critique, 35
Martingale, 33
Mean
stochastic, see Expectation
NAIRU, 9, 13
natural rate
of inflation, see core inflation
of output, see NAIRU
of unemployment, see NAIRU
Optimal Control
dynamic programming, 39
HJB, 39
Kuhn-Tucker, 39
Pontryagin, 39
Payoff
accumulated, 52, 52
discounted, 54
Hofbauer, 50
actual, 59
Matrix, 51, 58
Payoff matrix, 42
Phillips curve
expectation augmented, 18
Keynesian, 10
long run, 17
Monetaristi, 6
Index 188
New Keynesian, 13, 15
short run, 17
sifted, 18
triangle model, 11
Probability
conditional reaction, 48
unconditional, 49
Probability Measure
risk free, 95
Process, 27
continuous time, 27
discrete, 27
stochastic, 28, 31
ARIMA, 31
ARMA, 31
jump diffusion, 31
Leˆvy, 30
Poisson, 30
Wiener, 29
process
stochastic
Kolmogorov, 28
random sequence
Kolmogorov
seestochastic process, 28
Stagflation, 16
Strategy
genotypic, 50
mixed, 47, 50
phenotypic, 50
pure, 48
stochastic reaction, 48
strategy
mixed, 44
stochastic reaction, 44
triangle model, see Phillips curve - trian-
gle model
Utility function, see Loss function
Welfare function, see Loss function
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